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INTRODUCTION
This Article can be read as a response to a question a federal appel-
late judge asked me. During a clerkship interview, the judge inquired
about a course on my transcript subtitled "Queer Theory." I told him it
was a course on legal, political, and sociological theories of sexual orien-
tation and mapped some of its themes. He listened attentively, then
stated: "Actually, what I wanted to know was what the word 'queer'
means." Quick to rationalize authority, I assumed he knew what the word
meant, and was attempting to gauge the subtlety of my understanding of
it. So I responded: "My understanding is that it's a term once used in a
derogatory way towards homosexuals that has been co-opted by the gay-
rights movement, like the pink triangle."' I was about to continue, when
he interrupted: "What's the pink triangle?" A beat. I replied: "The pink
triangle was used by the Nazis during the Holocaust to designate homo-
sexuals." The judge said: "I didn't know that."
I knew that the judge recently had heard a controversial case consid-
ering whether gays should be accorded heightened scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore
assumed he had a certain modicum of cultural literacy about gays.2 My
* Law Clerk to judge Guido Calabresi, United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. J.D. Yale Law School, 1996. A previous version of this Article was part of a body of
work that was awarded the Theron Rockwell Field Prize by Yale University. I am indebted
to many people for their help throughout this project, including Bruce Ackerman, Akhil
Reed Amar, Peter Brooks, Guido Calabresi, Thomas B. Colby, Laura A. Dickinson, Glenn
C. Edwards, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Owen M. Fiss, Ryan Goodman, Rachel Harmon,
Melissa R. Hart, Katharine A. Huffnan, Neal Katyal, Harold Hongju Koh, Bob Newman,
Alison Peck, Richard A. Primus, Chris Sclafani Rhee, Jeannie Sclafani Rhee, William B.
Rubenstein, Shilpa S. Satoskar, Reva B. Siegel, and Tobias B. Wolff. Nestor M. Davidson
provided outstanding editorial assistance. All errors are mine.
1. Throughout this Article, I employ the words "gay" and "homosexual" to designate
those persons who have a significant sexual attachment to those of the same biological sex.
I do this for the sake of brevity, and intend the terms to include women as well as men.
Janet Halley's disclaimer is appropriate here:
In this Article I use the terms "homosexuality" and "homosexual-and more
tendentiously, the terms "heterosexuality" and "heterosexual"-without any
implication that they accurately describe any persons living or dead. As I try to
use them here, these terms describe rhetorical categories that have real, material
importance notwithstanding their failure to provide adequate descriptions of any
one of us.
Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v.
Hardwick, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1721, 1723 (1993).
2. This Article implicates three constitutional arguments for gay rights, but focuses on
one. The first derives from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As
part of "substantive due process," courts have considered a variety of privacy rights relating
1753HeinOnline  -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1753 1996
COLUMBIA LAW REVIWEW
immediate reaction to his question about the word "queer" was to inter-
pret it as a test given by a teacher. When he asked about the pink trian-
gle, I could no longer sustain the illusion. Like the thirteenth chime of
the clock that calls all that preceded it into question, the query forced me
to rethink the turns the conversation had taken.
I would not blame the reader who thought I was naive to be shocked
at this interchange. Judges constantly decide matters in which they are
inexpert, regulating identities, as this judge did in the gay Equal Protec-
tion case, without knowing the basics of those identities.3 My shock was
to: childrearing or education, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking
down statute requiring children to attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) (striking down statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages before eighth
grade); marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down miscegenation
statute); contraception, see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating
regulation that made contraceptives less available to unmarried than to married couples);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down law criminalizing use of
contraceptives by married persons); and abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(striking down statute prohibiting abortion). In 1986, the Supreme Court declined to
extend this line of cases to cover the right to engage in homosexual sodomy in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Both the pre- and post-Bowers legal literature on the
connection between privacy and homosexuality are voluminous. See, for example, the
sources cited in Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle, 92 Colum. L Rev. 1431,
1436 n.8 (pre-Bowers), 1434 n.7 (post-Bowers) (1992).
Since Bowers, gay-rights litigation has shifted toward the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment
The second and third arguments derive from Equal Protection analysis. Under the
"suspect classification" strand of Equal Protectionjurisprudence, courts recognize different
groups within society as meriting particular judicial protection from government-based
discrimination. Groups asking for protection are separated into three categories: those
requiring "strict" scrutiny (which requires that the government classification meet the
exceedingly difficult standard of being "necessary to promote a compelling governmental
interest," Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)), those requiring "intermediate"
scrutiny (which requires that the government classification "serve important government
objectives.., substantially related to ... those objectives," Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976)), and those requiring only "rational review" (which requires that the government
classification be "rationally related to a legitimate government interest," United States
Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973)). Classifications based on
homosexuality have thus far been analyzed under the "rational review" standard.
The second argument proposes that discrimination against gays constitutes
discrimination on the basis of sex and asks courts to apply the intermediate level of
scrutiny accorded sex-based classifications to classifications based on sexual orientation.
See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994) (arguing for holding discrimination against
gays to be sex discrimination). While this theory recently was adopted by the Hawaii State
Supreme Court in the groundbreaking case of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), it
has not been the primary battlefield of gay Equal Protection doctrine.
The third argument seeks to garner intermediate scrutiny for gays as gays. This Article
focuses on that argument Unless I indicate otherwise, I am referring to this argument
when I allude to the "Equal Protection argument for gays" or the "heightened scrutiny
argument for gays."
3. "Identity" is hard to define. One might question whether anyone knows the basics
of gay "identity" given the wide diversity of life experiences even among those who self-
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fueled, however, less by the judge's ignorance about gays than by the
thought that his ignorance of the pink triangle had pointed relevance to
the doctrinal analysis in the case he had just decided. One of the three
prongs of the heightened scrutiny inquiry mandated by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause asks whether the group in question has suffered a history of
discrimination. It struck me that the pink triangle responded directly to
this inquiry, as it symbolizes the persecution gays suffered during the
Holocaust, much in the way the yellow star stands as an emblem of the
persecution suffered byJews. More subtly, the pink triangle speaks to the
invisibility of gay history by rendering evident its invisible Holocaustal
moment much in the way that the symbol itself, during that moment,
rendered evident the invisible homosexual. I did not think it fanciful to
believe that knowledge of the pink triangle, laden as it is with such as-
sociations, might have changed the judge's doctrinal analysis.
This made me wonder about how the application of the other two
prongs of the Equal Protection Clause to gays might be enriched by other
gay symbols.4 Courts interpret the Equal Protection Clause to require a
three-prong inquiry to determine whether a group deserves heightened
scrutiny. That inquiry asks (1) whether the group has suffered a history
of discrimination, (2) whether the group is politically powerless, and (3)
whether the group is marked by an immutable characteristic.5 Just as the
identify as gay, a division that has become more evident as the political solidarity of gay
liberation in the 1970s has fragmented along gender, race, and other lines. See Steven
Seidman, Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some Historical and
Conceptual Notes, in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory 105,
117-27 (Michael Warner ed., 1993). When I use the words "gay identity" I mean nothing
more than the shared experience of having a sexual attachment to persons of the same sex
and the oppression experienced because of that attachment. Similarly, my use of the word
"movement" should not imply that this movement is unified other than in its resistance to
this oppression.
4. As used here, a symbol is a cultural sign that represents a referent that is not
present. It can be completely arbitrary relative to its referent (such as the operation
indicators of algebra or the pink triangle), have a cultural bond of signification (such as
the fifty stars of the American flag or the closet), or have a so-called "natural" bond of
signification (such as the dream symbols of psychoanalysis or the body). See Hanna F.
Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 95-96 (1967).
5. This test is based on the one outlined by the Supreme Court in Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986)). Not all courts
follow this (or any other) clear-cut test when they consider whether to grant a group
heightened scrutiny. To the contrary, courts often employ other forms of this test or
engage in a kind of gestalt reading without explicitly adverting to a test. Lower courts in the
gay context, however, have been remarkably (although not completely) consistent in
following this three-prong test. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir.
1988) (according gays heightened scrutiny), vacated and aff'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) (denying gays
heightened scrutiny); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984)
(same); Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. Ohio 1994)
(according gays heightened scrutiny), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and
remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1991) (same),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding
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first prong resonates with the pink triangle, the other two prongs reso-
nate with symbols common in the gay-rights movement. The political-
powerlessness prong implicates the symbol of the closet insofar as the
closet captures the invisibility and isolation that hinder gays in their polit-
ical mobilization. The immutability prong implicates the symbol of the
body insofar as the body traditionally has been a way of conceiving of
both immutability and sexual deviance. In all three instances, judicial
discussions of these prongs as applied to gays have not adverted to these
symbols.
In the near future, the United States Supreme Court is likely to con-
sider the argument that gays should receive heightened scrutiny. That
possibility assumes an added urgency because the argument ultimately
has been rejected by every circuit to confront the issue.6 The main pur-
pose of this Article is to strengthen the argument for heightened scrutiny
for gays by examining how these symbols-triangle, closet, body-pro-
vide a "thicker" response to the Equal Protection inquiry than has been
attempted under the conventional doctrinal framework.7
This kind of unconventional analysis necessarily raises the antece-
dent question of what counts as an argument in the law. In Part I, I ana-
lyze the resistance that occurs when "literary" arguments are made in the
law. After diagnosing the sources of that resistance, I contend that the
combination of the Equal Protection Clause and symbols should mitigate
it. Parts II through IV then consider each combination of prong and
symbol to show the work the symbols can do. When we consider whether
regulation did not survive rational review), rev'd sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc);Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (according
gays heightened scrutiny), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); High Tech Gays v. Defense
Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (same), rev'd, 895 F.2d
563 (9th Cir. 1990). Given this critical mass of precedent, a court considering heightened
scrutiny for gays likely will use some version of the three-prong test.
Courts have treated each prong as independent and necessary, with the failure to
satisfy any prong foreclosing the possibility of heightened scrutiny. For the most part, I
capitulate to this framework even where I disagree with it to keep my answer as consistent
as possible with the normative assumptions of the courts. Often, however, there are
implicit admissions by a court that each prong is neither independent nor required. The
three prongs often bleed into each other-for example, a finding of historical
discrimination may "trickle over" into a finding of political powerlessness. See infra notes
93-98 and accompanying text. Moreover, there is considerable debate as to whether
immutability is required for a finding of heightened scrutiny. See infra Part IV.
6. See cases cited supra note 5.
7. Let me be careful about what I am not saying. The fact that gays arrived at these
ways of understanding themselves as a political movement, independent of the Equal
Protection test, does not mean gays should be accorded heightened scrutiny. The way in
which a movement presents itself may be self-serving, and this presentation, even if not
directed at the Equal Protection test per se, cannot be a ground for granting or
withholding heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, this would
constitute exactly the special pleading that the use of an "objective" test is meant to
preclude. What I am arguing is that these symbols reflect truths that are directly responsive
to the test, but that the conventional use of the test may not capture.
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gays have suffered a history of discrimination, the analogy that the pink
triangle evokes between gays and Jews may drive home the nature of that
persecution. When we consider whether gays are politically powerless,
the closet may show how the gay community is divided by the closet door
in a way that makes political mobilization for gays a problem different
from what it may be for other disempowered groups. When we ask
whether homosexuality is immutable (and whether we care), the body
may enable us to think anew about how we conceive of both sexuality and
mutability, given that it often stands as a metonym for both. More gener-
ally, such an analysis may force us to revise our understandings of the
three prongs of the test itself, as the symbols engage them in unconven-
tional dialogue.8
I. DiscuRSrvE DISJUNCrION
In this Part, I first show how the assumption that "law coerces, while
literature only persuades" justifies the separation of law and literature,
and contend that this assumption does not always hold. I then argue that
the Equal Protection Clause and symbols present a strong case for sus-
pending that assumption and bridging the gap between the two fields.
A. Why Law and Literature?
An analysis of the impact of gay symbols on Equal Protection doctrine
arises from two distinct discourses-literature and law-thereby situating
this argument in the law-and-literature movement.9 Three views of the
relationship between law and literature are particularly relevant here.
8. The discourse surrounding whether gays should receive heightened scrutiny has
already enriched Equal Protection debates by raising hard questions about the meaning of
the three prongs. As Cass Sunstein has shown, the question of whether Bowers necessarily
forecloses heightened scrutiny for gays forces an examination of the role the history-of-
discrimination prong is meant to play. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the
Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1161, 1176 (1988). As Nan Hunter has noted, the ability of gays to be both
"discrete and insular" and "anonymous and diffuse" has forced a reconsideration of the
political-powerlessness prong. See Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 531, reprinted in Sex Wars 85, 97 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995).
Finally, asJanet Halley has shown, the "essentialist/constructivist" divide in gay studies has
advanced the debate about the meaning of the immutability prong. See Janet E. Halley,
Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from
Immutability, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 503, 506 (1994). These arguments and others are
strengthened when contextualized by the argument from symbol.
9. The law-and-literature movement dates back to the publication of James Boyd
White's The Legal Imagination in 1973. Robert Weisberg has subsequently divided the
movement into two branches, law-in-literature and law-as-literature, a distinction that has
been widely adopted. Law-in-literature considers literature about legal subjects (e.g.,
Kafka's The Trial, Camus's The Stranger, or Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird) and law about
literature (e.g., defamation, obscenity, or copyright). Law-as-literature considers the
applications of rhetoric and literary theory to the law. See Gretchen A. Craft, The
Persistence of Dread in Law and Literature, 102 Yale L.J. 521, 523-24 & nn. 6-7 (citing
Robert Weisberg, The Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YaleJ.L. & Human. 1, 36, 42 (1988)).
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The first, the "foundationalist" position, holds that law and literature
should be considered distinct because an immanent difference exists be-
tween the two enterprises: law coerces while literature persuades.
Although the sophisticated foundationalist position concedes that litera-
ture may affect the law indirectly by acting upon the human beings that
make and apply it, that position nonetheless asserts that literature should
have no direct role in legal argumentation. I focus on Richard Posner as
one of the most prominent defenders of such sophisticated foundational-
ism. 10 The second view rejects the proposition that an immanent distinc-
tion exists between law and literature, and blurs the boundary between
the categories altogether. In launching his critique of Posner, Stanley
Fish argues that the schism between law and literature is made rather
than given. His critique invites radical permutations, and opens itself in
turn to the charge of fostering anarchy. The third view can be seen as an
uneasy compromise between the first two. It accepts that there is no im-
manent distinction between law and literature, but rejects the idea that
there is therefore no useful distinction between the two fields. Owen Fiss
champions this view.
1. Foundationalist Thesis. -Judge Posner, with refreshing brio, posits
that "the study of literature has little to contribute to the interpretation of
statutes and constitutions but ... it has something, perhaps a great deal,
to contribute to the understanding and the improvement ofjudicial opin-
ions."'" According to Posner, this is because literature and law differ in
their effects-literature persuades, while law coerces. As Posner notes:
"The critic who interprets an ambiguous work of literature is not impos-
ing his view on anyone else; the court that interprets an ambiguous provi-
sion... is imposing its view on the rest of society, often with far-reaching
practical consequences."1 2 Law's distinctive violence makes it necessary
to quarantine the law away from other discourses. Insofar as legal actors
understand the foreseeable violence of their words, they are apt to be
more circumspect in the manner in which they deploy them.' 3 Those
who operate in other discourses may be less socialized to constrain them-
selves in this way, because their discourses are definitionally less coercive.
This Article considers the use of literature to respond to a legal inquiry and thus implicates
a third branch of the movement: literature-in-law.
10. I use the term "sophisticated foundationalism" to distinguish Posner's brand of
foundationalism from the "crude foundationalism" of, for example, Plato. See infra note
24.
11. Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1851,
1351 (1986).
12. Id. at 1373; see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601,
1608 (1986) (distinguishing law from literature on the basis of law's violence).
13. Within the law, subdistinctions may be made on the same basis, with more
coercive texts being more restrained than less coercive ones. For example, dissents often
seem to partake of a more "literary" quality than majority opinions. This distinction may
be explained by the fact that the dissenting judge knows she will not exert a directly
coercive effect on the parties before her, but that she is writing in a merely persuasive
capacity to convince judges in the future. I am indebted to Peter Brooks for this insight.
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Thus, free-wheeling literature may wreak havoc when allowed into the
more violent realm of the law.
On the other hand, Posner argues that lawyers may benefit by learn-
ing the "craft values" of great literature: "descriptive scrupulousness, con-
creteness, and complexity, which I mean to stand for an awareness of the
possibility of other perspectives than the writer's own." 14 In arguing for
such craft values, Posner notes that he makes a more limited version of
James Boyd White's exhortation to "lawyers and judges to be more sensi-
tive, candid, empathetic, imaginative, and humane."15 Literature may
cultivate in judges certain qualities that make them better human be-
ings.16 By doing so, it may have an indirect effect on the outcome of
cases, even if it cannot have a direct one.
One striking example of both of Posner's views about law and litera-
ture-that literature may indirectly influence law by plying its effects on
judges but that law and literature should nonetheless remain distinct-is
his own Plato-induced epiphany about homosexuality. In Sex and Reason,
Posner describes how he read the Symposium "to plug one of the many
embarrassing gaps in [his] education," 17 and how that experience
changed his views on homosexuality .
I knew [the Symposium] was about love, but that was all I knew. I
was surprised to discover that it was a defense, and as one can
imagine a highly interesting and articulate one, of homosexual
love. It had never occurred to me that the greatest figure in the
history of philosophy, or for that matter any respectable figure
in the history of thought, had attempted such a thing. It
dawned on me that the discussion of the topic in the opinions in
Bowers v. Hardwick. . . was superficial.18
We can be grateful for the conversion without surrendering concern
about how it was effected. The impetus for Posner reading the Symposium
is crucial and disturbing, for it shows on what a slender reed tolerance for
homosexuality can rest. Posner did not read the Symposium to expand his
views on homosexuality, but rather to "plug a gap" in his classical educa-
tion. It was not until he had to reconcile his conception of the canonical
status of "the greatest figure in the history of philosophy" with his concep-
tion of the non-canonical status of homosexuality that the latter
faltered.' 9
Posner's account underscores that while judges generally will not use
non-legal rhetoric, their determinations may be driven by subterranean
14. Posner, supra note 11, at 1388.
15. Id. at 1392 (citingJames B. White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of
Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1985)).
16. See id. at 1388.
17. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 1 (1992).
18. Id. (referring to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
19. See id.
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emotions, assumptions, mythologies, epics, and scriptures.20 At the same
time, Posner is careful to indicate that he can keep the literary and legal
aspects of his reasoning distinct. While Posner notes that reading the
Symposium reveals the majority opinion in Bowers to be "superficial,"2' he
is at pains to note that he would not necessarily have reached a different
decision.2 2 The Symposium speaks only to the literary qualities of the legal
text-here primarily its tone-and not to its doctrinal aspects. In such a
formulation, the effects of literature will necessarily be severely con-
scribed. Poets, to use Shelley's phrase, may be the unacknowledged legis-
lators of the world, but they only achieve this power by being the legisla-
tors of the unacknowledged world.23 The sophisticated foundationalist
concedes that judges are human and that literature will ply its effects on
them as human beings, but suppresses the literary from legal discourse.
2 4
This position thus precludes the Equal Protection argument from
symbols.
2. Antifoundationalist Antithesis. - The postmodem response to
foundationalism rejects the existence of an immanent distinction be-
tween law and literature by showing how the disciplinary distinction
drawn between the two fields is made rather than given. Stanley Fish,
responding to Posner, argues that while distinctions made between the
two disciplines are both real and consequential, "their reality and their
consequentiality are historical achievements-achievements fashioned
on the anvil of argument and debate-and that as historical achieve-
20. See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4-5
(1983) (showing that law is embedded in a normative world, or nomos, of which literature
is a constitutive part).
21. Posner, supra note 17, at 1.
22. See id. at 2.
23. See Percy Bysshe Shelley, A Defence of Poetry (1840), reprinted in Shelley's Prose
at 276, 297 (David L. Clark ed., corrected ed., 1966).
24. Posner's classical education, specifically that relating to Plato, may reveal itself in
more ways than one in this account, for the foundationalist distinction he draws between
law and literature is deeply akin to Plato's distinction between politics and poetics. In
Book III of The Republic, Socrates banishes the poet from the polls even as he praises the
poet as a "holy and wondrous and delightful creature." Plato, The Republic, Book III, at
398, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1961).
The apparent paradox between adulation for and banishment of the poet can be resolved
in that it is precisely because the poet is attractive that he is dangerous: in creating false
forms and making them appear true, the poet seduces his audience away from the proper
ideals of the state. Plato's distinction is foundational because it assumes both that there is
a "true" form and that poetry is at a further remove than politics from this true form, see,
for example, 1 I.M. Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines 13-14 (1962), thus
positing an immanent (and tautological) distinction between poetry and politics. Posner's
position is sophisticated foundationalism because it rejects Plato's definitive severance of
law from literature. Posner concedes that literature has a place, albeit a limited one, in the
law-he drives the poet underground rather than away. Yet what Posner advocates is
foundationalism nonetheless, merely a subtler permutation of "law coerces, while
literature persuades." Sophisticated foundationalism differs from crude foundationalism
only insofar as it legitimates a wider ambit for literature's persuasive effects.
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ments they can be undone in much the same way as they were
achieved."25 Under this formulation, the distinction Posner draws be-
tween coercive law and persuasive literature unravels (or can, if we undo
it). This unravelling resolves a number of tensions in the foundational
regime. First, it shows that laws are less coercive than they may seem. As
Fish notes, all acts are interpretive acts: "All shapes are interpretively pro-
duced, and since the conditions of interpretation are themselves unsta-
ble-the possibility of seeing something in a 'new light,' and therefore of
seeing a new something, is ever and unpredictably present."26 Seen this
way, the vision of a judicial act "beyond persuasion" is at best a deluded
fantasy, at worst a deliberate mystification.2 7 Whether we perceive it as
such, the judicial act is always an act of persuasion-the judge persuades
the bailiff to take the prisoner away, the judge persuades the warden to
carry out the sentence, the judge persuades the public not to riot in the
streets and free the prisoner. That we cannot see these as acts of persua-
sion does not mean that they are not persuasive acts, but that they are
deeply persuasive acts, acts that comprise "a discourse that has for histori-
cal reasons become associated with the presentation of truth."
28
Blurring the line between legal and literary discourse preserves the
viability of an argument from symbols, but perhaps at too great a cost.
25. Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally 298 (1989).
26. Id. at 302.
27. See Cover, supra note 12, at 1609 (arguing that violence ofjudicial acts is "in need
of no interpretation, no critic to reveal it").
28. Fish, supra note 25, at 298. The distinction between "coercive law" and
"persuasive literature" may be challenged from the literary side as well, for literature may
be more coercive than it seems. Fish adverts to the power of the canon, noting that a
powerful critic "can have a profound and direct effect on what gets taught in the schools,
what appears in the curriculum, what gains entrance into the canon, what gets published,
reviewed, anthologized, disseminated." Id. at 306. Through these effects, such a critic may
"have an effect on the very structure of a culture, its favored myths, storehouse of moral
values, modes of intellectual inquiry, etc." Id. Yet Fish notes that this constitutes only one
of the ways in which the conventional distinction between law and literature can be
contested. Id. Literature may have coercive effects that the law may never achieve, effects
necessarily predicated on the permeability of an individual mind to its demands and
blandishments, but more, rather than less, powerful for that. Most of us have at least one
totemic text that has insinuated itself into our consciousness. One of mine concerns the
coercive nature of literature itself. Upon reading Shakespeare's Sonnet 18, which
concludes with the lines:
So long as men can breathe or eyes can see
So long lives this, and this gives life to thee.
William Shakespeare, Sonnet 18, in The Complete Works 851 (Stanley Wells et al. eds.,
1986), I realized that I was complicit in carrying on the project of keeping the
apostrophized mistress's name alive. I was the breathing man, mine were the eyes that saw.
No one could call Shakespeare on his boast, because if the boast were empty, one would
not know of it. For me to know of the boast was to have fulfilled it, for any effort to cast the
lines away only inscribed them further into memory. It was an epiphany for me about the
strength of language that this prophecy was self-fulfilling, that it had been transmitted
from one reader to another, one editor to another, one publisher to another, so that the
poet's Renaissance sentiment could make its way ineradicably into my contemporary mind.
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The liberating premise that no immanent distinction exists between law
and literature may lead to the alarming conclusion that anything "counts"
as a legal argument. Fish refers to the notable omission of any mention
of the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement in Posner's piece as an
indication of a competing analysis that the piece needed to repress.
29
However, CLS threatens Fish as well because it articulates the more radi-
cal permutations of his stance. Roberto Unger's work is particularly perti-
nent to this debate, insofar as Unger uses the literary trope of "Negative
Capability" to attack foundationalism in law and other disciplines.30 By
"Negative Capability," Unger means the poetic capacity to remain open
to irrational elements, suspending the drive to reach rational conclu-
sions.3' Unger's argument is that this literary idea can reveal the false
necessity of foundational distinctions.32
If the price of foundationalism appears to be tautology, the price of
Ungerian anti-foundationalism appears to be anarchy. Foundational dis-
tinctions respond to the very real fear that poets can seduce us away from
rational political discourse. Unger eradicates those distinctions without
providing alternative defenses against that fear. While he explicitly states
that he does not advocate anarchy,33 Unger does not explain how what
he advocates differs from it. While we ask him to tell us what a world
without context might look like before we blithely tear down confining
yet stabilizing hierarchies, Unger's only response appears to be that we
cannot know what that world will look like because we constantly will be
recreating it.
34
3. Unstable Synthesis. - For those skeptical of Posner's and Unger's
conflicting stances, the challenge is to recuperate some distinction be-
tween law and literature without relying on an immanent distinction be-
tween them. Owen Fiss does precisely this when he states that the
"bounded objectivity of interpretation" is not "a secondary or parasitic
kind of objectivity."35 Indeed, Fiss argues: "Bounded objectivity is the
only kind of objectivity to which the law-or any interpretive activity-
ever aspires and the only one about which we care. To insist on more, to
search for the brooding omnipresence in the sky, is to create a false is-
sue."36 Fiss thus attempts to distinguish between the idea that no imma-
nent distinction exists and the idea that no valid distinction exists. To
concede the former, he argues, is not to concede the latter. Even if we
29. See Fish, supra note 25, at 307.
30. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory: Its Situation and It's Task 155-56
(1987) [hereinafter Unger, Social Theory]; Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity:
Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 277-312 (1987).
31. See sources cited supra note 30.
32. See Unger, Social Theory, supra note 30 at 156-57.
33. See id. at 154-55.
34. See id. at 159.
35. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739, 745-46 (1982).
86. Id. (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1916) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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must make, rather than detect, the distinction between law and literature
(for example) we still can make it well.
The case made in this Article proceeds from a Fiss-like theory, and at
a cautious pace. It makes no sweeping claims about what the relationship
between law and literature should be. Its modest ambition is to chart a
middle course between the equally false pieties of foundationalism and
anti-foundationalism by interrogating attempts to make or blur distinc-
tions between law and literature on a case-by-case basis.
B. Why Equal Protection and Symbols?
I have mapped the large and contested theoretical terrain on which
law and literature converse in part to situate the small and defensible plot
on which my argument takes place. While law and literature may veer
apart in many ways, using gay symbols to make an argument about gay
Equal Protection doctrine is a case in which they come quite close. On
the "legal" side, the Equal Protection Clause invites the use of the human-
ities. On the "literary" side, symbols evade many of the difficulties associ-
ated with other literary forms, and provide valuable insights into legal
doctrine.
1. Equal Protection Clause. - Any discussion of the Equal Protection
Clause necessarily implicates John Hart Ely's seminal theory of process-
based judicial review,3 7 which, in its turn, exfoliates the famous fourth
footnote of United States v. Carolene Products Co.38 While critics profess to
be confounded by the "puzzling persistence of this view,"3 9 I focus here
less on the puzzlement of the critics than on the persistence of the the-
ory. In other words, I evade the prescriptive debate about the merits of
the theory by brandishing the brute fact that the courts employ it. I take
it as axiomatic that the Carolene Products footnote, and the theory it de-
scribes, have worked their way into the consciousness of the American
37. See generallyJohn Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
38. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The footnote reads, in pertinent part:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious .... or national.... or racial minorities,
**. : whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
Id. (citations omitted).
39. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 Yale L.J. 1063, 1063-64 (1980) (noting how process-based theory of
constitutional law actually masks substantive decisionmaking); see also, e.g., Paul Brest,
The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative
Constitutional Scholarship, 90 Yale LJ. 1063, 1064-65 (1981) (noting that "process-
oriented strategies [are] covertly value-laden"); Lea Brilmayer, Caroene, Conflicts, and the
Fate of the "Inside-Outsider," 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1291, 1292 (1986) (arguing that Carolene
Products rhetoric concealed controversial assumptions).
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judiciary, and form the text or subtext of many decisions made under the
Equal Protection Clause.40
Ely's Carolene Products-inflected argument for judicial review (as sum-
marized by Bruce Ackerman) is as follows: democracies run on a theory
of minority acquiescence. Therefore, a minority group cannot expect to
win in many cases, even where it feels deeply wronged by the legislative
majority.41 On the other hand, no single minority block should lose con-
sistently. Majorities are not monolithic, but comprised of unstable coali-
tions of minorities fashioned through pluralistic bargaining. Thus, every
minority should have its day.4 If a minority loses consistently, the court
must determine whether that minority is disadvantaged in the bargaining
process. If the minority is found to be disadvantaged, then the court
should strike down the legislative determination of the majority.43 The
judiciary does so not on the basis of the fact that it disagrees with the
substance of the determination, but rather because it seeks to correct the
tainted process through which the majority arrived at that determination.
The genius of this formulation is that the court takes the processual high
ground as a referee rather than assuming the substantive low ground as a
player.4 Under Carolene, it is the legislature, not the court, that has cre-
ated the legitimacy deficit, and by correcting that deficit, the court pre-
serves, rather than breaks, faith with the majoritarian political process.45
Ely therefore touts the Carolene footnote as the lodestar that allows the
court to chart a course between the Scylla of clause-bound interpretivism
and the Charybdis of unconstrained countermajoritarian decision-
making.
46
This process-based theory ofjudicial review is built on the concept of
empathy failure. The Equal Protection Clause must shelter a particular
group because it suffers a disadvantage in the political bargaining pro-
cess. This disadvantage is empathy failure-the group's inability to make
40. Justice Powell noted that "the influence of Footnote 4 cannot be measured
accurately by simple enumeration of cases in which it has been cited." Lewis F. Powell,Jr.,
Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1982). Bruce Ackerman has
concluded that even when not cited explicitly, the footnote stands as ajustification for the
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislation burdening "suspect" classes. See Bruce A.
Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 716 n.5 (1985). But see Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action
and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 685, 691-97 (1991) (arguing
that, despite academic argument to the contrary, Carotene Products is not used frequently by
the Supreme Court).
41. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 719.
42. See id. at 720.
43. See id.
44. See id. The Carotene Products Court's processual justification for judicial review
may be seen as an attempt to evade the substantive due process arguments that had led to
its rout in Lochnerjurisprudence. See id. at 719.
45. See id. at 720.
46. See Ely, supra note 37, at 75-77 (discussing the way in which the three paragraphs
of footnote 4 reflect both roles for the Court).
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its claims sympathetic to potential bargaining partners. Where thejudici-
ary identifies such a failure of empathy, it has the right-indeed the obli-
gation-to intervene and correct the political process.
Critics are puzzled by the persistence of Carolene Products because
they find its ostensible movement away from substantive decision-making
a sham.47 They note that while the Carolene Products formulation presents
itself as processual, substantive values nevertheless secrete themselves in
the interstices of its inquiry.48 For example, in determining whether a
political process was "pure," the reviewing court must determine whether
other groups refuse to deal with a given minority out of principle or prej-
udice.49 Given that one person's principle is another's prejudice, the
court has to make a substantive determination as to which is involved.5 0
Ely's response to this criticism is that judges are relative outsiders to the
political system, and are more experienced in examining failures of pro-
cess.51 Therefore, they are more likely to be in a position to assess the
difference between principle and prejudice.52 While such determina-
tions are subjective, Ely argues, they are made at one remove from the
hurly-burly of legislative politics, and that distance may have a clarifying
effect.
53
Ely's response answers one question and begs others, namely, what
happens when the judge does not have this critical distance? What hap-
pens when the judge shares the exact prejudice that created empathy fail-
ure on the part of the legislator? While the judge may achieve certain
kinds of distance from the legislator, there is no reason to think that she
will not occasionally share the same blindness. And there's the rub: how
can a judge see a blindness she shares?
Judges interpreting the Equal Protection Clause have responded to
this problem by asking whether they themselves, rather than simply the
legislature, suffer from empathy failure for the group in question. They
have done so by crafting a three-prong test that forces judges to take a
sober second look at fundamentals of that group's identity. That second
47. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 39, at 1064-65 ("[I]t is not difficult to show that the
constitutional theme of perfecting the process of governmental decisionmaking is radically
indeterminate and fundamentally incomplete.").
48. See, e.g., id. ("The process theme by itself determines almost nothing unless its
presuppositions are specified, and its content supplemented, by a full theory of substantive
rights and values-the very sort of theory the process-perfecters are at such pains to
avoid.").
49. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 737.
50. See id.
51. See Ely, supra note 37, at 103.
52. See id. In City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 472-73
n.24 (1985),Justice Marshall provided another rationale for why judges are "well suited" to
the task of identifying "discrete and insular" minorities. He argued thatjudges, by virtue of
the "lessons of history and experience" that their profession has given them, have the best
guides for when "society is likely to stigmatize individuals as members of an inferior caste
or view them as not belonging to the community." Id.
53. See Ely, supra note 37, at 103.
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look attempts to diminish the possibility thatjudges will express the same
prejudice as the legislature by forcing them to come to terms with the
nature of the group. Through that engagement, judges are prompted to
interrogate their assumptions about the group in a way that the legisla-
ture is not.
That one of the purposes of the test is to inspire understanding on
the part of judges by forcing them to work exercises in empathy makes
literary understanding immediately relevant. For literature is nothing if
not such a source of empathetic imagining. Martha Nussbaum defends
"the literary imagination precisely because it seems.., an essential ingre-
dient of an ethical stance that asks us to concern ourselves with the good
of other people whose lives are distant from our own."54 As she notes,
"an ethics of impartial respect for human dignity will fail to engage real
human beings unless they are made capable of entering imaginatively
into the lives of distant others and to have emotions related to that
participation."55
2. Symbols. - While the Equal Protection Clause extends its invita-
tion to literature generally, it will be more receptive to some literary
genres than others-particularly the symbol. In order to show this, I con-
trast the symbol to the novel, which some commentators see as the liter-
ary form most able to evoke empathy.56 Nussbaum defends her focus on
novels in her discussion of empathy in public rationality by noting three
distinguishing characteristics of the novel-its imaginative, particularis-
tic, and emotional aspects. These virtues, however, can transmute into
their nearest vices, which, as formulated by Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry, are literature's untrue, unrepresentative, and non-analytic as-
pects.57 I knit together Nussbaum with Farber and Sherry to provide a
54. Martha Nussbaum, Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life xvi
(1995).
55. Id. The connection 'between the empathy required by the Carolene Products
analysis and that prompted by literary works has not gone unnoticed. In the gay context,
one federal court invoked the Carolene Products footnote as the text that "has set the tone
for the Supreme Court's consideration of all threats to the exercise of minorities'
constitutional rights." Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 209 n.24 (N.D. Cal.
1983). In the same analysis, it chided the magistrate judge whose decision it was reviewing
for failing to take seriously affidavits in which gay plaintiffs narrated their "experience with
'coming out of the closet,' in various professional and social settings." Id. The court noted
that these stories were relevant to the doctrinal inquiry mandated by the Equal Protection
Clause. Id.
56. As Richard Rorty notes:
The process of coming to see other human beings as "one of us" rather than as
"them" is a matter of detailed description of what unfamiliar people are like and
of redescription of what we ourselves are like. This is a task not for theory but for
genres such as ethnography, the journalist's report, the comic book, the
docudrama, and, especially, the novel.
Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity xvi (1989); see also Nussbaum, supra
note 54, at 5-10 (discussing the novel as a prime literary source of empathetic imagining).
57. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 807, 809 (1993).
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balanced portrait of the benefits and drawbacks of the novel as a medium
for empathy in the law. I then argue that while symbols retain many of
the benefits of the novel, they avoid many of its drawbacks.
In defending the novel, Nussbaum first argues that the fictional na-
ture of novels make them fields of greater possibility than history or biog-
raphy by relieving them from the constraints of reality:
Literary art, [Aristotle] said, is "more philosophical" than his-
tory, because history simply shows us "what happened," whereas
works of literary art show us "things such as might happen" in a
human life. In other words, history simply records what in fact
occurred, whether or not it represents a general possibility for
human lives. Literature focuses on the possible, inviting its
readers to wonder about themselves.
5 8
Politics is often described as the art of the possible. Nussbaum
points out that literature is the art of the possible as well, but in the oppo-
site sense. While politics emphasizes realistic possibility, literature em-
phasizes unrealistic possibility, by allowing us to inhabit other lives as if
they were our own.
Yet fiction's ability to project us beyond the actual into the possible
makes fiction a poor empirical base. As Farber and Sherry note:
The more fictionalized the story, however, the more trouble-
some its use as empirical evidence becomes. Relying on fiction
as evidence is rather like an episode recounted by Patricia Wil-
liams: "An image that comes to mind is that of movie starJessica
Lange, who testified to Congress about the condition of farms in
the United States because she had played a farmer's wife. What
on earth does 'testimony' mean in that context?" 59
Lange's performance in the film enacts a "possibility" rather than an actu-
ality; when we watch the film we do not believe that she is a farmer's wife,
but we are willing to suspend our disbelief and enter into the world in
which she is one. Whatjars about Lange's testimony in Congress is that
these very suspensions of reality-I am going to empathize with a
farmer's wife by watching a woman who I know is not a farmer's wife play
a farmer's wife-so commonplace in art, seem out of place in policymak-
ing. Here the ductility of stories, their ability to represent what is not true
as if it were, is cast as a form of "research fraud: doctoring data to fit your
thesis."
6 0
Nussbaum next points out that the novel is particular rather than
general, giving faces to forms that would otherwise remain abstract:
[Tihe novel is concrete to an extent generally unparalleled in
other narrative genres. It takes as its theme, we might say, the
interaction between general human aspirations and particular
58. Nussbaum, supra note 54, at 5 (footnote omitted).
59. Farber & Sherry, supra note 57, at 882 (quoting PatriciaJ. Williams, The Alchemy
of Race and Rights 30-31 (1991)).
60. Id. at 834.
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forms of social life that either enable or impede those aspira-
tions, shaping them powerfully in the process. Novels (at least
realist novels of the sort I shall consider) present persistent
forms of human need and desire realized in specific social
situations.6'
The novel is "concrete," "particular" and "specific." It draws us into a
protagonist's life. It does not seek to detach us as judges of a protago-
nist's claim, but gives us access to her felt experience.
But involvement in the particulars of an individual story may prevent
us from performing the necessary aggregation of interests essential to
public decisionmaking. As Farber and Sherry note:
[I]f the story is being used as the basis for recommending policy
changes, it should be typical of the experiences of those affected
by the policy. Owen Fiss has cogently argued that when the
Supreme Court "lays down a rule for a nation... [it] necessarily
must concern itself with the fate of millions of people .... Ac-
cordingly, the Court's perspective must be systematic, not anec-
dotal .... "6 2
The ability of stories to draw in a reader, to make them see things
through the lens of the protagonist, endangers a decisionmaker's ability
to weigh competing claims.63 Paul Gewirtz points out the nalvet6 of
privileging storytelling against conventional lawmaking by noting that sto-
ries inevitably contradict one another and that celebrating storytelling in
itself does not empower us to arbitrate fairly between them.64 The plural
of anecdote is not data.
Nussbaum's third defense of the novel is that its appeal to our emo-
tions allows it to disentrench traditionally held assumptions:
"[G]ood literature is disturbing in a way that history and social
science writing frequently are not. Because it summons power-
ful emotions, it disconcerts and puzzles. It inspires distrust of
conventional pieties and exacts a frequently painful confronta-
tion with one's own thoughts and intentions. One may be told
many things about people in one's own society and yet keep that
knowledge at a distance. Literary works that promote identifica-
tion and emotional reaction cut through those self-protective
stratagems, requiring us to see and to respond to many things
that may be difficult to confront-and they make this process
palatable by giving us pleasure in the very act of confrontation. 65
61. Nussbaum, supra note 54, at 7.
62. Farber & Sherry, supra note 57, at 838-39 (quoting Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All
Its Splendor, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 789, 802-03 (1990)).
63. See Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 1411, 1435 (1993)
("[T]here is a risk that emphasizing individual stories and stressing feelings can
undermine critical evaluation and analysis of contradictory claims."); see also Craft, supra
note 9, at 528 (1992) (noting that "unfiltered emotion, in case after case, would jade
observers' sympathy and distort even the attempt at impartiality").
64. See Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 Yale LJ. 1023, 1045 (1996).
65. Nussbaum, supra note 54, at 5-6.
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For many scholars, this aspect of literature contributes the most to legal
discourse. As Richard Delgado notes: "Stories, parables, chronicles, and
narratives are powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of
presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a
background of which legal and political discourse takes place.... Stories
can shatter complacency and challenge the status quo."66
An emotion, however, is not an argument. While those who tout the
effects of stories emphasize their ability to destabilize the status quo, they
often fail to note that their own move can often be perceived as equally
hegemonic. Farber and Sherry make up that lack:
Without reasoned arguments, neither understanding nor dia-
logue are likely to flourish. Robin West refers to the "unequivo-
cal shock of recognition" upon reading certain articles, and
Kathryn Abrams believes Patricia Williams' stories because they
"resonate" with her experiences. But for those readers who
neither resonate nor recognize, and for those who passionately
disagree, there is no way to enter the dialogue. Thus, as Gerald
Torres says, unless augmented by analysis, storytelling may
"function as an authoritarian conversation-ending move."67
Storytelling advocates often emphasize the exclusive aspects of rationality
as a mode of discourse that favors insiders. Yet the aesthetic response
that stories elicit is exclusive as well, winnowing those who respond from
those who do not, those who see from those who cannot. Moreover, as a
medium that requires emotive responses, literature may be less perme-
able to effort. As conventionally told, one can learn and replicate a logi-
cal argument, but one does not epiphanize one's way to an epiphany.
Nussbaum's impassioned defenses and Farber and Sherry's attacks
seem to present an impasse. The symbol, however, may provide a resolu-
tion because it captures many of the benefits of the novel without falling
prey to many of its drawbacks. First, truth-verification is not a problem
for symbols as it is for stories. The truth-verification concern relates to
whether the person's story is an accurate depiction of reality: Did my
anecdote about the appellate judge actually happen as I described it? Yet
when we question whether a symbol actually represents its referent, we
are not asking whether the person who propounded the symbol was "tell-
ing the truth" about it, because that person does not exist. Symbols are
definitionally the creations of communities rather than individuals:
"[t]he individual can devise signs for his own private needs; he cannot
make symbols." 68 While we can contest the misuse of symbols-as when,
66. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411, 2413-14 (1989); see also Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive
Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning, 87 Mich. L. Rev.
2225, 2228 (1989) ("[T]he highest use and greatest facility of narrative is as an
inconoclastic tool of persuasion to legal and social change.").
67. Farber & Sherry, supra note 57, at 851 (footnotes omitted).
68. Paul Tillich, The Religious Symbol, in Symbolism in Religion and Literature 75,
77 (Rollo May ed., 1960).
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for example, Susan Sontag resists warmaking metaphors as means of
describing disease 69 -the criticism in such cases is not that any individual
is fabricating a story, but rather that a group is engaging in a destructive
discourse.
Second, and relatedly, symbols are definitionally representative.
Symbols are "socially rooted and socially supported" in a way that individ-
ual stories are not; they are by their nature aggregations of desires and
meanings that exist within a community.70 Indeed, the symbol may sacri-
fice particularity in order to be representative. 71 Many symbols, such as
the American flag, derive their ability to draw together communities of
adherents precisely because they do not force believers to articulate what
it is about the symbol that draws them together.72 Such an articulation
doubtless would fracture an otherwise unified community, for the overde-
termined signifier of the flag accommodates both the nationalism of the
xenophobe (America is not like other countries) and the pluralism of the
liberal (America is like all other countries). The symbol subsumes plural
meanings in order to have plural appeal; 73 quite magically, however, this
apparent watering-down of meaning does not have a dilutive effect on
the power of the symbol, as the varied yet visceral voices raised against
flag-burning reveal. As Chief Justice Rehnquist has noted, many Ameri-
cans approach the flag "with an almost mystical reverence regardless of
what sort of social, political, or philosophical beliefs they may have."74
Whether symbols are more "analytic" than stories is a fascinating
question. On the one hand, symbols can be seen as communicating in a
direct and visceral way not associated with rational thought. There is an
"all-at-onceness" to the perception of the symbol that gives it a stronger
presence; as Abb6 Du Bos said: "We may say here, metaphorically speak-
ing, that the eye is nearer to the soul than the ear."75 This "all-at-once-
ness" reveals the fallacy underlying the First Amendment truism that
those who do not like a visual sign can avoid it "simply by averting their
eyes." 76 Once the viewer perceives a symbol, she cannot defeat its impact
simply by avoiding a second glance. This "all-at-onceness" is recognized
69. See Susan Sontag, AIDS and Its Metaphors 10-11 (1989).
70. See Tillich, supra note 68, at 76-77.
71. See David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power 11 (1988).
72. See id.
73. Symbols, at least visual symbols, may be comprehensible to all, without regard to
nationality or education, while "the curse of Babel works against poetry." Tzvetan
Todorov, Theories of the Symbol 131 (Catherine Porter trans., Cornell Univ. Press
1982) (1977). The symbol, therefore, is available for more widespread consumption.
74. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 429 (1989) (Rehnquist, Cj., dissenting).
75. Todorov, supra note 73, at 131 (quoting Abb6 Du Bos, Critical Reflections on
Poetry, Painting and Music (1719) (Thomas Nugent trans., 1978) (1719)).
76. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
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by cases in which symbols are characterized as immediate incitements to
action.
77
Yet this aspect of symbols is not implicated by Farber and Sherry's
critique about the non-analytic nature of the story, which argues that only
those predisposed to have an emotional response would be affected by it.
While symbols may be shibboleths that exclude others, they are generally
more accessible than stories, precisely because they need to be public
signifiers in order to accomplish their purpose. In describing the AIDS
logo, the slogan SILENCE=DEATH under a pink triangle, Douglas Crimp
and Adam Ralston note that:
[I]t is not merely what SILENCE=DEATH says, but also how it
looks, that gives it its particular force. The power of this equa-
tion under a triangle is the compression of its connotation into
a logo, a logo so striking that you ultimately have to ask, if you
don't already know, "What does that mean?" And it is the an-
swers we are constantly called upon to give to others-small,
everyday direct actions-that make SILENCE=DEATH signify
beyond a community of lesbian and gay cognoscenti. 78
The effectiveness of the symbol is thus predicated on the fact that people
expect to understand symbols, such that they will ask about those they do
not recognize. Because symbols are for public consumption, 79 for the
illiterate as well as the literate, for the masses as well as for the cogno-
scenti, their emotive aspect must be less exclusive.
It is for such reasons that Hannah Pitkin views political representa-
tion and symbolic representation as sharing the common goal of "making
present something which is not there," which is the root of the word repre-
sentation.80 This view allows us to see both animate persons and inani-
mate objects as representatives of certain communities. Thus Barney
Frank, a gay Congressman, and a pink triangle, a gay symbol, can both be
seen to "speak for" the gay community. Both are accountable to their
77. See, e.g., Anderson v. Vaughan, 327 F. Supp. 101, 106 (D. Conn. 1971) (Clarie,J.,
dissenting) (noting the inherently provocative nature of Ku Klux Klan, Nazi, and Viet
Cong flags); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 366 N.E.2d 347, 357 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977), rev'd in part, 373 N.E.2d 21 (IMI. 1978) ("[T]he tens of thousands of
Skokie'sJewish residents must feel gross revulsion for the swastika and would immediately
respond to the personally abusive epithets slung their way in the form of the defendants'
chosen symbol, the swastika.").
78. Douglas Crimp & Adam Rolston, AIDS Demo Graphics 14 (1990).
79. In the Skokie case, the Illinois Appellate Court drew a distinction between
uniforms and symbols, stating that the former were protected under the First Amendment
but the latter were not. See Village of Skokie, 366 N.E.2d, at 354. This part of the opinion,
later struck down by the state supreme court, would have allowed persons without swastikas
wearing Nazi storm trooper uniforms to march in a parade, but not those wearing the
swastika, even if not-wearing an SS uniform. The courtjustified this position by noting that
the symbol was more likely to incite violence than the uniform. See id. The court's
intuition was that symbols communicated an idea that could incite reaction much more
readily than a uniform. See id. at 354-57.
80. See Pitken, supra note 4, at 8-9, 226-27.
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constituencies-if either fails to "represent" that community, it is under-
stood that another "representative" will come and take their place. And it
is through this accountability that they attain their legitimacy. The best
reading of the Equal Protection Clause as a device meant to protect
against bias by forging an understanding of communal identity should
thus ask the judge to be open to that community's symbols. By defini-
tion, if a community is disempowered in the political bargaining process,
there will not be as many Barney Franks as there should be, and the
Barney Franks will not be heard on their issues. One alternative route to
discovering that identity is to look to its other representatives-its
symbols.
While the attempt here has been to question resistance to a merger
of doctrine and symbol at a high level of abstraction, that resistance can
be assailed at a more particular level-that of triangles, closets, and
bodies.
II. HISTORY OF DIsCmMrNATION AND THE PINK TRiANGLE
A. History of Discrimination
The first prong of the Equal Protection Clause test asks whether the
group in question has suffered a history of discrimination. While courts
have interpreted the second and third prongs to defeat the claims of the
gay community for heightened protection, every court to consider the
issue has concluded that gays satisfy the first one.81 This prong may thus
seem a strange place to start arguing that an examination of symbols
would permit a better legal understanding of gays. The consensus of the
courts seems to moot the issue-what more can gay-rights advocates ask
for than such clear wins?
A lot. First, while every court to engage in the inquiry has concluded
that gays have suffered a history of discrimination, many have not
reached the inquiry because they consider it pre-empted by Bowers v.
Hardwick.82 Given that this unwillingness to entertain a gay Equal Protec-
81. See, e.g., Equality Found. Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 436-37 (S.D.
Ohio 1994) (concluding that "gays, lesbians and bisexuals have suffered a history of
invidious discrimination based on their sexual orientation"), rev'd on other grounds, 54
F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996);Jantz v. Muc, 759
F. Supp. 1543, 1548-49 (D. Kan. 1991) ("Homosexuals in the United States have
historically been subjected to discrimination both pervasive in its scope and intense in its
impact."), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992); High Tech Gays v.
Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (N.D. Cal. 1987)
("Lesbians and gay men have been the object of some of the deepest prejudice and hatred
in American society."), rev'd on other grounds, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990).
82. See, e.g., Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1995)
("Bowers v. Hardwick and its progeny command that, as a matter of law, gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals cannot constitute either a 'suspect class' or a 'quasi-suspect class' ...."), vacated
and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n.3 (D.C. cir.
1994) (en banc) ("[I]f the government can criminalize homosexual conduct, a group that
is defined by reference to that conduct cannot constitute a 'suspect class' "); Ben-Shalom v.
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don claim may stem in part from anti-gay bias, these courts are perhaps
the ones most in need of this analysis. Second, many courts that do en-
gage in the historical inquiry treat it in a perfunctory manner, appearing
to check the mental "yes" box by the quesdon, "Has this group suffered
political persecution?" before going on to deny gays heightened scru-
tiny.83 The speed with which a court checks an uncontroversial box may
seem unproblematic, but such an approach runs counter to the spirit of
the inquiry mandated by the Equal Protection Clause, with serious practi-
cal consequences.
To understand how a perfunctory concession that gays have satisfied
the prong breaks faith with the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,
we must understand how the Equal Protection Clause test's use of history
differs from that of the law in general. Cass Sunstein notes that "in its
judicial interpretation, the [Due Process Clause] has frequently been un-
derstood as an effort to restrict short-term or shortsighted deviations
from widely held social norms; it has an important backward looking di-
mension."84 Sunstein shows that the Equal Protection Clause, in con-
trast, considers history for the purpose of determining whether to break
from it:
Since its inception, the Equal Protection Clause has served an
entirely different set of purposes from the Due Process Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause is emphatically not an effort to
protect traditionally held values against novel or short-term devi-
ations .... The clause is not backward-looking at all; it was self-
consciously designed to eliminate practices that existed at the
time of ratification and that were expected to endure.
... [T]he Equal Protection Clause is not rooted in common
law or status quo baselines, or in Anglo-American conventions.
The baseline is instead a principle of equality that operates as a
criticism of existing practice. The clause does not safeguard tra-
ditions; it protects against traditions, however long-standing and
deeply rooted.8 5
The Equal Protection Clause thus inverts the custom of adhering to the
past that the Due Process Clause in particular, and the law in general,
follow. For the variable of history, the strength of arguments made under
each of the Clauses will be inversely related-if a history of "discrimina-
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) ("If homosexual conduct may constitutionally be
criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled
to greater than rational basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes."); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("After Hardwick it cannot logically be
asserted that discrimination against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm."); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that reasoning in Bowers and precedent
in circuit "forecloses appellant's efforts to gain suspect class status for practicing
homosexuals").
83. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 573 (finding "history of discrimination" an
insufficient ground for application of heightened scrutiny).
84. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1171.
85. Id. at 1174.
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tion" is well-established, the Due Process claim will be weaker and the
Equal Protection claim will be stronger, and vice versa.
For our purposes, the most important difference between the two
uses of history is how each implicates the epistemology of the deci-
sionmaker. As conventionally told, judges often abdicate their own sub-
ject position in the face of the law.86 While this abdication may be seen
in judges' approaches to the law generally, it finds particular expression
in judicial attitudes toward history.87 Through this abdication, judges
often seem to dissolve as decisionmakers-it is the precedent that com-
mands a given result, not their own sentiments. This allows them to
evade accountability for their own views, even when those views depart
significantly from what is strictly required by precedent.88 Under
Sunstein's theory, the Due Process Clause is in harmony with the legal
tradition of following the past, and therefore with the tradition of the
judge whose subjective viewpoint disappears into the woodwork of doc-
trine.89 The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, makes that deci-
sionmaker sharply visible. It asks the judge whether the history of dis-
crimination suffered by a group indicates that it might suffer
incommensurate harms in the political bazaar. In making this determina-
tion, the judge must consider the mindset of the legislator to ascertain
whether the legislator experienced empathy failure in dealing with this
group. As noted earlier, that determination necessarily implicates the
mindset of the judge, for one is unlikely to see another's blindness if one
shares it.90
This focus on the judge's subject position implicit within the history
prong of the Equal Protection test places an additional burden on the
court to engage in a reflective, rather than a reflexive, response when
considering the claims of a group. In order to meet that burden, a court
should not be able simply to dismiss a claim as facetious. Nor should it be
able simply to "check a box," even in a way that is favorable to the group,
and move on. Rather, it should display some notion of the history exper-
ienced by the group, and an unwillingness to allow that history to con-
tinue by default. Considering the Equal Protection claims of illegitimate
children in Mathews v. Lucas, Justice Stevens noted in dissent that:
Because of that tradition of disfavor the Court should be espe-
cially vigilant in examining any classification which involves ille-
86. This axiom perhaps finds its most famous expression in Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803): "The government of the United States has been
emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."
87. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (opinion of
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,JJ.) (relying on stare decisis to uphold abortion rights).
88. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 993-94 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I suppose the Court is
entitled to call a 'central holding' whatever it wants to call a 'central holding'-which is,
come to think of it, perhaps one of the difficulties with this modified version of stare
decisis.").
89. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 1163.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
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gitimacy. For a traditional classification is more likely to be used
without pausing to consider its justification than is a newly cre-
ated classification. Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem
acceptable and natural to distinguish between male and female,
alien and citizen, legitimate and illegitimate; for too much of
our history there was the same inertia in distinguishing between
black and white.9 '
Justice Stevens's distrust of tradition comports with Sunstein's theory of
the history prong as a heuristic device that forces the judicial deci-
sionmaker to consider his potential complicity in the oppression he ex-
amines. Under this theory the decisionmaker must engage the biography
of a group to determine the nature of its suffering.
92
A more pragmatic argument supplements the principled contention
that judges who check a box are violating the spirit of the test. As a prac-
tical matter, a flawed reading of the history prong may adversely affect
analysis under the other two prongs. Those "trickle over" effects may in
turn determine the ultimate outcome of the Equal Protection inquiry as a
whole. In fact, many courts considering the issue check the "yes" box for
the history of discrimination and then deny gays heightened scrutiny on
other grounds. 93 While this "trickle over" is often subtle, explicit exam-
91. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. A collateral benefit of this reading is that it resolves the potential redundancy of
the history prong with the political-powerlessness prong. Assuming that the best reading
of the Equal Protection Clause is as an instrument that calibrates and corrects empathy
failure, an inquiry into the current political powerlessness of the group seems the most
direct way of achieving its ends. Indeed, a supplemental inquiry into the group's history of
discrimination (or immutability) seems redundant. After all, if a group is currently
politically powerful, then it should not be accorded greater solicitude by the courts, even if
it has historically suffered discrimination. Its political power should allow it to engage in
self-help through the pursuit of legislative redress. Conversely, if a group has not suffered
a history of discrimination but is currently politically powerless, it should be protected.
Seen in this light, the history prong is mere surplusage.
Sunstein's theory supplies a reading of the history prong that is not redundant with
the political powerlessness prong. It does so by emphasizing how the history prong asks
the decisionmaker to look notjust at what he sees, but also at the lens through which he
sees it. Thus, ajudge who sees that a group is not politically powerless is asked whether he
might be unable to see empathy failure because of a mindset he has inherited. Conversely,
ajudge who sees a group that is politically powerless might be reminded by the fact that a
history of discrimination does not exist that what he is seeing is not so great a harm, but a
self-correcting vicissitude of the political process. In other words, while a finding that a
group currently enjoys political power should make an historical inquiry irrelevant, one
cannot make that finding in the absence of that historical inquiry.
93. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that while gays have suffered a history of discrimination,
they are not defined by an immutable characteristic and are not politically powerless); Ben-
Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding in dicta that while gays
have suffered a history of discrimination they are not politically powerless). Of course, this
gives only weak support to the hypothesis, given that it is implicit in a three-prong test that
something can satisfy prong one without satisfying prong two or prong three. The
examples below, however, should indicate that the prongs are not as independent as they
might seem.
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ples do exist. In Frontiero v. Richardson, the Court held that women suf-
fered a history of discrimination and investigated the ways in which
women were subordinated by men.94 It described the "attitude of 'ro-
mantic paternalism,' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a ped-
estal, but in a cage."95 This exegesis under the history prong explicitly
"trickled over" into the Court's subsequent analysis of the political-
powerlessness prong.96 In dealing with the political-powerlessness prong,
the Court had to overcome the presumption that women were not politi-
cally powerless because they constituted a majority of the population.
The Court did so by noting that: "It is true, of course, that when viewed
in the abstract, women do not constitute a small and powerless minority.
Nevertheless, in part because of past discrimination, women are vastly under-
represented in this Nation's decisionmaking councils."97 The Court thus
adverted to its previous analysis under the history prong to show that one
test of political powerlessness would be more appropriate than another,
thereby seriously affecting the ultimate determination. The three prongs
may not be as independent as a "three-prong test" implies-the history
prong sometimes may operate as an independent variable that shapes the
other prongs.98
An inquiry into the history prong is thus clearly relevant, meriting an
exploration of how that inquiry is conducted. When courts properly dis-
cuss this prong, they isolate two implicit components. First, courts con-
sider whether the group asking for heightened scrutiny has encountered
a history of discrimination similar to that encountered by an already pro-
tected group. Second, and tangentially, courts consider the particulari-
ties of the history of the group in question to isolate elements of oppres-
94. See 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
95. Id. In considering this history of discrimination, the Frontiero Court appeared to
sound a warning note much like Stevens's admonition in Mathews that judges must be
careful about replicating past discrimination. As evidence that it had been susceptible to
discriminatory attitudes toward women in the past, the Court quoted Justice Bradley's
statement that the" 'paramount destiny and mission of woman are [sic] to fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.'" Id. at 685
(quoting Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (Bradley, J., concurring)). The
Frontiero Court emphasized that "a distinguished Member of this Court was able to
proclaim" these words a hundred years before its own decision, implying that if even a
"distinguished" member of the Court was susceptible to such notions, present members
should be vigilant about their own vulnerability to them. Id. at 684.
96. While the prongs were not enumerated as such in the case, all three were
deployed. See id. at 685-86.
97. Id. at 686 n.17 (emphasis added).
98. As I argue more fully below, see infra Part IV, a parallel trickle-over effect might
occur in the gay context. When a court investigates the history of gay persecution, it will be
more likely to see how the history of gays is a history of the closet. If a court understands
how the closet inflects gay oppression, it will be more likely in turn to reject the standard
tests for measuring political powerlessness. Just as the Court rejected the "headcount in
the population" test for women to adopt the "representation in the Nation's
decisionmaking councils" test, see Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684, a court that understood the
closet might see that neither test adequately captures the political powerlessness of gays.
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sion that might not resonate with those of an already protected group.
The two steps can thus be seen as separate, even conflicting, inquiries,
the first protecting a group because of the way in which it resembles al-
ready protected groups, the second protecting it for ways in which it dif-
fers from those groups.
1. Step One: Inside the Discourse of Equivalents. - Under the first step,
a group seeking protection is recognized as "satisfying" the prong if its
history is sufficiently analogous to the history of a group that has already
been accorded heightened scrutiny.99 These talismanic groups include
those based on race,'00 national origin,101 gender,10 2 alienage, 03 and il-
legitimacy.'0 4 Thus, in Frontiero, the Court used the observation that
"throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our soci-
ety was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-
Civil War slave codes,"105 as a predicate for finding that women had suf-
fered a significant history of discrimination. Employing the same stan-
dard to reach a different result, the Court held in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia that "[w] hile the treatment of the aged in this Nation
has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say,
those who have been discriminated against on the basis of race or na-
tional origin, have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal
treatment.' "106
Analyzing the debate surrounding gay civil-rights legislation, Jane
Schacter has baptized this framework as the "discourse of equivalents."
According to Schacter, this framework asks whether gay men and lesbians
sufficiently resemble other traditionally protected groups, thus using cur-
rent "civil rights laws as the normative baseline against which the gay civil
rights claim is tested to determine whether the fit between established
and aspiring law is sufficiently close to confer legitimacy."10 7 While
Schacter is commenting about legislation, the discourse of equivalents
has a similar hold in Equal Protection case law. Indeed, it may have a
stronger hold in case law because of the countermajoritarian nature of
99. Savor the ironies. First, instead of demanding equal treatment with the
privileged, disempowered minorities under the discourse of equivalents ask for equal
treatment with other oppressed groups. Second, the Equal Protection Clause, which can
be seen as iconoclastic in the sense that it inverts the law's sacralization of history, must
nonetheless justify that iconoclasm by adverting to comparable historical examples of
iconoclasm.
100. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
101. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 (1954).
102. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
103. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
104. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 504 (1976).
105. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685 (1975).
106. 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976). Similarly, in Mathews, the Court noted that
discrimination against the illegitimate "has never approached. ... the historic legal and
political discrimination against women and Negroes." Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506.
107. Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 283, 285 (1994).
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judging. Definitionally, a court would be asked to break from the dis-
course of equivalents only where the legislature had not already acted
sufficiently to protect a particular group, and courts are highly reluctant
to second-guess the legislature in such a scenario.108 Furthermore,
within the case law, the discourse has its strongest hold in the arena of
constitutional adjudication, because of the difficulty a legislature has in
overturning a court's decision. We thus can expect the discourse of
equivalents under Equal Protection jurisprudence to be highly restrictive.
The question then arises of how the history of discrimination suf-
fered by gays fares under that discourse. That history has been chal-
lenged as less severe than that experienced by racial minorities or women
in at least three ways. First, sex (and race) are seen to be immutable,
while sexual orientation is seen as chosen.10 9 As noted below, immutable
characteristics are seen as increasing the severity of discrimination (inso-
far as persons cannot evade that discrimination by changing those charac-
teristics) and also as calling into question the rationality of the discrimi-
nation itself (insofar as persons cannot be held culpable for what they
cannot choose),110 Second, it is asserted that as gays have never been
denied the vote, they are presumptively less vulnerable to the political
process than women or blacks."' Third, it is argued that gays have dis-
cretion over the expression of their identity. Thus, even if homosexuality
were immutable, gays could still evade many forms of discrimination by
masking that trait. In the economy of the Equal Protection Clause, visibil-
ity counts toward a history of discrimination, while invisibility counts
against it. For example, in Frontiero, the Court noted that "it can hardly
be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex character-
istic, women still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimi-
nation."" 2 Conversely, in Mathews, the Court hypothesized that the his-
tory of discrimination suffered by the illegitimate did not rise to the level
of that suffered by women or blacks "perhaps in part because illegitimacy
does not carry an obvious badge."" 3
These differences provide a powerful barrier to arguments tying the
history of discrimination suffered by gays with that suffered by other al-
ready protected groups. That courts to reach the issue have deemed gays
to have suffered a history of discrimination is not to the contrary. These
108. For the genesis of the modem debate on the countermajoritarian difficulty, see
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics 16-23 (2d ed. 1986).
109. See Neil L. Glazer, Straight Talk About Homosexuality, Harv. L. Rec., Mar. 5,
1993, at 15.
110. For an extended discussion of imutability, see infra Part IV.
111. Schacter notes that "a video entitled 'Gay Rights/Special Rights,' produced by a
conservative group called the Traditional Values Coalition and aimed at minority
audiences, features a screen with the heading 'Ever denied the right to vote?' and the
answers 'Homosexuals: No;' 'African Americans: Yes.'" Schacter, supra note 107, at 292.
112. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (footnote omitted).
113. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976).
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differences may be the subtext for courts deciding that Bowers pre-empts
the heightened scrutiny inquiry. Moreover, even for the courts that do
engage in the inquiry, these barriers may inhibit a deeper inquiry into the
history of discrimination against gays that could trickle over to other
prongs.
2. Step Two: Outside the Discourse of Equivalents. - An alternative ap-
proach to the inquiry into a group's history of discrimination points out
the flaws of the discourse of equivalents. Schacter challenges this dis-
course because it implies that "civil rights protection can be tested and
resolved against a stable and historically constant conceptual template"
and thereby transforms "anti-discrimination law into a bulwark for pre-
serving the status quo."" 4 As Schacter notes:
Discrimination against gay men and lesbians as a group has not
mirrored the discrimination suffered by other groups protected
under civil rights laws. The experiences of these protected
groups have themselves, however, been far from identical. For
example, the enduring legacy of slavery makes discrimination
against African Americans distinct from the pervasive historic
subordination of Native Americans or the social and economic
subordination of women. None of these experiences replicates
the others. And none replicates the social history of
homosexuality." 5
These criticisms, clearly applicable to Equal Protection jurisprudence,
point out that a legal order that counteracts discrimination against gays
only to the extent it resonates with the discrimination of an already pro-
tected group will necessarily be underinclusive. 1 6
114. Schacter, supra note 107, at 297.
115. Id.
116. Andrew Koppelman's argument that discrimination against gays is a kind of sex
discrimination is particularly susceptible to this charge because it recognizes
discrimination against gays only to the extent that this discrimination maps onto
discrimination against women. Koppelman recognizes this, quotingJonathan Goldberg's
criticism that "[b]y collapsing questions of sexuality into the 'more important' realms of
gender, homosexuality is allowed salience insofar as it seems assimilable to heterosexuality,
insofar as same-sex relations are taken to be no different from cross-sex ones."
Koppelman, supra note 2, at 202 n.16 (quoting Jonathan Goldberg, Sodometries:
Renaissance Texts, Modem Sexualities 15 (1992)). Koppelman responds that "[t]he point
of the present argument is, however, not 'to seek to hierarchize oppressions,' but to map
the ways in which they are related." Id. (quoting Goldberg, supra, at 14). This response is
too easy. Equal Protection jurisprudence markedly deploys a hierarchy of oppressions.
Only a small number of groups-those who have suffered enough to meet the
requirements of the history prong-will be accorded protection under the Clause. While
Koppelman doubtless does not "seek to hierarchize oppressions," that will be the likely
effect of his analysis. If courts recognize discrimination against gays as sex discrimination
but not as discrimination against gays simpliciter, the current hierarchy of sex over sexual
orientation as a category will endure. Arguing within the status quo has the benefit of
persuading those averse to change but the burden of entrenching their potentially
incorrect assumptions.
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The second step of the history prong, while much less prominent
than the first, plays some role in mitigating this problem by investigating
differences between historical oppressions. If a group's history of discrimi-
nation diverges from that experienced by an already protected group, the
divergence counts against it, but its effects may be overcome if the group
can show that this difference is nonetheless oppressive. Thus, in Frontiero,
the Court noted that women should be granted heightened scrutiny be-
cause they had suffered from "romantic paternalism." 1"7 Such romantic
paternalism distinguished women from blacks-while blacks have been
subjected to paternalism, it is doubtful that anyone would characterize it
as putting them "on a pedestal."118 In the case of women, the Court was
willing to grant protection not in spite of, but because of, a characteristic
that lay outside the discourse of equivalents.
The difficulty of arguing outside the discourse of equivalents is that
courts impose a much higher standard before recognizing particular
characteristics as warranting solicitude. Every new characteristic the
courts recognize as warranting greater protection threatens to open the
floodgates to a new wave of groups asking for protection based on that
characteristic. Recognizing this, courts understandably are loath to ex-
pand their portfolio of relevant characteristics. In City of Cleburne, Texas v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., the Supreme Court noted its reluctance to
give heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded in terms reflecting its
restrictive animus:
[I]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded
were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by the Court of
Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled way to distin-
guish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable dis-
abilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves
mandate the desired legislative responses, and who can claim
some degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at
large. One need mention in this respect only the aging, the dis-
abled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We are reluctant to set
out on that course, and decline to do so.119
The Court anticipates the tying arguments that will be made if it deems
another group, and therefore another set of characteristics, worthy of
protection. It states its reluctance to recognize new classes in no uncer-
tain terms. As a result, gays face a formidable hurdle in attempting to
garner protection based on a characteristic that falls outside the dis-
course of equivalents.
117. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
118. Id. The "romantic paternalism" argument contrasts with the "numerosity"
argument, in which the Court noted that women were not a minority in the population.
Both arguments revealed that women were different from blacks, but while the numerosity
argument cut against granting them protection, the "romantic paternalism" argument cut
in favor of granting that protection.
119. 473 U.S. 482, 445-46 (1985).
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In short, courts engage in a two-step inquiry under the history
prong-first inquiring after a group's similarity to an already protected
group and then inquiring after the group's difference from such a group.
Both steps are in keeping with the Clause's spirit of empathy. By forcing
a court to consider the analogy between the suffering of a certain group
and another protected group, the first step makes the court consider
whether its sympathies, already extended to one group, can logically be
withheld from another. By pushing a court to consider the differences
between the oppression of the group asking for protection and other
groups, the second step encourages the court to consider the particulari-
ties of that oppression. This ensures that a group that cannot "tie" its
claims to a pre-existing sympathy will not be excluded solely on that basis.
Gays seem to face an impasse under both steps of the history prong. Inso-
far as they choose to argue within the discourse of equivalents, they must
confront aspects of their history that do not resonate with those of
already protected groups; insofar as they choose to argue outside the
discourse of equivalents, they, like all previously unrecognized groups,
face high barriers to getting particular characteristics recognized as war-
ranting solicitude. The pink triangle, however, partially resolves both
impasses.
B. The Pink Triangle
As recounted in my initial anecdote, " [t]he pink triangle was used by
the Nazis during the Holocaust to designate homosexuals.' 20 It was one
of many symbols used in creating a taxonomy of "contragenics": red
patches for political prisoners,12' green triangles for criminals, 22 black
triangles for asocials, 123 and yellow stars for Jews.' 24 The pink triangle
thus implicitly links gay oppression to the oppression of other minori-
ties-particularly Jews, who were the most numerous and prominent vic-
tims of the Holocaust.
To understand the importance of the choice of the triangle as an
emblem of the gay movement, we must understand the costs of that
choice. While the more conventional strategy may be to link the op-
pressed group to a symbol that has positive connotations, 125 the triangle
appropriates and recasts a symbol of victimhood. The choice was an ac-
tive one, for the movement rejected the alternative of the Greek
120. See supra text accompanying note 1.
121. See Richard Plant, The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals 14
(1986).
122. See id. at 160.
123. See id.
124. See Gore Vidal, Pink Triangle and Yellow Star, in Pink Triangle and Yellow Star
and Other Essays 1976-82 at 167, 170 (1982).
125. The rainbow flag is an example of this strategy. See Deb Price, Rainbow Flag Is
Symbol of a United Gay People, Star Trib., Apr. 19, 1995, at 4E (describing positive
connotations of rainbow flag and contrasting these with negative connotations of pink
triangle).
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lambda,126 which evokes the more tolerant Hellenic attitudes toward ho-
mosexuality. 127 The movement's choice to associate itself with the nadir
rather than with the zenith of historical toleration for gays has been hotly
criticized. Stuart Marshall states: "I've spoken with people who were
forced to wear the pink triangle in concentration camps, and they were
horrified by its contemporary use by the gay movement. The memories
they associate with the image are unspeakable." 28
Yet discarding the pink triangle because the symbol cannot be cut
free of its initial use misses the point. As a symbol, the pink triangle is
undeniably unstable, given that its pro-gay use is constantly haunted by
the memory of its anti-gay deployment. But part of the power of the pink
triangle to represent the gay-rights movement stems precisely from this
instability. Indeed, it may be less accurate to say that the symbol is unsta-
ble than to say that it incorporates instability as part of its meaning. The
symbol aptly reflects the history of rights for homosexuals, in which toler-
ance has waxed and waned.' 29
As a symbol of instability, the pink triangle may galvanize pro-gay
sentiment on the part of both those initially sympathetic and those un-
sympathetic to the movement. For gay sympathizers, the pink triangle
serves as a minatory symbol against complacency. Even Marshall, who
laments the use of the symbol at a time when the gay-rights movement is
perhaps experiencing its moment of greatest optimism, also recognizes
that the Weimar Republic that preceded the Third Reich was a period of
relative tolerance for homosexuals.' 30 The pink triangle reminds pro-gay
sympathizers that its original usage could be resuscitated at any time; in-
deed, some argue that no resuscitation is necessary.' 3 ' The symbol works
on those not already sympathetic to the gay rights movement as well. By
invoking the Holocaust, the triangle evokes a raft of associations that has
126. See Stuart Marshall, The Contemporary Political Use of Gay History: The Third
Reich, in How Do I Look? 65, 68 (Bad Object-Choices ed., 1991).
127. For an account of these more tolerant attitudes, see generally Martha C.
Nussbaum, Platonic Love and Colorado Law: The Relevance of Ancient Greek Norms to
Modem Sexual Controversies, 80 Va. L. Rev. 1515 (1994) and sources cited therein.
128. Marshall, supra note 126, at 91. For first-person accounts of the treatment of
homosexuals in the concentration camps, see, e.g., Pierre Seel, I, Pierre Seel, Deported
Homosexual: A Memoir of Nazi Terror (Joachim Neugroschel trans., 1995) (memoir of
gay survivor relating his experiences in Schirmeck-Vorbriich concentration camp); Plant,
supra note 121 (various accounts by gay survivors of experiences in camps).
129. The Nazis themselves attributed a perceived rise in homosexuality to the more
permissive preceding era:
When the Nazis came to power... they raised the estimate [of homosexually-
inclined men in Germany] to 2 million men, 10 percent of the male population.
The Nazis called these new figures a "frightful legacy from the liberalistic period"
which had to be eliminated. Homosexuals were therefore branded as enemies of
the state.
Ven L. Bullough, Homosexuality: A History 94 (1979) (footnote omitted).
180. See Marshall, supra note 126, at 67, 79.
131. See Eve K. Sedgwick, The Epistemology of the Closet 129 (1990) (characterizing
the American response to AIDS as enacting a genocidal fantasy of a world without gays).
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made its way into the cultural consciousness of most Americans through
the history of the Jews. By drawing a nexus between the persecution of
homosexuals and the persecution of Jews, the symbol invites
homophobes to ask whether they occupy the position in relation to the
homosexual that the Nazis occupied in relation to the Jew.
While the pink triangle thus makes an evocative pro-gay appeal on a
visceral level, it also provides a rational contribution to the history prong
of the Equal Protection test. It responds to the first step, which requires
comparison to groups that have received protection, by pointing out that
the grounds raised for distinguishing gays from blacks or women-muta-
bility, the historical right to vote, and invisibility-do not distinguish
them from Jews. The pink triangle also engages the second step, which
examines differences between historical oppressions, to highlight one as-
pect of the history of gays that makes them unlike other groups, but
which contributes to their oppression-namely the distinctive invisibility
of that history.
1. Step One. - The pink triangle provides an answer to the impasse
the pro-gay argument encounters under the first step of the history prong
by linking gays to Jews. While the Supreme Court has never held that
religious groups are protected as a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause, there is both legislative and judicial evidence that such
groups are deemed worthy of protection. In the legislative context, reli-
gion is typically equated (via a discourse of equivalents) with race and
gender. For example, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits em-
ployment discrimination on the basis of religion as well as on the basis of
race, color, sex, and national origin.132 In the Equal Protection context,
the Supreme Court has noted in dicta that heightened scrutiny applies
when" 'inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage' "
are at issue.' 33 The fact that Jews (and other religious groups) have not
been protected under the Equal Protection Clause may stand for nothing
more than the fact that protections guaranteed religious groups under
the First Amendment pre-empt that inquiry.' 4 Any link that gays can
make with Jews will thus reinforce the claim to protection under the first
prong.
That link is easily made. Jews, like gays, have none of the three char-
acteristics commonly used to distinguish gays from blacks or women.
First, many elements of Jewish identity are not biologically immutable,
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991). Notably, efforts to amend Title VII to include
sexual orientation as a protected category have failed. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act
Amendments of 1981: Hearing on H.R. 1454 Before the Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1982) (statement of Congressman Ted Weiss).
133. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 885 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)) (emphasis added).
134. See generally Benjamin H. Barton, Note, Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges
After Batson v. Kentucky and JE.B. v. Alabama: An Equal Protection and First Amendment
Analysis, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 191 (1995).
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but instead are the product of individual choice.13 5 Second, Jews were
not denied the right to vote in the United States, revealing that political
persecution is not limited to formally disenfranchised groups. Finally,
Jews, like gays, often do not carry a visible badge of their identity.3 6 As
Sedgwick notes, "[elthnic/cultural/religious oppressions such as anti-
Semitism are more analogous in that the stigmatized individual has at
least notionally some discretion-although, importantly, it is never to be
taken for granted how much-over other people's knowledge of her or
his membership in the group."
137
These similarities allow gays to draw on the greater cultural literacy
that people have aboutJews in order to provide access to the experience
of gay oppression. The intellectual link between the invisibility of gays
and the invisibility of Jews, for example, may be further exfoliated by ad-
verting to the more robust cultural mythology surrounding Judaism.
Sedgwick does precisely this by juxtaposing Jean Racine's account of the
Biblical Purim story against the hypothetical story of a gay clerk in the
chambers of a Supreme CourtJustice who does not come out to the Jus-
tice prior to Bowers. 138 The Purim story is Holocaustal: King Assu~rus is
prompted by his advisor Aman to attempt to purge the world of Jews. 139
The King's wife Esther has hidden the fact that she is Jewish from her
husband, but discloses that fact in an attempt to avert the genocide. By
doing so, she forces her husband to weigh the intimate against the Holo-
caustal; he almost instantly chooses the former. With that small, personal
disclosure, she is able to persuade her husband to save not only herself,
but her entire people. 140 Sedgwick relates this myth to the gay context:
It would not be hard to imagine a version of Esther set in the
Supreme Court in the days immediately before the decision in
Bowers v. Hardwick. Cast as the ingenue in the title role a hypo-
thetical closeted gay clerk, as Assu~rus a hypothetical Justice of
the same gender who is about to make a majority of five in sup-
135. See Suzanna Sherry, SelectiveJudicial Activism in the Equal Protection Context:
Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Geo. LJ. 89, 122-23 (1984).
136. I refer here to physical traits-first and last names, of course, are often used as
visible badges ofJewish identity. See id.
137. Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 75. Gays share these attributes with religious groups
generally. See Lisa Duggan, Queering the State, in Sex Wars, supra note 8, at 189-90.
However, as noted below, the nexus between gays andJews is particularly evocative.
138. See Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 76-79 (discussing Jean Racine, Esther (H.R.
Roach ed., 1949)).
139. See id. at 76. For purposes of consistency with the quotation below, I retain
Racine's spellings of "Assurus" and "Aman" instead of the conventional English spellings
"Ahasuerus" and "Haman."
140. See id. To these points, add that Esther is terrified to come out; that she fears
for her life and has all the Jews of the city fast for three days in an appeal to God that she
be spared when she approaches the King; and that, in recognition of this, Purim is today
celebrated as a mask-and-disguise festival.
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port of the Georgia law. The Justice has grown fond of the
clerk, oddly fonder than s/he is used to being of clerks .... 141
Sedgwick's sentence trails off here, but we know how the story ends.
What gives this comparison its plangency is that the Esther story under-
scores both the incomparable personal risk, as well as the enormous
transformative potential, that coming out entails for many gay persons.
Although the holocaust referred to here is not the Nazi Holocaust,
the pink triangle illuminates this comparison. To compare Esther to the
gay clerk is to compare the averted extermination of the Jews to the ver-
dict in Bowers, threats not remotely comparable. Yet this analogy is ren-
dered less combustible by the associational axis already created by the
pink triangle, which reminds us that if gays were not threatened by that
holocaust, they were implicated in the other one alongside Jews.
While the gay-Jewish comparison gives a better response to the im-
passe under the first step of the history prong, it is not a perfect one. The
analogy between gays and Jews may be closer than that between gays and
blacks or gays and women, but it still inevitably engenders resistance. As
Sedgwick notes, "[t]here is another whole family of reasons why too long
a lingering on moments of Esther-style avowal must misrepresent the
truths of homophobic oppression; these go back to the important differ-
ences betweenJewish... and gay identity and oppression."'142 That resis-
141. Id. at 76-77. Perhaps one reason why this scenario is not hard to imagine is that
it essentially happened. The true story of the gay clerk in the Supreme Court who was in
the critical chambers in the critical year is well-known in gay communities. It has tended,
however, to remain oral, rather than written, history; in casting the account as a
hypothetical, Sedgwick was probably protecting the privacy of the gay clerk from the
greater exposure that occurs when stories are fixed in print. I realize that I may be accused
of violating that privacy in typing these words, but the account has since been published in
(among other places) John Jeffiies's biography of Lewis Powell. See John C. Jeffiies, Jr.,
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 511-30 (1994). The Justice in question was Lewis Powell, who
was the swing vote in the case, and who said to one of his clerks that" 'I don't believe I've
ever met a homosexual,' "without knowing that the person he was addressing was gay. Id.
at 521 (quoting Justice Powell). Without naming the clerk, Jeffries reveals most parts of
Sedgwick's "hypothetical" as truth:
Uncharacteristically, Ujust before oral argument] Powell had still not decided how
he would vote. In great distress, the [gay] clerk debated whether to tell Powell of
his sexual orientation. Perhaps if Powell could put a familiar face to these
incomprehensible urges, they would seem less bizarre and threatening. He came
to the edge of an outright declaration but ultimately drew back, settling for a
"very emotional" speech urging Powell to support sexual freedom as a
fundamental right. "The right to love the person of my choice," he argued,
"would be far more important to me than the right to vote in elections." "That
may be," Powell answered, "but that doesn't mean it's in the Constitution."
Id. at 521-22. What is startling about this account is that Powell's gay clerk made his own
presence hypothetical when he used the words "would be," rather than "is." Powell went
on to join justice White's opinion, providing the crucial fifth vote that made it the majority
opinion. Id. at 525.
142. Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 78. This family of reasons includes the following:
(1) "there is no suggestion that... [Esther's] identity might be a debatable, a porous, a
mutable fact about her"; (2) "Esther expects Assurus to be altogether surprised by her
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tance is also felt by those who are not pro-gay. 143
Gays may insist on differences between themselves and other minori-
ties with ferocity precisely because of their ability to be rendered invisible
and to be subsumed within their other affiliations. Distorting gay identity
to make it look like that of blacks or women or Jews resonates with the
phase prior to coming out in which gays distort their identity to look like
straights. If gays are going to pretend to be something they are not, the
thought goes, why not pretend to good purpose and pretend to be heter-
osexual?'4 While the pink triangle responds to the major problems of
the first step, these responses do not assuage the fear that to argue within
the discourse of equivalents only announces a capture by it. Yet the ge-
nius of the pink triangle is that it responds, albeit in a limited way, to this
critique as well.
2. Step Two. - While the pink triangle evokes the similarity between
gay history and Jewish history in one sense, it simultaneously emphasizes
a difference between them-their comparative visibility. Although gays
and Jews are both comparably invisible as individuals, they are not both
comparably invisible as groups. The choice of the pink triangle as an
emblem of the gay-rights movement itself underscores the distinctive in-
visibility of gay history. Not only is the triangle necessary to locate a pe-
self-disclosure, and he is"; (3) "Esther worries that her revelation might destroy her or fail
to help her people, but it does not seem to her likely to damage Assurus, and it does not
indeed damage him"; (4) "The inert substance of Assurus seems to have no definitional
involvement with the religious/ethnic identity of Esther"; (5) "There is no suggestion that
Assudrus might himself be ajew in disguise"; (6) "Esther knows who her people are and
has an immediate answerability to them,"; and (7) "Esther's avowal occurs within and
perpetuates a coherent system of gender subordination." Id. at 79-81 (emphasis omitted).
143. As Gore Vidal notes:
I was present when Christopher Isherwood tried to make [the analogy between
gays and Jews] to a young Jewish movie producer. "After all," said Isherwood,
"Hider killed six hundred thousand homosexuals." The young man was not
impressed. "But Hitler killed six milion Jews," he said sternly. "What are you?"
asked Isherwood. "In real estate?"
Vidal, supra note 124, at 170. Comparing gays to blacks, women, or Jews will always
encounter resistance from persons who think that the analogy denigrates or
mischaracterizes the history of the latter groups. Such resistance is not necessarily
homophobic. One form of this criticism, for example, points out that the suffering of the
already-protected group is being used in order to get more protection for another group,
rather than being recognized in its own right. It is indeed hard not to wonder when gays
(or any other group) invoke an analogy to another group whether their sympathies for the
suffering of that group extend beyond that group's use to them. If we as gays are asking
that other people empathize by comparing our suffering to that experienced by blacks, we
might do well to think about what kind of understanding we ourselves have of the
experience on which that analogy is based. But it is important to remember that gays
themselves are unlikely to enjoy this process. To use another group's suffering to secure
one's own rights implies a benefit arising from that group's suffering, which, absent
schadenfreude, is a position most persons are unlikely to relish. The discourse of equivalents
places both protected and unprotected groups in an unsavory position.
144. See Martin Sherman, Bent 28-36, 38-41 (1979) (play depicting gay non-Jew who
successfully passes as straightJew).
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riod in that history that would otherwise remain uncharted, but that sym-
bol is often only understood through its connection to the yellow star.
Thus, while the pink triangle appears to stress its similarity to the yellow
star, it simultaneously relies on the difference between the two symbols-
namely the greater cultural understanding of the suffering underlying
the yellow star-to achieve its potency. We see this dynamic at work in
Sedgwick's comparison-the centrality of the Purim story, and
Sedgwick's ability to count on its cultural accessibility, highlight the ab-
sence of gay mythologies on which the agon of the clerk's story could
intelligibly be mapped.
The pink triangle thus stands not only as an emblem of the homosex-
ual, but also as an emblem of the invisibility of gay history. The triangle,
accompanied by the slogan SILENCE = DEATH, constitutes the most fa-
mous graphic to arise out of the AIDS crisis.145 The emblem was created
by the Silence = Death Project, six gay men who later joined the ACT UP
organization. 1' In describing why they chose the symbol, a member of
the project noted:
Our emblem's significance depends on foreknowledge of the
use of the pink triangle as the marker of gay men in Nazi con-
centration camps, [and] its appropriation by the gay movement
to remember a suppressed history of our oppression ....
SILENCE = DEATH declares that silence about the oppression
and annihilation of gay people, then and now, must be broken as
a matter of our survival.' 47
The AIDS symbol, which explicitly builds on the pink triangle, rests its
force on the ability of the triangle to act as a public mnemonic for an
otherwise occluded history. In my initial anecdote, what gave the judge's
ignorance of the symbol its poignancy is that he had not heard of the
symbol that most pointedly represented the gay wil to be heard.
The distinctive invisibility of the gay-rights movement is related to
the invisibility of gay individuals. 148 Contrast, for example, the sixties slo-
gan "Black is Beautiful," 149 with the nineties slogan 'We're here, we're
145. See Rob Baker, The Art of AIDS 141 (1994).
146. See id. ACT UP, or the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, is "a diverse,
nonpartisan group united in anger and committed to direct action to end the AIDS crisis."
Crimp & Rolston, supra note 78, at 13.
147. Id. at 14.
148. The invisibility of individual gays is better captured through the symbol of the
closet. See infra Part III. The two invisibilities (of individuals and of the group) are
related yet distinct. Individual invisibility deeply abets group invisibility, as if to breathe
new sociological life into the discredited biological maxim that ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny. Yet they are also distinct, as many individually "out" gay scholars have found in
their attempts to recuperate a history that remains stubbornly closeted. See Lisa Duggan,
History's Gay Ghetto: The Contradictions of Growth in Lesbian and Gay History, in Sex
War, supra note 8, at 144-145. I focus here on group invisibility.
149. See Renee Graham, 'Black Is': political, personal, powerful, Boston Globe, Feb.
26, 1996, at 36 (discussing the history of the slogan).
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queer, get used to it!"15 0 The slogans come from the civil rights move-
ments for African-Americans and gays, respectively. The contrast, how-
ever, lies in the fact that African-Americans are trying to reshape percep-
tions of who they are while gays are trying to assert their mere existence.
While other slogans, such as "Gay is Good" resonate with "Black is Beauti-
ful,"1 1 the 'We're here" slogan indicates a consciousness that before gays
can convince people of what they are, they must convince people that
they are. 15
2
This raises the question of whether gay invisibility meets the strin-
gent standard that courts apply to isolate new historical debilities. An
affirmative response may rely on the fact that judges have been deeply
complicit in producing gay invisibility, so they should be hyper-aware of
their potential continued complicity in it. Again, given that the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause is to preclude empathy failure, it is rele-
vant that one of the attributes of the group under investigation is a
chronic inability to make its oppression visible.
Insofar as judges share society's blindness toward the gay commu-
nity, of course, they will be difficult to persuade. We want to think that
those engaged in privileged discourse, here judicial discourse, should
know basic facts about the persons about whom they rule. But should
they? Sedgwick argues that they "should" not, given that their ignorance
has been as carefully cultivated as our knowledge through the exercise of
what she calls the epistemological privilege of unknowing:
150. See Bruce Bawer, Notes on Stonewall, The New Republic, June 13, 1994, at 24,
26 (discussing the use of the slogan in the gay rights movement).
151. Indeed, "Gay is Good" explicitly drew on "Black is Beautiful." See Larry Gross,
Contested Closets: The Politics and Ethics of Outing 20 (1993); see also Gabriel Rotello,
Stonewall Goes Uptown to 42d Street, Newsday, Aug. 4, 1994, at A38 (noting resonance
between two slogans).
152. This is not to say that other minorities are not made to feel as if they do not exist.
Harlon Dalton's discussion of what he calls "e-racing," is one of the narratives that makes
such an assertion impossible:
On occasion, I have been in the company of White folk who momentarily forgot
that I was present, or who were temporarily blind to "what" I am. It is as if I had
been transformed into a fly on the wall. "If a White person had done that, he
would have been out on his earl" "They have no respect for family." "Did you
hear the one about... ?" Suddenly, the conversation screeches to a halt and
everyone freezes. Apparently, I have become visible again. Faces redden, and an
effort is made to smooth things over.
Harlon L. Dalton, Racial Healing 71 (1995). The account trenchantly shows that one need
not be physically invisible to be socially invisible. Even if one cannot "pass" in the crude
sense of not giving immediate proof of one's identity, one can have that identity ignored
and despoiled. Yet the narrative also illuminates what I see as a crucial difference between
the context of race and sexual orientation, captured by the evocative word "e-raced."
Erasure implies a prior text, and that text is Dalton's race, of which he has been denuded.
Something existed that was obliterated. In contrast, it is harder to think about erasure in
the gay context because it is harder to conceive of a gay text. The page of gay identity is
not a palimpsest but a tabula rasa.
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Knowledge is not itself power, although it is the magnetic field
of power. Ignorance and opacity collude or compete with it in
mobilizing the flows of energy, desire, goods, meanings, per-
sons. If M. Mitterrand knows English but Mr. Reagan lacks
French, it is the urbane M. Mitterrand who must negotiate in an
acquired tongue, the ignorant Mr. Reagan who may dilate in his
native one. Or in the interactive speech model by which ...
"the standard ... meaning can be thought of as what is recogniz-
able solely on the basis of interlocutors' mutual knowledge of
established practices of interpretation," it is the interlocutor
who has or pretends to have the less broadly knowledgeable un-
derstanding of interpretive practice who will define the terms of
the exchange. So, for instance, because "men, with superior ex-
tralinguistic resources and privileged discourse positions, are
often less likely to treat perspectives different from their own as
mutually available for communication," their attitudes are "thus
more likely to leave a lasting imprint on the common semantic
stock than women's."'153
Sedgwick uses the aptly protean phrase "privilege of unknowing" in a
doubled sense-privilege permits ignorance, and ignorance entrenches
privilege. The two senses create a feedback loop. Because the powerful
have power, one must respect their ignorance and reduce one's speech to
the lowest common denominator one shares with one's more powerful
listeners if one hopes to persuade them. By watering down one's speech,
however, one further entrenches the privilege that motivated that discur-
sive strategy.
Under this formulation, homosexuality is regulated through a dis-
course of ignorance by regulators who do not need to understand it.
This can be seen in the way homosexuality often is framed through pret-
erition: that is, the mention of a term only to dismiss it. As noted by a
typical legal encyclopedia:
The terms of many criminal sodomy statutes reflect the legisla-
tors' reluctance to set out in detail the elements of sodomy be-
cause of its loathsome nature. Instead, the statutes simply pro-
vide for the punishment of any person who commits "sodomy or
the crime against nature," or "the abominable and detestable
crime against nature," or designate the offense of sodomy simply
as "sodomy" or "the crime against nature" or by similar
euphemisms. 54
Or, as Sedgwick puts it more colorfully:
Unspeakable, Unmentionable, nefandam libidinem, "that sin
which should be neither named nor committed," the "detestable
and abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named,"
"Whose vice in special, if I would declare, It were enough for to
perturb the air." "Things fearful to name," "the obscene sound
153. Eve K Sedgwick, Privilege of Unknowing: Diderot's The Nun, reprinted in
Tendencies 23, 23 (1993) (citations omitted).
154. 70A Am. Jur. 2d Sodomy § 3 (1987) (citations omitted).
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of the unbeseeming words," "A sin so odious that the fame of
it / Will fright the damned in the darksome pit," "the love that
dare not speak its name"-such were the speakable nonmedical
terms, in Christian tradition, for the homosexual possibility for
men.15
5
What emerges from these formulations is that the loathsomeness of the
crime prevents it from being named, much less discussed, with precision.
This is an infelicitous combination, given that it might result in serious
penalties for inchoate transgressions.
156
Bowers exemplifies the epistemological privilege of unknowing, both
in the majority opinion, which upheld the Georgia sodomy law, and, less
intuitively, in the dissent, which would have struck down the law. The
majority's privilege of unknowing was exercised in part through simple
preterition. Its opinion noted that: "Blackstone described 'the infamous
crime against nature' as an offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape, a hei-
nous act 'the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature,' and
'a crime not fit to be named.' ,,157 For the most part, however, the major-
ity's privilege was exercised in a more sophisticated form of unknowing.
The majority did not pass over the notion of homosexuality, but expati-
ated on the obviousness of its immorality and criminality, calling the
claim that there is a right in this nation's history and traditions to engage
in sodomy "facetious."158 Even Justice Powell, who later stated that he
155. Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 202-03.
156. The combination also begins to reveal the power of ignorance. In the same way
that knowledge figures itself against the ground of ignorance, the named poses itself
against the unnameable. This is unsurprising, because naming is a kind of knowledge, the
redemption of a local knowable from the global unknown. Conventionally, just as
knowledge is assumed to be power, the ability to name implies power as well; think, for
example, of Adam naming the animals. Genesis 2:19-20. Yet the privilege of unknowing
manifests its counterintuitive force in these preteritive formulations of sodomy insofar as
the regulator's confession that an object cannot be named enhances rather than
diminishes his power over it. In stating that they could not name homosexuality, those
engaged in these preteritive acts were not stating that they could not control it. They did
and do-gays in America have been "'condemned to death by choking, burning and
drowning ... executed, [castrated], jailed, pilloried, fined, court-martialed, prostituted,
fired, framed, blackmailed, disinherited, [lobotomized, shock-treated, psychoanalyzed
and] declared insane, driven to insanity, to suicide, murder, and self-hate, witch-hunted,
entrapped, stereotyped, mocked, insulted, isolated . . . castigated . . . despised [and
degraded].'" Thomas, supra note 2, at 1462 (quoting Jonathan Katz, Gay American
History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the U.S.A. 11 (1976)) (alterations in original); see also
Andrew Sullivan, Virtually Normal 22 (1995) (discussing sanctions against homosexuality).
Indeed, the endless mill of speech about homosexuality's unnameable nature may have
insulated that regulation from resistance, because that regulation foundjustification in the
putative consensus of silence.
157. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (quoting 4 William Blackstone,
Commentaries *215).
158. Id. at 194.
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may have made an error in casting the deciding vote, was at pains to say
how little that insight affected him. 159
The Bowers concurrence also shows that those who control discourse
are not necessarily those who know it best. Consider, for example, Chief
Justice Burger's claim that protection for sodomy flouted "millennia of
moral teaching."160 Notably absent from the three citations accompany-
ing this claim is John Boswell's book, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and
Homosexuality,161 published to public acclaim' 6 2 five years before Bowers.
Boswell's book, the product of "nearly a decade"163 of work, concludes,
inter alia: (1) that "Roman society, at least in its urban centers, did not
for the most part distinguish gay people from others and regarded homo-
sexual interest and practice as an ordinary part of the range of human
eroticism;"' 6 4 (2) that the "early Christian Church does not appear to
have opposed homosexual behavior per se;' 65 and (3) that in the elev-
enth century, "[h]omosexual passions became matters of public discus-
sion and were celebrated in spiritual as well as carnal contexts. Opposi-
tion to gay sexuality appeared rarely and more as aesthetic partisanship
than as moral censure; exceptions to this were ignored by religious and
civic leaders." 166 The citation of Bailey's book on homosexuality, 167 and
the notable absence of Boswell's book, demonstrates how, and to what
effect, the privilege of unknowing can be exercised in this area of
jurisprudence.168
159. Justice Powell expressed regret over his position in Bowers in a speech to a group
of New York University law students: "'I think I probably made a mistake in that one....
So far as I'm concerned it's just a part of my past and not very important ... I don't
suppose I've devoted half an hour' to thinking about the decision since it was made." Ruth
Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3.
160. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
161. John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1980).
162. Gore Vidal has characterized this "ferociously learned" book as a breakthrough,
insofar as it "obliged even the 'homophobic' New York Times to review it intelligently."
Vidal, supra note 124, at 167.
163. Boswell, supra note 161, at xvii.
164. Id. at 333.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 334.
167. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986) (Burger, CJ. concurring)
(citing Derrick S. Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western Christian Tradition 70-81
(Archon Books 1975) (1955)).
168. The tone of the Court is just as, if not more, indicative of this exercise of power,
as best seen through ajuxtaposition of the tone of Boswell's book with that of the majority
opinion. In his conclusion, Boswell reflects that:
Beyond these modest conclusions and the facts which support them, little can be
asserted with confidence. The social topography of medieval Europe is so
unexplored that the writer on this subject cannot hope to avoid leading his
readers down many wrong paths or, occasionally, coming to a dead end. His
comfort must subsist in the belief that he has at least posted landmarks where
there were none before and opened the trails on which others will reach
destinations far beyond his own furthest advance.
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Even the Bowers dissent may have similarly deployed the privilege of
unknowing. Michael Sandel notes that the dissent based its view on the
concept of autonomy rights rather than dealing with homosexuality di-
rectly, and thereby rested its defense of homosexuality on an impover-
ished understanding of it. As Sandel puts it:
The problem with the neutral case for toleration is the opposite
side of its appeal; it leaves wholly unchallenged the adverse views
of homosexuality itself. Unless those views can be plausibly ad-
dressed, even a Court ruling in their favor is unlikely to win for
homosexuals more than a thin and fragile toleration. A fuller
respect would require, if not admiration, at least some apprecia-
tion of the lives homosexuals live. Such appreciation, however,
is unlikely to be cultivated by a legal and political discourse con-
ducted in terms of autonomy rights alone.
169
This criticism of Bowers posits that even the dissenters may have ruled for
gays without understanding them. The autonomy principle in this for-
mulation is just another way of keeping homosexuals at arms length; it
"tolerates homosexuality at the price of demeaning it."' 7°
These accounts reveal that one distinctive aspect of gay history that
cannot easily be translated into relevance in the discourse of equivalents
is the invisibility of that history. As noted, the Court appears reluctant to
consider such new characteristics for fear that other groups might use
them to invoke sympathy for their causes. Yet the invisibility of gay his-
tory seems to be a particularly valid trait for consideration, given that it
relates directly to the inquiry of the history prong. If the purpose of the
history prong is to help the judge educate himself about his vision of the
group, surely it would be ironic for the court not to consider the ways in
which that group may be hard to see. If ajudge is attempting to listen to
the biography of a group, surely it must be relevant that the biography
will be told in a whisper. Moreover, if the judiciary itself has been com-
Boswell, supra note 161, at 334. Contrast the tone of this paragraph with the tone of the
White and Burger quotations above. See supra text accompanying notes 157-160. It is
White and Burger, on the basis of limited research, who make broad claims concerning the
content of "millennia of moral teaching." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, CJ.,
concurring). It is Boswell, who, after almost ten years of research in this field, gestures
toward its ambiguity.
169. Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521, 537 (1989).
170. Id. It is important on one level to distinguish between the motivations of the
majority and the dissent. The dissent probably refused to deal with the concrete instance
of homosexuality in part as a political move to gather votes on the Court and sympathy
from its readers. It is entirely plausible that even a person with a deep understanding of
homosexuality might pitch his discourse toward the "thin," but less controversial, defense
of the "right to be let alone" rather than toward a "thick" defense that would force readers
to engage with the concrete practice of sodomy. On another level, however, motivations
may not be that important. It is precisely Sandel's point that while such tactics may have
the obvious benefit of building coalitions, they may have the occluded cost of allowing
ignorance about a group to remain unchallenged.
1792 [Vol. 96:1753
HeinOnline  -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1792 1996
SUSPECT SYMBOLS
plicit in that silence, an Ely-inflected reading of the Equal Protection
Clause would make that silence a prime trait for judicial consideration.
III. PoLrxcAL POWERLESSNESS AND THE CLOSET
The second prong of the Equal Protection test inquires whether the
group asking for heightened scrutiny is politically powerless. This prong
of the test has been criticized as ill-defined, 171 and courts have struggled
to determine the appropriate indicia of political powerlessness. Courts
have employed three tests in the gay rights context. The first, developed
in Frontiero v. Richardson, requires that a group have been excluded from
the "Nation's decision-making councils" before the court finds them to
be politically powerless. 172 This test has been applied in only two Equal
Protection cases: one sex-discrmination case, Frontiero, and one sexual-
orientation discrimination case, Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinati.173
The second, developed in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc., inquires whether a group has the "ability to attract the attention of
the lawmakers."174 It has been applied only to the mentally retarded
(Cleburne) and gays (four cases). 175 As noted below, it generally will be
easier to find that a group is politically powerful under this test than it is
under the Frontiero test. This perhaps explains why courts wishing to find
that gays are not politically powerless prefer this test. The third, based on
United States v. Carolene Products Co., focuses on whether the class is a "dis-
crete and insular minorit[yl."176 Unlike the other two tests, this test has
been widely applied to a variety of different classifications, including
171. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417, 437 (S.D. Ohio
1994), rev'd, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 2519 (1996).
172. 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973).
173. See Equality Found., 860 F. Supp. at 439.
174. 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985).
175. Three of the courts that explicitly advert to the Cleburne test have found that gays
are not politically powerless. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office,
895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[H]omosexuals are not without political power, they
have the ability to and do 'attract the attention of the lawmakers,' as evidenced by [several
state statutes and local ordinances]." (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445)); Ben-Shalom v.
Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) ("In these times homosexuals are proving that
they are not without growing political power. It cannot be said 'they [homosexuals] have
no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.'" (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 445));
Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C. 1991) ("[lit cannot be successfully maintained
that our political branches are not paying attention to homosexuals or those who advocate
legislation favorable to them."), rev'd en banc on other grounds sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin,
8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc on other grounds sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41
F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But seeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991)
(finding that "homosexuals face severe limitations on their ability to protect their interests
by means of the political process"), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992).
176. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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sex,177 alienage, 78 and race.179 It has been explicitly applied to gays in
one case, Ben-Shalom v. Marsh.'8 0 If current gay Equal Protection cases
are representative, the courts are most likely to use the Cleburne test in the
future. In the interest of comprehensiveness, however, I consider all
three.
The organization of this Part reflects its thesis.18 1 It begins with the
symbol of the closet because the political powerlessness of gays, regardless
of how it is measured, cannot be ascertained without taking into account
the effects of the closet. To show how the closet is the philosopher's
stone against which any inquiry about gay political powerlessness must be
robbed, this Part explores the centrality of the symbol in describing gay
oppression. This centrality arises from the symbol's ability to describe the
regimes of isolation and invisibility imposed on lesbians and gay men.
This Part then turns to doctrine, showing that all three tests are inade-
quate insofar as they do not, as currently applied in the gay context, ac-
count for the effects of the closet. Finally, it considers a brace of cases
outside the Equal Protection context to reveal the difference a sensitivity
to the closet makes to doctrinal arguments.
A. The Closet
It is hard to talk about homosexuality without talking about the sym-
bol of the closet. Homosexuals who are not open about their orientation
are said to be closeted; indeed, even the word "open" poses itself against
the closedness of the closet door. When homosexuals are described as
"out," the underlying symbol of the closet is so pervasive that it can be left
177. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2296 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("It is hard to consider women a 'discrete and insular minorit[y].'" (alteration
in original)).
178. See, e.g., Sugarman'v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973) ("[A]liens as a class 'are
a prime example of a "discrete and insular" minority.'" (quoting Graham v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971))).
179. See, e.g., Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality
opinion of O'Connor, J.).
180. 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1380 (E.D. Wis.) (finding that "homosexuals constitute a
discrete and insular group"), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989).
181. This discussion of the political-powerlessness prong inverts the order of
discussing doctrine before symbol followed for the other two prongs. This is because the
theory being expounded is often little more than a back formation from the intuitive sense
courts have of the group's political powerlessness. For example, in Cleburne, the Court
ignored two existing tests of political powerlessness to create a third. See Cleburne, 473 U.S.
at 445. The two existing tests-the "presence in the decision-making councils of the
nation" test and the "discrete and insular minority" test-clearly would have resulted in a
finding that the mentally retarded were politically powerless. Yet the Court, seemingly
intent on finding that the mentally retarded were not politically powerless, did not adopt
either of those tests, creating instead a third test-the "ability to attract the attention of the
lawmakers" test-out of whole cloth. It then "applied" its new test to the case of the
mentally retarded for a predictable finding that they were not politically powerless. See id.
Following the Court's lead in considering the political powerlessness of gays, I use that
determination to "test" the tests, rather than vice versa.
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implicit-there is no follow-up question "out of what?" Our collective
inability to reimagine the metaphor reflects and reinforces its fixity. Why
not coffin? Why not room? As one commentator noted: "[T]he primary
symbol of gay repression hasn't been the ghetto or a list of segregation
laws. It's been the much more psychologically complex image of the
closet: the dark place where cultural hate meets, and makes, self-hate."'
8 2
The landmark work on the closet as a symbol in gay culture is
Sedgwick's Epistemology of the Closet.183 In this work, Sedgwick argues that
the closet has a special ability to describe the oppression of homosexuals
because it captures their distinctive invisibility and isolation.'84 While
Sedgwvick argues that the closet should be particularly indicative for gays,
she does not argue that it is indicative. The latter point can be
supported, however, by an exploration of the deployment of the symbol
of the "double closet." The trope of the double closet marks the situation
in which a person is a member of two minority groups for which the
closet is a shaping influence. Examples include persons who are gay and
victims of domestic violence, 185 persons who are gay and Republican,
8 6
persons who are gay and affluent, 8 7 or persons who are gay and afflicted
with AIDS.'88 That each of the persons in this otherwise diverse group is
182. Ellen Goodman, Gay Policy Won't Work, Dallas Morning News, July 16, 1993, at
23A, available in 1993 WL 8812000.
183. Sedgwick, supra note 131.
184. While perhaps intuitive, such an assumption is not uncontroversial, for the closet
as a metaphor for oppression has been extended beyond the referent of homosexual
oppression. Sedgwick gives the examples of a speaker stating that blacks "came out of the
closet" in the sixties, and of her own discussion of how it is possible to "come out" as a fat
woman. See id. at 72. However, while these examples might suggest that the closet has
been "evacuated of its historical gay specificity," Sedgwick posits that precisely the opposite
is true. Rather than cutting their moorings from the homosexual/heterosexual
distinction, these modem usages of the closet are so indelibly marked with that distinction
that they carry it into other discourses. The closet may be a metaphor for many different
kinds of oppression, but the deployment of that metaphor becomes intelligible only when
funneled back through the oppression suffered by homosexuals. See id.
185. See Jane Lowers, Gay and Lesbian Partners Not Immune to Violence, Chi. Sun-
Times, Feb. 25, 1995, at 18 (" 'There's a double closet involved when someone admits that
they have been beaten, and that the lover who beat them is of the same sex . . .'")
(quoting Jerri Lynn Fields, director of the Horizons Community Services Anti-Violence
Project).
186. SeeJonathan Mandell, Gay Republicans; Log Cabin Club Gets Its Turn, Newsday,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 15 (stating that some gay Republicans describe themselves as occupying a
"double closet").
187. See Kathleen Teltsch, Young Philanthropists Give to Nontraditional Causes, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1986, at C1 (quoting David Pillsbury Becker on his homosexuality and
wealth: "I lived in a double closet as a member of two minorities, one at the top of society
and one near the bottom.").
188. See Eleanor Mallett, Therapist Refuses to Let AIDS Shackle Him, The Plain
Dealer, July 27, 1993, at IC, available in 1993 WL 4303294 (quoting Jim Stuntz, a gay
person with AIDS: "I have no more closets to come out of.").
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gay indicates that the primary resonance of the closet is a gay one. This
descriptive evidence thus shores up Sedgwick's prescriptive claim.' 8 9
Accepting, then, that the closet has resonance for homosexuals, we
might ask on what lines the analogy between the closet and gay oppres-
sion are drawn. As Sedgwick notes, the Oxford English Dictionary [QED]
defines the closet variously as:
(1) (a) A room for privacy or retirement; a private room; an in-
ner chamber; ... (b) esp. Such a room as the place of private
devotion... ; (c) As the place of private study or secluded spec-
ulation; esp. in reference to mere theories as opposed to practi-
cal measures; (2) (a) The private apartment of a monarch or po-
tentate... ; (3) (a) A private repository of valuables; (b) A small
side-room or recess for storing utensils, provisions, etc.; a cup-
board; (c) skeleton in the closet (or cupboard): a private or con-
cealed trouble in one's house or circumstances, ever present,
and ever liable to come into view;... (4) With special reference
to size: Any small room: especially one belonging to or commu-
nicating with a larger . . . ; (5) The den or lair of a wild
beast ... ; (6) (a) That which affords retirement like a private
chamber, or which encloses like a cabinet; a hidden or secret
place, retreat, recess... ; (7) Short for "Closet of ease," "water-
closet";... (10) ... (b) A place of private devotion. 190
Two different closets emerge from both the OED and Sedgwick: one with
a negative connotation and one with a positive one. Most familiarly, the
closet connotes confinement, isolation, and repression, as in its incarna-
tion as a locus for "private or concealed trouble... ever present, and ever
liable to come into view."19' Such connotations inhere in Sedgwick's con-
cept of gays as isolated from an immediate usable heritage. The
celebratory aspect of coming out thus predicates itself on an opposition
to this conception of the closet; what was private and concealed is
brought into sociability and light. Call this the confining closet. The posi-
tive aspect of the closet, perhaps less familiar to one approaching the
symbol from a pro-gay context, is that the closet affords protection-for
valuables, for the wild beast, for the person who wishes to "retreat. '192
Such privacy is reflected in Sedgwick's concept of the "notional discre-
tion" of gays to choose invisibility.193 The cautionary aspect of coming
out builds on this model of the closet; what was protected now becomes
vulnerable through its visibility. Call this the protective closet.
189. Indeed, the nexus between homosexuality and the closet may be stronger as a
descriptive matter than as a prescriptive one. While invisibility and isolation distinguish
gay oppression from some oppressions, they only further ally it with other oppressions,
such as the oppression directed at persons with AIDS. People with AIDS often have
notional discretion of their IV status, and most adult people with AIDS were not born to
people with AIDS.
190. 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 349-50 (2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter OED].
191. Id. at 350.
192. Id.
193. See Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 75.
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In both its confining and protective incarnations, the closet contrib-
utes to the political powerlessness of gays. As Schacter notes, in its con-
fining aspect, "the closet exacts a high price in self-esteem, emotional
health, and access to the community."194 To show the costs of such con-
finement, I extend Elaine Scarry's seminal theory of the relationship be-
tween the room and the body. I then turn to the less intuitive ways in
which the protective closet impedes the political mobilization of gays by
increasing tolerance of that confinement.
1. Confining Closet. - While the closet as a confining structure is a
domestic symbol, it is not domesticated-the violence suffered within its
bounds is real, not mannered. Consider Elaine Scarry's discussion of the
body, the room, and torture:
In normal contexts, the room, the simplest form of shelter, ex-
presses the most benign potential of human life. It is, on the
one hand, an enlargement of the body: it keeps warm and safe
the individual it houses in the same way the body encloses and
protects the individual within; like the body, its walls put bound-
aries around the self preventing undifferentiated contact with
the world, yet in its windows and doors, crude versions of the
senses, it enables the self to move out into the world and allows
that world to enter. But while the room is a magnification of the
body, it is simultaneously a miniaturization of the world, of civili-
zation. Although its walls, for example, mimic the body's at-
tempt to secure for the individual a stable internal space-stabi-
lizing the temperature so that the body spends less time in this
act; stabilizing the nearness of others so that the body can sus-
pend its rigid and watchful postures; acting in these and other
ways like the body so that the body can act less like a wall-the
walls are also, throughout all this, independent objects, objects
which stand apart from and free of the body, objects which real-
ize the human being's impulse to project himself out into a
space beyond the boundaries of the body in acts of making,
either physical or verbal, that once multiplied, collected, and
shared are called civilization.19 5
Scarry sees the room as the body writ large, for like the body, the room
frees the self from certain functions by assuming responsibility for them.
Yet while these structures are extensions of the body, they are not part of
the body in the way, for example, that an artificial limb or heart might be.
Part of the utility of the wall is precisely in its independence from the
body, in its ability to be mine rather than me. The room, then, achieves
value through its amphibiousness between the inner sphere of the per-
sonal and the outer sphere of the social.
Torture, in Scarry's vision, is the subversion of this mediating struc-
ture, the disruption of which calls into question both self and world. One
194. Schacter, supra note 107, at 299.
195. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World
38-39 (1985).
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form of this subversion occurs when the structure that represents the ex-
tension of the self is turned threateningly back on it:
Just as all aspects of the concrete structure are inevitably assimi-
lated into the process of torture, so too the contents of the
room, its furnishings, are converted into weapons: the most
common instance of this is the bathtub that figures prominently
in the reports from numerous countries, but it is only one
among many.' 96
Indeed, torture gains an added edge when a familiar structure is sud-
denly given a sinister valence, a conversion that itself becomes a meta-
phor for the dissolution of civilization into brutality.
The symbol of the closet differs from this symbol of the room in that
it does not posit an ambient room that has been invaded by another, and
whose furnishings are used against the owner. Rather, it configures its
pain as a kind of room that is definitionally uncomfortable and un-
furnished. There is no invader, save perhaps the threatened one with his
hand on the outside knob. The symbol does not need to pose that in-
vader, for the closet itself performs that invasion.
Scarry's analysis of the room, when extended to the closet, is almost
uncanny in its ability to reveal the particularities of the oppression of the
closeted homosexual. First, if both room and closet are the body writ
large, 197 the closet is not writ large enough. If the room provides crude
versions of the senses in its windows and doors, creating a permeable
membrane between self and world,198 the closet, posed initially with its
door firmly closed, is a body that is blind and that cannot feel the exter-
nal world. If the room stabilizes the temperature to relieve the body of
that work,199 the closet is, definitionally, "close"-uncomfortable and
even suffocating. If the room, through its walls, stabilizes the nearness of
others to ensure intimacy,200 the closet achieves that distance by giving
only enough space for solitude. Thus, while the room draws a charmed
circle around an individual, the closet draws a conscribing one, providing
senselessness rather than sense, discomfort rather than comfort, solitude
rather than intimacy.
Similarly, both room and closet are the world writ small, but the
closet is a world overly miniaturized, collapsed into insignificance. The
walls of a room, Scarry states, realize the human being's impulse to pro-
ject himself outward, and in their independence from the body represent
the acts of making that are the constitutive parts of civilization. Similarly,
the furniture in the room is enough not like the self to provide the self
with relief from the discomfort it would suffer on its own.
196. Id. at 40.
197. See id. at 38.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 39.
200. See id.
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Both in the details of its outer structure and in its furniture
(from "furnir" meaning "to further" or "to forward," to project
oneself outward) the room accommodates and thereby elimi-
nates from human attention the human body: the simple triad
of floor, chair, and bed (or simpler still, floor, stool, and mat)
makes spatially and therefore steadily visible the collection of
postures and positions the body moves in and out of, objectifies
the three locations within the body that most frequently hold
the body's weight, objectifies its need continually to shift within
itself the locus of its weight, objectifies, finally, its need to be-
come wholly forgetful of its weight, to move weightlessly into a
larger mindfulness.
20 1
Close and unfurnished, the closet denies the right of the body to project
itself outward. It provides only a floor (and only a floor to stand on),
thereby denying the body's "need continually to shift within itself the lo-
cus of its weight."20 2 With that denial, it ensures that the body will never
be able to forget itself, or move "into a larger mindfulness."20 3 The closet
teaches the body misplaced within it to be obsessively conscious of its
discomfort and thus of itself.
If the closet provides a symbol for gay pain, it also has nested within
it the means of liberation. The closet is a place of storage or for visitation
rather than a place of habitation-a person who resides there is on the
wrong side of the door. That intuition of misplacement is abetted by the
fact that closet doors never remain closed. In quotidian life, the utility of
closets rests on their ability to be opened and closed, they are not
designed as places where things are lost beyond retrieval, they are "[a] ny
small room: especially one belonging to or communicating with a larger
[one]. 20 4 To compare gay oppression to the body's confinement in the
closet is to retain liberation as normative. Indeed, while the closet may
be locked, there is something unnatural about a closet (or room) that is
perpetually locked. We know that the sanctums of the fairy tale-
Bluebeard's closet,20 5 the king's room in Trusty John,206 and the room of
the Master Maid 2°7-are closed up with the strictest injunction that they
should never be opened. We also know, from the moment the injunction
is delivered, that both it and the closet will be breached.
Most obviously, the closet is not the body. The symbol of the closet is
analogous to the body in that both are loci of entrapment. The closet
traps the homosexual body within its confines just as the man's body traps




204. OED, supra note 190, at 350 (emphasis added).
205. See Blue Beard, in The Blue Fairy Book 356 (Andrew Lang ed., 1948).
206. See TrustyJohn, in The Blue Fairy Book, supra note 205, at 363.
207. See The Master Maid, in The Blue Fairy Book, supra note 205, at 148.
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sion."208 In both cases, moreover, the cure for the tension between the
container and the contained is the removal of the latter from the former.
The two symbols differ, however, in the relative value they place on the
container and the contained. In the case of inversion, the container is
the valued object, and the contained is removed as an act of exorcism.
The object of science, psychology, and religion has been to cast homosex-
uality out of the body. In the case of the closet, the contained is more
valuable than the container, making removal a liberation rather than a
purge. It is not homosexuality that must come out of the body, but the
homosexual body that must come out of a confining structure. The rela-
tive value placed on container and contained, of course, reflects a differ-
ence in value placed on homosexuality itself.
2. Protective Closet. - The negative effects of the protective closet on
gay political mobilization may seem less clear, because the closet in this
formulation possesses a benign aspect. It provides a "room for privacy or
retirement"20 9 or a "place of private study or secluded speculation, '210
spaces in which to amass the intellectual and spiritual resources that are
needed in the world beyond. The injunctions against "outing" made by
the gay community seem implicitly motivated by the understanding that
the closet is a protective structure, and that to force someone out prema-
turely is an act of violence.2 11 The protective aspects of the invisibility
afforded by the closet might militate for a finding of political power. As
noted, the Court seems to share the view that, ceteris paribus, invisibility
leads to greater power for a minority: illegitimates were deemed more
powerful because they were invisible while women were deemed less pow-
erful because they were not.
21 2
While the closet has a benign aspect, that aspect nonetheless has a
negative impact on gay mobilization. The protective aspects of the closet
have sinister long-term implications. The comfort provided by the closet
prevents people from going into a radically uncomfortable world. While
the closet may be a small room "belonging to or communicating with a
larger [one],"213 it often can be experienced as a room that belongs to
nothing and communicates with nothing. The homosexual's sojourn in
the closet is a benign tenancy but an oppressive residency.214 When one
208. See Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 87 ("[T]here was, and there persists... the
trope of inversion, anima muliebris in corpore virili indusa-a woman's soul trapped in a
man's body'-and vice versa."). Indeed, some writers have analogized the closet to the
body: "We see [our souls] bound.., to the narrow closet of a man's body." OED, supra
note 190, at 350; see also id. ("This skinne... is also called the litle closet of the heart.").
209. OED, supra note 190, at 349.
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 151, at 1-2 (1993); Michelangelo Signorile, Queer in
America 70-77 (1993).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 112-113.
213. OED, supra note 190, at 350.
214. See Stanley Siegel & Ed Lowe, Jr., Uncharted Lives: Understanding the Life
Passages of Gay Men 67-68 (1994).
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settles into the closet, the contemplative life begins to sap the active one,
and the closeted person can be cautioned about the dangers of an overly
cloistered life.215 As Chesterfield noted in 1746, "The knowledge of the
world is only to be acquired in the world, and not in a Closet."2 16
One objection to the argument that the gay closet is oppressive even
in its protective aspects is that gays may choose at any time to leave it. If
gays stay closeted, the objection goes, they are exercising a choice to em-
phasize privacy over visibility, and choice implies power. While more op-
tions create more power for the individual, however, they might not cre-
ate more power for the group. As Ackerman has noted, the fact that gay
individuals can exit (or not enter) their group adversely affects their
political mobilization.2 17 The history of women's ability to refusejury ser-
vice illustrates this dynamic.2 18 In Hoyt v. Florida, for example, the Court
upheld a Florida statute that allowed women to choose to serve on ajury
but which required men to do so, observing that a "woman is still re-
garded as the center of home and family life." 219 While this ostensibly
gave individual women more power than individual men by allowing
them to take refuge in the protective structure of the home, it dis-
empowered women as a group in the community vis-A-vis men by sapping
their participation on juries. Similarly, by taking individual solace in the
structure of the closet, individual gays deprive their communities of ac-
countable members.
Seen in this light, the closet fashions a prisoner's dilemma, which
can be represented by the familiar two-by-two matrix:
220
215. See id.
216. OED, supra note 190, at 349 (quoting 8 The Letters of Philip Dormer Stanhope,
Fourth Earl of Chesterfield 779 (Bonamy Dobree ed., 1932); see also id. at 350 ("'We see
[our souls] bound.., to the narrow closet of a man's body.'") (quoting Nathaniel Fairfax,
A Treatise of the Bulk and Selvedge of the World 147 (1674); id. at 349 ("[I] n their closets
they make men exactly suited to their systems; but.., such men as exist nowhere else.'")
(quoting 1 The Life of Gouvemeur Morris 311 (Jared Sparks ed. 1832)).
217. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 724-26.
218. I am indebted to Akhil Amar for this example.
219. 368 U.S. 57, 62 (1961). Hoyt was effectively overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
220. The assumption underlying the dilemma is that one person who "benefits
greatly" cannot exceed the sum of two people who "benefit." Thus the top left comer
maximizes communal utility.
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A Comes Out A Remains Closeted
B Comes Out A benefits A benefits greatly
B benefits B benefits minimally
(Cooperative (A freerides on B)
Liberation)
B Remains Closeted A benefits minimally A benefits minimally
B benefits greatly B benefits minimally
(B freerides on A) (Mutual
Disempowerment)
The prisoner's dilemma teaches that in the absence of the ability to com-
municate, parties will not reach the communally optimal solution, be-
cause their individual value-maximizing choices will push them toward
the bottom right-hand box. The closet, of course, is a good metaphor for
the prison cell posited by the prisoner's dilemma, insofar as it prevents
parties from communicating with each other. A cannot get the informa-
tion he needs about B's likely action because the question: "If I come
out, will you come out too?" is a speech act that performs the coming out
at issue even as it is posed. The often-voiced desire among gay activists
that all gays would turn a distinctive color (thereby making them into a
new "race")221 is a desire to overcome the prisoner's dilemma; that desire
highlights that the closet, protective as it is for individuals, hurts the polit-
ical vitality of the community.
B. Political Powerlessness
How well, then, do each of the three conventional tests of political
powerlessness-the Frontiero test, the Cleburne test, and the Carolene test-
capture the oppression of the closet? This Part now turns to doctrine to
show that each test fails to measure the political powerlessness of gays
accurately because each in its different way fails to understand how the
closet shapes that political powerlessness. The Part concludes by demon-
strating that such understanding is not an unattainable ideal. An exam-
ple of a court exhibiting an admirable understanding of the effects of the
closet on gay powerlessness can be found, although it arises from the pri-
vacy context rather than the Equal Protection context. A comparison of
two cases in the privacy context-one which does not consider the closet
and one which does-underscores the importance of this understanding.
1. The Frontiero Test. - The Frontiero test asks whether a group is
represented in the "decisionmaking councils" of the country.2 22 As ap-
plied to gays, it suffers from the obvious defect of failing to distinguish
221. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 151, at 49 ("'I have often wished that all gay people
would turn blue at the same moment and thereby put an end to our oppression ....')
(quoting Nancy Walker, Yanking Them Out, Gay Community News, May 14, 1983, at 5).
222. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1973).
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between closeted and out members of decisionmaking councils.223 The
panel of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals that employed this test in
the gay context stated that "[h]omosexuals are not without political
power. Time magazine reports that one Congressman is an avowed homo-
sexual, and that there is a charge that five other top officials are known to
be homosexual."
2 24
Even if one grants this claim, of course, this is an absurd argument,
as six Congressmen do not political power make.2 25 But consciousness
about the closet renders patent the real irony in Ben-Shalom: the court's
reliance on the five politicians "charged" with being homosexuals. The
only source cited for the proposition that these politicians are reputedly
gay is entitled "How to Spread a Smear," indicating that the top officials
were "smeared" by the identity of being gay.22 6 The court does not con-
sider that advocates who have to be "charged" with having a particular
group identification are unlikely to be effective advocates for that
group. 22 7 Indeed, closeted Members of Congress, especially those
charged with being homosexual, may be precisely the people who need
to prove they are not homosexual by distancing themselves from gay in-
terests and even supporting and-gay legislation. As Sedgwick notes: "[I] t
is entirely within the experience of gay people to find that a homophobic
figure in power has, if anything, a disproportionate likelihood of being
gay and closeted."
228
One argument against the assertion that only "out" gays should be
counted is that Frontiero does not make any distinction between whether a
person acknowledges his or her minority group status. The number of
223. I employ the terms "closeted" and "out" here in the way they are commonly used.
I further explore (and contest) that common usage below. See infra notes 263-264 and
accompanying text.
224. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 n.9 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Margaret
Carlson, How to Spread a Sexual [sic] Smear, Time, June 19, 1989, at 33 (the court
mistakenly added the word "Sexual" before "Smear")).
225. In Frontiero, the fact that there were only fourteen women in Congress was
sufficient to find political powerlessness. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 n.17.
226. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 466 n.9.
227. As Judge Norris noted in Watkins v. United States Army: "[T]he social, economic,
and political pressures to conceal one's homosexuality commonly deter many gays from
openly advocating pro-homosexual legislation, thus intensifying their inability to make
effective use of the political process." 847 F.2d 1329, 1348 (9th Cir.), vacated en banc, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
228. Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 81; see also id. at 242-46 (giving examples). Janet
Halley reproduces part of a Studs Terkel interview with Ted Allenby, a Marine
dishonorably discharged for his homosexuality:
TERKEL: Did you take part in the banter?
ALLENBY: Of course. You have to, otherwise somebody'd suspect you. You
develop quite a repertory of tricks to prevent detection. Be even more vociferous
than everybody else.
Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and
Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 915, 934 n.67 (1989) (quoting Studs Terkel, The Good
War An Oral History of World War Two 180 (1984)) (emphasis added).
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women in Congress was relevant for the purposes of the test, but the
political views of the women were not. Similarly, the argument would
run, the test as applied to gays properly counts the number of homosexu-
als, rather than their anti-gay political views. This argument, however,
fails precisely because it ignores the dynamic of the closet that allows per-
sons to reject their identity in a way that is impossible for members of
minorities that have visible differentiating traits. The closeted homosex-
ual is not saying "I am gay but I will not always vote gay," but rather "I am
not gay." The equivalent is thus not the woman who states "I am not a
feminist," but rather the woman who says "I am not a woman." The very
absurdity of a woman denying her identity in this manner raises the pre-
sumption that the issue of persons of minority groups disavowing their
identities was not one that concerned the Frontiero Court when it dis-
cussed exclusion from our "Nation's decisionmaking councils."2 29 By
counting closeted gays in their tallies, courts risk adding what they should
be subtracting from their estimates of gay power; an unmodified applica-
tion of the Frontiero test thus systematically overestimates gay power.
Regardless of whether one chooses to modify the Frontiero test, it will
be of only limited value because the total number of gays in the country is
not known. Power is a ratio, not an absolute number: political power in
the nation's decisionmaking councils cannot be assessed without an un-
derstanding of the size of the constituency being represented. The lower
a court's estimate of gays in the population, the more likely it will be to
interpret a given presence as indicating power. Conversely, the higher a
court's estimate of gays in the population, the more likely it will be to
interpret a given presence as indicating powerlessness. The problem with
assessing this ratio in the context of gays is that one of its terms is ob-
scured-call this the problem of the "closeted denominator."23 0
229. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 n.17 (1978).
230. Bruce Bawer summarizes the "numbers game" as follows:
There is no other prejudice whose practitioners play numbers games. From the
appearance of the Kinsey Reports in 1948 and 1953 until very recently, it was a
truism that about 10 percent ofAmericans are homosexual. This would make the
gay population roughly equal to that of blacks and Hispanics and four times that
ofJews. Some gays thought the percentage was even higher; others would have
placed it closer to six or seven. Homophobes made a point of disputing these
numbers, as if they found unbelievable or intolerable, or both, the very idea that
so many Americans were gay, and as if it were somehow more permissible to
abuse a smaller minority than a larger one. These homophobes argued that gays
make up only 3 or 4 percent of the population, or even as little as 1 or 2. They
based these figures on surveys in which people are asked if they have ever had
"homosexual intercourse." One problem with using the results of such surveys to
determine the percentage of gays in the population is that many gays have never
had "homosexual intercourse," if by that term one means anal penetration;
another problem, of course, is that a large percentage of gays are so deeply
closeted that they would never respond truthfully to such a survey.
Bruce Bawer, A Place at the Table: The Gay Individual in American Society 82 (1993).
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When closeted gays are properly excluded from the headcount, gay
presence in the nation's decisionmaking councils is so minuscule that it
seems that any plausible estimate of the number of gays in the population
would lead to a finding of political powerlessness. However, the closeted-
ness of the denominator allows judges to substitute their own private esti-
mates. If lack of exposure to gays leads to underestimating their num-
bers,23' such a substitution may have adverse consequences. This is
because judges may be particularly prone to underestimating the gay
population. As Judge Posner has noted: "IJ]udges know next to nothing
about [sex and sexuality] beyond their own personal experience, which is
limited, perhaps more so than average, because people with irregular sex
lives are pretty much... screened out of the judiciary."2 2 The degree to
which gays are underrepresented in the nation's decisionmaking councils
will only become apparent when gays are more visible in the general pop-
ulation.233 Ironically, that visibility is not likely to occur until gays be-
come more politically empowered and therefore less needful of judicial
protection.
2. The Cleburne Test. - The Cleburne test inquires whether the
group has been able to get the "attention of lawmakers."23 4 The test fo-
cuses not on the number of group members, but rather on the number of
group sympathizers, in the legislature. 23 5 The common indicia that a
group has earned "the attention of lawmakers," such as the amount of
pro-gay legislation passed, are reasonably objective and have not been
seriously contested. For example, it is uncontested that there are state
statutes, executive orders, and municipal regulations that prohibit dis-
crimination against gays.23 6 Yet there is great controversy about how to
interpret this data. Courts have used identical evidence regarding pro-
gay legislation as indicative of both gay power237 and powerlessness.
238
231. I realize that this assumption may be contestable, but it seems intuitively
plausible.
232. Posner, supra note 17, at 1.
233. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting irony that "the only discrimination courts may remedy is
the discrimination they alone are perspicacious enough to see" because once legislature
takes note, courts' hands are tied.).
234. Id. at 432.
235. While it is not necessarily true that sympathizers would oumumber members
(because, as the case of gays indicates, members are not necessarily sympathizers) one
would generally expect this to be the case, making a finding of political powerlessness
under the Cekburne standard more likely than under Frontiero.
236. For an often cited summary, see Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1508, 1667-68 (1989) [hereinafter
Developments].
237. See High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 74 &
n.10 (9th Cir. 1990) (identifying antidiscrimination legislation as a sign of political potency
for gays and citing Developments, supra note 236, at 1667-68).
238. SeeJantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1550 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing Developments,
supra note 236, at 1667 n.49, 1668 n.51).
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Courts that attempt to adduce evidence that gays are politically pow-
erful, however, are convicted by their own words. One court stated that
"[o] ne need only remember St. Patrick's Day 1991 in New York City to
see Mayor David Dinkins marching in the traditionally Irish-Catholic
parade with homosexual groups and activists who were important sup-
porters during his tough mayoral campaign."239 The court does not ask
why one can be expected to remember this event. Dinkins marching with
the gays is memorable because it is the exception that proves the rule of
politicians not wanting to support gays.
The closet, of course, cannot account for all the obstacles gays face
in garnering the sympathy of legislators. Like any other stigmatized
group, gays have dfficulty because supporters risk acquiring some of that
stigma through association. As Judge Norris noted in Watkins v. United
States Army, gays have difficulty forming cross-group coalitions because
"[e]lected officials sensitive to public prejudice may refuse to support leg-
islation that even appears to condone homosexuality."240 The Army had
ascribed this reluctance to the fact that toleration might be seen as tacit
approval of homosexuality.241 While this is a serious problem, it is not
confined to minorities for whom the closet is a shaping influence. If
blacks, for example, are stigmatized, pro-black supporters will be tainted
through association as well.
On the other hand, when attempting to form cross-group coalitions,
gays encounter three problems that are not faced by minorities who are
unaffected by the closet. First, the problem of the closeted denominator
recurs. As Judge Canby noted in his dissent from a denial of rehearing
en banc in High Tech Gays:
Compare the situation [of gays] with that of blacks, who clearly
constitute a suspect category for equal protection purposes.
Blacks are protected by three federal constitutional amend-
ments, major federal Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1870, 1871, 1875
(ill-fated .though it was), 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, and 1968, as
well as by antidiscrimination laws in 48 of the states. By that
comparison, and by absolute standards as well, homosexuals are
politically powerless.242
Judge Canby thus assumes that the number of gays cannot be so much
smaller than the number of blacks that it would justify a finding that gays
are politically powerful while blacks, who have much more legislation
passed in their favor, are deemed politically powerless. Indeed, in argu-
239. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd sub. nom. Steffan v.
Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Stefian v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (en banc).
240. 847 F.2d 1329, 1348 (9th Cir.), vacated en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)
(citing Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1285, 1304 n.96 (1985)).
241. Id. at 1348 (citing Army's Opening Brief at 17, 19 n.9, 30 n.18).
242. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 378 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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ing that "by absolute standards as well, homosexuals are politically power-
less," Judge Canby notes that no reasonable estimate of gays could permit
a finding that gays were not powerless.243 The indeterminacy of the gay
population in the United States may thus appear moot until the amount
of pro-gay legislation grows in significance. However, this indeterminacy
serves anti-gay purposes, insofar as it allows judges to evade the force of
Judge Canby's analogy by obscuring the statistic that would cinch the
analogy tight.
Second, the closet decreases the likelihood of cross-group empathy.
Cross-group empathy means that "[o]ne can empathize without having
been there."244 Political power thus depends not only on the number of
group members, but on the number of group empathizers. People
achieve such empathy by rubbing elbows with others: "The more we get
to know people who are different in some ways, the more we will begin to
appreciate the ways in which they are not, which is the beginning of polit-
ical cooperation."245 While most male legislators will never be women,
most will have intimate relationships with women. We can expect these
relationships to do some of the work of "internalizing" the costs of bur-
densome legislation. When such relationships do not exist, however, we
need to be more careful. As Ely notes, legislators are likely to interact
with homosexuals, 246 and with other non-homosexuals who are also hurt
by homophobia.247 However, because of the closet, legislators may not
know that they are doing so. Thus, stereotypes "are likely to remain
fixed, given our obliviousness to the fact that the people around us may
well be counterexamples."2 48
Finally, just as the closet makes it unclear that gays are gay, it also
makes it unclear that straights are straight. Because gays can masquerade
as straight, every person who holds himself out as "straight" is suspect.
Straights who support gays thus risk being cast as gay themselves, and are
243. See id. (Canby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
244. Ely, supra note 87, at 160.
245. Id. at 161 (citations omitted).
246. See id. at 162.
247. See id. Homophobia often affects non-homosexuals, in part through the third-
party harms caused by closeted homosexuals. As Bawer notes, "the perpetuation of the
closet is harmful not only to homosexuals but to society at large. It harms the woman who
marries a secretly gay man and one day, perhaps after twenty years of marriage, finds him
in bed with another man. It harms the children of such unions." Bawer, supra note 230, at
68.
248. Ely, supra note 37, at 163. Jeffries recounts one conversation between Powell
and his gay clerk as follows:
When told that (as the clerk believed) 10 percent of the population was gay,
Powell was incredulous. "I don't believe I've ever met a homosexual," he told his
astonished clerk. "Certainly you have" came back the reply, "but you just don't
know that they are." In North Africa, Powell said, "not a single episode of
homosexuality was reported" despite several months away from women, but the
clerk insisted that the behavior would have occurred without Powell's knowledge.
Jeffries, supra note 141, at 521.
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deterred from expressing pro-gay sympathies. As Janet Halley notes,
"one's mere participation in political action to alter laws affecting gays
and lesbians can precipitously earn one a public homosexual identity. '249
Straights who feel that they cannot afford to be perceived as gay thus will
eschew any association with gays. As the Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army
court noted:
No soldier would dare be caught reading anything that might be
construed as a homosexually-oriented book or magazine. No
soldier would want to be observed in the company of any person
suspected of being a homosexual. Most importantly, no soldier
would even want to make any statements that might be inter-
preted as supporting homosexuality.
2 50
The invisibility of homosexuality forces all pro-gay advocates, straight or
gay, to assume the social costs of being gay. The military makes gay advo-
cacy potentially career-ending, and therefore prohibitively costly. Even
when the consequences of gay advocacy are not career-ending, they will
dissuade those with limited political capital from investing it in pro-gay
causes. Consider a politician faced with the choice of forming a coalition
with a gay group or a racial group of comparable power.2- ' Given that
both groups have the same power, the politician will get the same benefit
from either of them. However, the costs the politician incurs by allying
with gays are much higher than those he incurs by allying with the racial
group. The white who defends blacks is a "nigger-lover," but not a "nig-
ger"; the straight who defends gays is a "queer-lover," and a possible
"queer." Viewed solely from a utility-maximizing perspective, therefore, a
rational straight legislator will never form an alliance with gays if a com-
parable group with a visible differentiating characteristic can be found.
3. The Carolene Products Test. - A third test for political powerless-
ness asks whether gays are a "discrete and insular" minority. This stan-
dard comes from the famous footnote in Carolene Products, which states in
part that "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition... curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry." 252
Bruce Ackerman has criticized the "discrete and insular" language as
having outlived its usefulness. 25 3 He argues that "discrete and insular"
minorities, in actuality, may be more politically powerful than "anony-
mous and diffuse" minorities, because the former have less of a free-rider
249. Halley, supra note 228, at 973.
250. 489 F. Supp. 964, 974 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
251. The word power rather than size is appropriate here, given that, as described
below, a gay group is likely to have less power than a racial group of comparable size. In
order to isolate the stigma at issue here, it is necessary to control for the power differential.
252. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
253. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 717.
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problem,2 M lower organizational costs, 255 and greater influence over
election outcomes.256 Ackerman further warns that the "discrete and in-
sular" standard may be deployed to withhold protection from groups that
are disadvantaged in the bargaining process in the precise manner the
Carolene Products Court sought to correct.2
7
Even if one attempts to argue within the doctrinal language, its im-
plications for gays are not clear. Gays might be characterized as "anony-
mous and diffuse" or as "discrete and insular."258 On the one hand,
many "closeted" gays live out their lives without ever disclosing their hom-
sexuality to another person. In order to protect the integrity of their
closets, they must eschew the company of other homosexuals. Such gays
might be characterized as "anonymous and diffuse." 259 On the other
hand, "out" gays band together by living in the gay ghettos of major ur-
ban areas like New York or San Francisco, frequenting gay establish-
ments, and establishing social networks of "families they choose" consist-
ing of other gay persons. 260 After relinquishing the protection of the
closet, homosexuals are so threatened with prejudice that they need an
254. See id. at 724-26.
255. See id. at 726.
256. See id. at 726-28.
257. See id. at 745-46. Judge Posner notes that some groups that traditionally have
been thought to be "discrete and insular" no longer merit that description. However, he
disagrees with Ackerman's conclusion that the standard has outlived its usefulness. Rather,
he contends that the groups have outlived their need for protection. He states: "It is no
longer true that blacks orJews or Orientals or even American Indians constitute 'discrete
and insular minorities' despised by a politically, economically, and socially dominant
majority... or that these groups lack political power ... ." Richard A. Posner, The Federal
Courts: Crisis and Reform 188 (1985) (quoting Caroene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
258. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 97.
259. It would be an oversimplification to say that closeted gays relinquish all of their
political power. One notable way in which closeted gays are not politically powerless is the
manner in which they vote. The anonymity of the American voting process allows even the
closeted citizen to wield power at the polls. The voting booth itself may be seen as a kind
of protective closet, safeguarding gays under the more general mantle of giving people the
privacy to vote their conscience. Yet two counterpoints should also be noted. First,
closeted gays themselves must be divided into gays who are closeted to themselves or who
admit their homosexuality but suppress it and those who are closeted to others out of fear
of external repercussions but who have a pro-gay consciousness. Anonymity will not make
the former group vote pro-gay, while it might well allow the latter group to do so. Treating
closeted gays as a uniform group that can take advantage of the anonymity of the voting
booth is thus an error. Second, as Ackerman notes, the Caroene Products footnote was not
directed solely at persons who were denied the vote. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at
715-17. To the contrary, the footnote specifically alms to protect enfranchised persons
disempowered in other ways. Thus, even if all closeted gays voted pro-gay in the voting
booth, their disempowerment in other aspects of their life would still make them a cause
for concern under Carolene Products.
260. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 97.
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alternative mechanism of protection. 261 Many find this in numbers; that
is, in insularity. These gays may be described as "discrete and insular."262
Having thus complicated the picture of the gay political community,
it is tempting to summarize by describing that community as comprised
of two kingdoms-one discrete and insular, one anonymous and dif-
fuse-divided by the closet door. Yet even this more sophisticated char-
acterization will not lie pat, for it implies that each individual gay can be
placed definitively inside or outside the closet. However, this is one of
the ways in which the closet metaphor, by positing a binary of "in" and
"out," fails to describe the experience of gay men and lesbians. As
Sedgwick writes:
Even at an individual level, there are remarkably few of even the
most openly gay people who are not deliberately in the closet
with someone personally or economically or institutionally im-
portant to them. Furthermore, the deadly elasticity of heter-
osexist presumption means that, like Wendy in Peter Pan, people
find new walls springing up around them even as they drowse:
every encounter with a new classful of students, to say nothing of
a new boss, social worker, loan officer, landlord, doctor, erects
new closets whose fraught and* characteristic laws of optics and
physics exact from at least gay people new surveys, new calcula-
tions, new draughts and requisitions of secrecy or disclosure.
Even an out gay person deals daily with interlocutors about
whom she doesn't know whether they know or not; it is equally
difficult to guess for any given interlocutor whether, if they did
know, the knowledge would seem very important. Nor-at the
most basic level-is it unaccountable that someone who wanted
ajob, custody or visiting rights, insurance, protection from vio-
lence, from "therapy," from distorting stereotype, from insulting
scrutiny, from simple insult, from forcible interpretation of their
bodily product, could deliberately choose to remain in or to re-
enter the closet in some or all segments of their life. The gay
closet is not a feature only of the lives of gay people. But for
many gay people it is still the fundamental feature of social life;
and there can be few gay people, however courageous and forth-
right by habit, however fortunate in the support of their imme-
diate communities, in whose lives the closet is not still a shaping
presence. 263
Gays can never be out and be done with it; they must continually reiterate
their sexual orientation against a heterosexist presumption that reinstates
itself at every pause.26 The most damaging failure of the closet symbol is
261. See id.
262. See id.
263. Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 68.
264. Gays tired of doing the work of coming out verbally sometimes choose to do it
performatively. Signs like an earring in the right ear, a pink triangle button, a "fag tag," a
necklace of freedom rings, are used to counter default presumptions of heterosexuality in
ways that words cannot. Such a relinquishment of control over one's identity, however,
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perhaps that it misrepresents the continuum of a person's disclosure of
his or her homosexual orientation as a binary constructed from the
endpoints of that continuum. One is either "out" or "closeted": the
closet with its rigid door between the "outside" and the "inside" does not
lend itself to subtler gradations. However, these gradations are not only
relevant, but crucial to an understanding of gay oppression. First, gays
come out in a gradual process that is misrepresented by a construct that
marks some point as the point at which they "come out." Second, most
gays disclose their homosexuality to some but not to others-for example
to their families but not their co-workers, or vice versa-in a way that the
closet, which does not perform such discrimination between audiences,
fails to reflect. Finally, because it is impossible for any gay to be fully
"out" or "closeted," the endpoints of the continuum on which the binar-
ism is based do not exist.
This reinforces Ackerman's thesis that the "discrete and insular" test
derived from the Carolene footnote is of limited use in the evaluation of
political powerlessness. Moreover, even if the test were generally appro-
priate, it would be hard to apply in the case of gays, since gays are both
"discrete and insular" and "anonymous and diffuse." Once again, when
we use a traditional test to measure gay political powerlessness, we dis-
cover that it fails to capture the shaping influence of the closet, and
therefore fails to capture gay identity.
4. Closet Cases: Sipple and Coors. - Any inquiry about gay political
powerlessness that does not consider the effects of the closet is necessarily
reductive. No court considering an Equal Protection claim has invoked
the closet explicitly in its discussion of heightened scrutiny for gays. How-
ever, a pair of cases outside the Equal Protection context demonstrate the
practical consequences of an understanding of the closet. Each case
weighed the right of gays to keep their homosexuality private against the
right of others to disclose it. In the first, Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co.,
the court failed to consider the closet in its analysis favoring disclosure,
although the symbol might have resolved one of the seeming contradic-
tions in the opinion. 265 In the second, Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, the
court appeared to privilege privacy over disclosure (although it re-
manded the case for further consideration of the issue) by relying heavily
on the symbol of the closet.2 6 6 Obviously, there are numerous ways of
explaining why these courts reached their different results, but ajuxtapo-
sition of these cases shows that an understanding of the closet might ex-
plain that difference.
may have severe costs, as stories of gays bashed simply for such visible proof of identity
indicate. See, e.g., American Values, Orlando Sentinel, July 3, 1993, at A16, available in
1993 WL 5231148.
265. See 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Ct. App. 1984).
266. See 570 F. Supp. 202, 209 n.24 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
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Oliver "Bill" Sipple foiled an assassination attempt on President
Ford, and newspapers reporting on the event disclosed that he was gay.2 67
Sipple brought suit against these newspapers alleging tortious invasion of
privacy.2 68 He stated that publication of his sexual orientation was offen-
sive to him "inasmuch as his parents, brothers and sisters learned for the
first time of his homosexual orientation; and that as a consequence of
disclosure of private facts about his life [he] was abandoned by his family,
exposed to contempt and ridicule causing him great mental anguish, em-
barrassment and humiliation."269 The trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the defendants. 270 The court of appeals affirmed, resting its de-
termination in part on the finding that Sipple's homosexuality was not a
private fact.271 In making this finding, the court noted that Sipple spent
time in areas of San Francisco and other cities known to be gay haunts,
that he marched in gay parades, that he was friends with prominent
homosexuals, and that his name and sexual orientation had been re-
ported in various gay magazines. 272 The court concluded that because
Sipple's "sexual orientation was already in the public domain and since
the articles in question did no more than to give further publicity to mat-
ters which appellant left open to the eye of the public, a vital element of
the tort was missing, rendering it vulnerable to summary disposal.1273
The court's reasoning seems cogent: after all, if one discloses some
information to a large group of people, it seems reasonable that one
thereby assumes the risk that this information may be made generally
public by the media. Yet this train of reasoning does not explain a funda-
mental contradiction in the two pictures of Sipple that emerge from the
case. One picture is of a person who has integrated his homosexuality
into his public life: Sipple marches in parades, hobnobs with gay activists,
and figures in the gay press.2 74 The other is of a person who keeps his
homosexuality intensely private from his parents, brothers, and sisters.275
Far from attempting to resolve this contradiction between Sipple's public
and private homosexual identity, the court catches him in it. The court
portrays Sipple as the most irrational of actors-the politically active fig-
ure who is afraid that someone will tell his mother on him.
"Irrationality" may be one explanation of this contradiction, but the
closet provides a better one. In avoiding any discussion of the closet, the
court refused to entertain the possibility that Sipple's seemingly paradoxi-
cal management of his homosexual identity had a deep logic to it. In
choosing to lead his double life, Sipple had to calculate the probability
267. See Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
268. See id. at 667.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id. at 668.





HeinOnline  -- 96 Colum. L. Rev. 1812 1996
SUSPECT SYMBOLS
that his activities in San Francisco would come to the attention of his
family, multiply that probability by the great harm he would suffer if dis-
covered, and weigh that product against the benefits of his activism.
Given that he probably could intuit the likely reaction of his family and
the possible benefits of his activism, the crucial variable that Sipple had to
estimate was the likelihood that his family would discover his homosexu-
ality. Sipple appears to have assumed that news of his political advocacy
was unlikely to travel beyond the community in which he was active.
Sipple banked on the fact that the readership of Data Boy, Pacific Coast
Times, and Male Express was unlikely to be the same as the readership of
the San Francisco Chronicle.2 76 This was not an irrational assumption. Not
only does the "mainstream" population distance itself from the discrete
and insular population of out gays, but "gay-friendly" persons often pro-
tect the privacy of gays.27 7 The closet from which one emerges when one
comes out to the gay community can be seen as nested within the closet
that one emerges from when one comes out to the larger community. It
is precisely this distinction between the two kinds of disclosure-one to
the "gay-friendly" public and one to the "general" public-that the court
overlooked when it stated that "the articles in question did no more than
give further publicity to matters which appellant left open to the eye of the
public."2 78 The first public the court mentions is the "general" public,
while the second is the "gay-friendly" public. In presenting the former as
a simple extension of the latter, the court mistakes a distinction in kind
for one of degree.
It is certainly true that Sipple's case tests the boundaries of that dis-
tinction, given that he arguably held himself out as gay to the "general"
public as well as the gay one by, for example, marching in parades.2 79 Yet
276. See id.
277. Sedgwick's presentation of the story of Powell's gay clerk as a hypothetical is one
example of this, as is Jeffries's (and for that matter my) decision not to name the clerk.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
278. Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 669 (emphasis added).
279. But even this is open to debate. Evidence for the proposition that gays perceive
the "gay" public to be distinct from the "general" public precisely in the way that Sipple did
can be found by going to any gay pride parade and watching how the marchers respond to
television cameras. Stationary cameras are often trained on the marchers as they pass, and
many marchers will avert their faces as they march by these cameras. Again, this seems like
a contradiction. Marchers in gay parades are engaged in a "public" act of asserting their
support for gays such that television coverage giving "further" publicity to the act should
not be a cause for their concern. Indeed, as the marchers presumably intend to
demonstrate public solidarity with gays, one might legitimately expect that further
publicity would be welcome. That this is not the case indicates that the marchers are
drawing a distinction between the two publics to which they are making their statement.
The public comprised of persons physically present at the parade, whether as marchers or
onlookers, is being distinguished from the more general public that may catch the parade
on television. That distinction seems sensible. After all, those who march in or who come
out to watch gay-pride parades (with the exception of protestors and some persons who
accidentally happen on it) are generally those who are sympathetic to gays. Marchers can
thus sustain a legitimate expectation that their disclosure of solidarity will not lead (at least
19961 1813
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the court's analysis would have been more subtle and accurate if it had
recognized the distinction before noting that Sipple had eroded it. It
would also have been more just, because that distinction is clearer in the
lives of many gay people. A court that regards the "public" as monolithic,
such that a single disclosure by a gay person of his or her homosexuality
can be seen as potentially leaving that person's homosexual identity open
to all, puts additional pressure on gays to keep their identities totally
secret.
The Coors court also faced the problem of how to balance a person's
right to keep his or her homosexuality private with another person's right
to know and disclose it.280 Coors, a brewery, had entered into a contract
with KQED, a public television station in the San Francisco bay area.
281
Coors alleged that Harold Wallace and the organization Solidarity, a
political group comprised solely of gay men and lesbians of which he was
a member, had tortiously interfered with the contract by dissuading the
station from fulfilling its contractual obligations.28 2 Coors, the plaintiff,
sought to discover the names of the membership of Solidarity, which
Solidarity refused to give up on the ground that such a disclosure would
chill its associational privacy or freedom of political expression under the
First Amendment.28 3 The magistrate judge who initially heard the case
rejected this defense and ordered Solidarity to answer the interrogatories
regarding its membership.2 84 As quoted by the district court, the magis-
trate judge stated: "'I really can't buy the First Amendment claims. I
don't find the chilling effect and I don't really see in these papers a solid
basis that would support the grounds on which you [Solidarity] object to
those interrogatories.'" 285
The district court's opinion attempted to show the magistrate judge
what he could not see. It noted that determining whether a constitu-
tional defense should pre-empt a discovery request necessarily entailed a
complicated weighing of interests, which it was not convinced that the
judge had undertaken.28 6 In particular, it chastised the magistrate judge
for not considering the effects of the closet:
We note that, although Solidarity filed affidavits as to some
avowed members' experience with "coming out of the closet," in
various professional and social settings, the Magistrate rebuked
Solidarity's attempted analogies to prejudicial treatment of
directly) to negative repercussions. In sharp contrast, marchers cannot sustain a similar
expectation of television viewers, who may happen upon the gay pride parade while
channel surfing.
280. See Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Cal. 1983).




285. Id. at 205 n.5 (quoting Reporter's Transcript, Dec. 1, 1982, at 7) (alteration in
original).
286. See id. at 205.
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members of the NAACP in the South and in the Black Panther
Party in the major Northern industrial cities out of hand. We
find this skepticism and curt dismissal inappropriate, in light of
the substantial case law which counsels great solicitude for such
claims. Indeed, if membership in the Republican Party is
deemed inviolably private, then membership in a far less popu-
lar, and far more fragile, association should be afforded at least
a similar level of protection.
2 8 7
With these and other comments on the closet, the court emphasized the
importance of the closet to a consideration of the privacy interests of
gays. The Coors court implied that the magistrate judge should expand
the contours of his discussion of the discovery rule to incorporate "softer"
forms of evidence, such as the "coming out" stories of gay men and
lesbians.
2 88
These cases have clear shortcomings in making the point that an ex-
plicit discussion of the closet will effect pragmatic changes in the Equal
Protection discourse surrounding gays. That one court was insensitive to
the privacy rights of gays and did not consider the closet, while another
court showed deeper sensitivity to those privacy rights and explicitly con-
sidered the closet, is not to say that the closet analysis necessarily accounts
for the difference in outcome. Correlation is not causation; even if it
were, it would be unclear which way the causation would run. After all, it
could be the greater sensitivity to gay privacy rights that incited the dis-
cussion of the closet rather than vice versa.
The point, however, is still worth making, in order to suggest that my
abstract analysis of the closet symbol may be concretely tethered to judi-
cial outcomes. In both Sipple and Coors, the rule of law at issue was osten-
sibly neutral on its face. The Sipple court operated on a premise of neu-
trality, implicitly finding that the rule should not be group sensitive.
Thus, it suggested that the efforts of a person attempting to maintain a
public and private identity should not be protected even where there
were valid motives particular to his group for doing so. The Coors court
rejected that premise of neutrality, emphasizing that civil suits (and spe-
cifically the ostensibly neutral discovery rules used therein) could be used
as "coercive devices to cripple, or subdue, vocal opponents," 2 89 and not-
ing that the need of many gays for anonymity makes them peculiarly vul-
nerable in this regard. The Coors court recognized that to allow the dis-
covery motion could, in essence, end the case, as avoiding forced
disclosure might be worth more to the defendants than defending the
suit. Even a conservative approach to these cases shows that to overcome
a court's default presumption that neutrality means applying rules against
287. Id. at 209 n.24 (citation omitted).
288. Cf. Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (giving detailed narrative
of gay plaintiff's struggle with his sexual identity), rev'd en banc, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir.
1985).
289. Coors, 570 F. Supp. at 209.
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all groups in the same way, one must make a credible case for why true
neutrality (insofar as it exists) means treating groups differently. The
closet makes that case.
Another challenge to the relevance of these cases is that they con-
cern the privacy rights of gays rather than their political powerlessness,
and that it is the latter, rather than the former, that is relevant to their
Equal Protection claims. This objection is much more easily overcome,
for in each case, the political repercussions of the privacy analysis form an
implicit or explicit corollary of the court's discussion. Implicit within
Sipple is the understanding that Sipple's political advocacy was held hos-
tage by the closet. As active as he was in San Francisco, his political activ-
ity would be conscribed to those communities that would not endanger
his closeted status in other communities. 2 90 The Coors court made that
connection explicitly:
[W]e recognize that protecting Solidarity's members from being
"plucked" involuntarily from the closet may be necessary to pre-
serving them, as a "discrete and insular minority," within the
political process. Justice Stone concluded, in a footnote which
has set the tone for the Supreme Court's consideration to all
threats to the exercise of minorities' constitutional rights, that
the greatest solicitude should be paid to those threats aimed at
suppressing an attempted exercise of political rights. Homosex-
uals attempting to form associations to represent their political
and social beliefs, free from the fatal reprisals for their sexual
orientation they anticipate in jobs or other social activities, are
just such a minority.29'
The Coors court's dictum exemplifies the tight connection between the
personal and the political, revealing that the "personal" privacy issue of
non-disclosure might have "political" repercussions deserving of Carolene
Products concern.
IV. IMMUTABILYIY AND THE BODY
The third prong of the Equal Protection test inquires whether the
characteristic that distinguishes the group is an immutable one. Unlike
the other two prongs of the test, the legitimacy of this entire prong (as
opposed to particular formulations of it) in the Equal Protection inquiry
has been challenged. Commentators have explicitly, and I believe rightly,
called for the retirement of the prong, and some courts have implicitly
withdrawn or finessed it. My approach in this Part differs from the ap-
290. Sipple's decision to sue after his family learned of his homosexuality is consistent
with the hypothesis that it was his family that was the greatest impediment to his universal
avowal of his homosexual identity. By bringing suit, Sipple guaranteed further disclosure
(and memorialization of his sexual orientation in law reviews for years to come).
Presumably, this additional publicity did not matter because the greatest harm had already
been done.
291. Coors, 570 F. Supp. at 209 n.24 (citing United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
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proach I take in the two preceding ones in that I use the symbol in order
to challenge the doctrinal inquiry rather than to answer it.
There are two justifications for why a group must be defined by an
immutable characteristic before it is accorded heightened scrutiny. The
first is that immutability is a proxy for status-based discrimination, given
that immutable characteristics are perceived to be beyond the control of
individuals. The second is that immutability can be a proxy for empathy
failure, given that people who know they will never have a characteristic
are less likely to empathize with those who do. While both justifications
must be assailed before one can properly call for the retirement of the
prong, I focus on the second. I do so because, as I will briefly summarize,
the first has already been soundly and rightly attacked, while the second,
although similarly flawed, has not. I do so also because I believe the em-
pathy-failure framework properly undergirds Equal Protection analysis.
This raises the question of why I seek to reject the second justifica-
tion (and the entire prong). The symbol of the body answers that ques-
tion. While immutability may sometimes be a proxy for empathy failure,
at other times it is not. An examination of how the body is deployed in
the gay context shows that homosexuality is one of the cases in which
immutability provides a poor proxy for empathy failure. Indeed, in the
case of gays mutability is a better proxy for empathy failure than immutabil-
ity. This is reflected in anti-gay deployment of the body, in which persons
obviously suffering from empathy failure for gays use the body to quiet
their fears about the mutability of sexual orientation. It is also seen in
pro-gay deployment of the body, in which persons who are not suffering
empathy failure for gays often use the body to make arguments that ho-
mosexuality is immutable. In both these cases, empathy failure is linked to
mutability, and empathy is linked to immutability, via the symbol of the
body.
A. Immutability
1. The Status Justification. - The first justification for the immutabil-
ity requirement is that immutability helps identify groups that are exper-
iencing status-based discrimination. The immutability prong has tradi-
tionally rested on this justification. The Supreme Court introduced this
prong in Frontiero by noting that discrimination on the basis of sex classifi-
cations "would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.'
' 292
According to Janet Halley, the Frontiero opinion foreshadowed the later
problems the Court would have with the status theory of immutability by
noting that many classifications based on immutable characteristics, such
as intelligence and physical disability, were unproblematic.2 93 Immutabil-
292. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
293. See Halley, supra note 8, at 507-08 (citing Frontwero, 411 U.S. at 686).
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ity was thus not a per se bar, and the prong could be waived if relevance
to a legitimate purpose was shown. Given that a statute must have a "le-
gitimate purpose" to survive even rational review, however, the exception
seems to engulf the rule. Halley quotes Ely's argument that this reliance
on "relevance to a legitimate purpose" in addition to the immutability
criterion swallows the immutability factor whole:
[C]lassifications based on physical disability and intelligence are
typically accepted as legitimate, even by judges and commenta-
tors who assert that immutability is relevant. The explanation,
when one is given, is that those characteristics (unlike the one
the commentator is trying to render suspect) are often relevant
to legitimate purposes. At that point, there's not much left of
the immutability theory, is there?
294
Halley then describes the lackluster reception that immutability got from
the Cleburne Court.295 The Cleburne Court, quoting the Ely passage above,
noted that the mentally retarded are "different, immutably so, in relevant
respects" from others, but did not infer the need for heightened scrutiny
from this difference. 296 As Halley concludes, "[a]fter Cleburne immutabil-
ity remains a factor, but it is not clear that the Court will ever again make
even an asymptotic approach to a claim that discrimination based on a
characteristic the bearer cannot shed is intrinsically repellent to any 'ba-
sic concept of our system."' 297
Judge Norris's opinion in Watkins v. United States Army, which con-
tains the most recent extended discussion of the immutability prong, cor-
roborates Halley's account.298 In that opinion, Judge Norris notes that:
Although the Supreme Court considers immutability relevant, it
is clear that by "immutability" the Court has never meant strict
immutability in the sense that members of the class must be
physically unable to change or mask the trait defining their
class. People can have operations to change their sex. Aliens
can ordinarily become naturalized citizens.... At a minimum,
then, the Supreme Court is willing to treat a trait as effectively
immutable if changing it would involve great difficulty, such as
requiring a major physical change or a traumatic change of
identity. Reading the case law in a more capacious manner, "im-
mutability" may describe those traits that are so central to a per-
son's identity that it would be abhorrent for government to pe-
294. Id. at 508 (quoting Ely, supra note 37, at 150 (alteration in original) (footnote
omitted)). Halley does point out, however, that there is something (although not much)
left of the immutability theory-namely that it can act as a tiebreaker in ordering two
equally relevant legislative classifications. See id.
295. See id. at 509-10.
296. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442
(1985).
297. Halley, supra note 8, at 510 (quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (quoting Weber
406 U.S. at 175)).
298. See 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.
1989).
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nalize a person for refusing to change them, regardless of how
easy that change might be physically. Racial discrimination, for
example, would not suddenly become constitutional if medical
science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of
changing one's skin pigment.2 99
Judge Norris's admission that he is reading the case law more capaciously
is perhaps an understatement. "Immutability" under his reading has noth-
ing to do with whether something can change, but rather with how im-
portant a characteristic is to the possessor's identity. Even under his
more conservative first formulation, immutability does not mean that a
characteristic is unchangeable, but only that it is difficult to change. In
both incarnations, "immutable characteristic" becomes a metonym for
"core identity" rather than remaining a synonym for a "characteristic the
bearer cannot shed."300
Based on her review of the judicial treatment of the status theory,
Halley criticizes the resurgence of immutability-based arguments among
gay-rights advocates. Halley notes that while the "folk" wisdom of saying
that one cannot help one's homosexuality "often is the only effective re-
source available to gay men, lesbians, and bisexuals seeking to persuade
their parents, coworkers, and neighbors that they can love someone of
the same sex and remain fully human,"301 it suffers from multiple defects
as a constitutional argument, notably that it excludes from its protection
those who cannot or will not assert that their homosexuality is immuta-
ble. 0 2 She concludes that gay-rights litigators should "cease and desist"
from invoking strong essentialist arguments about homosexuality.303
299. Id. (citing Tribe, supra note 39). Tribe notes that "even if race or gender
became readily mutable by biomedical means, I would suppose that laws burdening those
who choose to remain black or female would properly remain constitutionally suspect."
Tribe, supra note 39, at 1073 n.52. This response has a certain force, given that it seems
inconceivable that such a biomedical procedure would alter our belief that these groups
merit heightened scrutiny. Yet there are at least three reasons why Tribe's hypothetical is a
false rescue. First, we may recognize a group's reliance interest in the largesse we have
extended to it (or develop a reliance interest of our own in that largesse) such that we will
not recant a decision that we might make differently if confronted with it de novo.
Second, we might recognize that the social meanings that pre-date the technological
development will still have binding force after that development, such that, for example,
our understanding that an individual's sex is stable over time will endure as a prescriptive
maxim that sustains its own reality even when it has lost its descriptive necessity. Third,
what Tribe does for immutability may be done for the historical ability to vote and to
invisibility as well. While this might appear to be a strength, it actually reveals a weakness.
We may not demur when any one characteristic is withdrawn through this hypothetical
exercise, but at some point we will balk when enough of these bases for distinguishing
between groups currently deemed worthy and unworthy of heightened scrutiny are called
into question.
300. Halley, supra note 8, at 510.
301. Id. at 567.
302. See id. at 519-20.
303. See id. at 516.
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2. The Empathy-Failure Justification. - While cogent, Halley's critique
of the argument from immutability is incomplete, insofar as it only ad-
dresses the status theory of immutability. After considering and critiqu-
ing the status theory,304 Ely points out a more viable alternative:
[M]utability (or something like it) may be relevant in another
way as well, one that bears on the likelihood that the decision-
maker's ability to generalize will be distorted by his or her per-
spective. For example, it is at least arguable that the facts that
all of us once were young, and most expect one day to be fairly
old, should neutralize whatever suspicion we might otherwise
entertain respecting the multitude of laws (enacted by predomi-
nantly middle-aged legislatures) that comparatively advantage
those between, say, 21 and 65 vis-a-vis those who are younger or
older. It is not quite the same thing as immutability, of course:
alienage generally is an escapable condition, so in theory are
poverty and perhaps even gender. But nonetheless, and it is this
that seems more relevant, most legislators have never been
alien, poor, or female. They all were young, though, a fact that
may enhance their objectivity about just what the difference
entails.30
5
Ely thus tries to harmonize the immutability prong with his now-familiar
empathy-failure theory of the Clause. Under this formulation, immutabil-
ity stands as a proxy for groups that may be victims of empathy failure on
the part of the legislature. That a legislator might share a given charac-
teristic has the effect of psychologically internalizing the costs of any legis-
lation that will burden the group with that characteristic. If a characteris-
tic is immutable, however, the legislator who does not share that
characteristic is less likely to sympathize in this way.30
6
304. See Ely, supra note 37, at 150.
305. Id. at 160 (foomotes omitted).
306. An interesting comparison might be made with the theory of the "Original
position" outlined in John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (1971). Rawls's processual theory of
fairness also considers the dangers of empathy failure:
The idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any
principles agreed to will bejust. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural
justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific
contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and
natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume
that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged
to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.
Id. at 136-37 (footnotes omitted). Rawls, like Ely, realizes the danger that "the decision-
maker's ability to generalize will be distorted by his or her perspective." Ely, supra note 37,
at 160. He therefore creates the original position as a hypothetical situs in which
decisionmakers bracket the characteristics that might distort that perspective. Under Ely's
formulation, the immutability prong makes a less radical inquiry: it controls for distortions
of perspective not by asking decisionmakers hypothetically to surrender those
characteristics, but merely by asking them to be alert to their potentially distortive nature.
The underlying thrust of both positions, however, is similar-both press decisionmakers to
identify and compensate for characteristics that are known to lead to empathy failure.
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Unlike the status justification, this justification conforms to the em-
pathy-failure theory of the Equal Protection Clause. By doing so, it re-
solves the tension that some commentators have seen between the immu-
tability prong and the other two prongs of the test. This tension can be
characterized as one between the symmetrical and the asymmetrical treat-
ment of groups. Any immutable characteristic will generate at least two
groups: a group that will always have that characteristic and a group that
never will. The status justification of the immutability prong treats these
groups symmetrically-that is, if one group gets heightened scrutiny
under this prong, then the other group must as well. It can hardly do
otherwise, since it focuses on the injustice of burdening immutable status,
and each group is locked into an immutable status. Thus, because both
men and women are marked by the immutable characteristic of their
sex,307 discrimination leveled against men is just as impermissible as dis-
crimination leveled against women. But this symmetrical treatment of
groups conflicts with the asymmetrical treatment of groups under both
the history prong and the political-powerlessness prong. Faced with two
groups, both the history prong and the political-powerlessness prong di-
rect solicitude toward the more disempowered group.
When courts resolve the tension that inheres in the Equal Protection
test in favor of the symmetrical approach, things happen that seem at
odds with a Carolene Products reading of the Clause. Once a disfavored
group passes this prong, the favored group from which the immutable
characteristic separates it must also pass. This ultimately may lead both
favored and disfavored groups to get protection. As Justice Rehnquist
noted in his dissent in Craig v. Boren, the courts treat "gender classifica-
tion as a talisman which-without regard to the rights involved or the
persons affected-calls into effect a heavier burden ofjudicial review." 308
Justice Rehnquist found this puzzling in light of the fact that men did not
meet the indicia of a suspect class.309 Moreover, as seen in the affirmative
action context, measures purporting to help the disfavored groups often
will get struck down on the basis of symmetry.310 This leveling aspect of
307. Of course, as Judge Norris points out, gender is not strictly immutable. See
Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1347 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 875
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
308. 429 U.S. 190, 220 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
309. As Justice Rehnquist noted:
Most obviously unavailible to support any kind of special scrutiny in this case, is a
history or pattern of past discrimination, such as was relied on by the plurality in
Frontiero to support its invocation of strict scrutiny.' There is no suggestion in the
Court's opinion that males in this age group are in any way peculiarly
disadvantaged, subject to systematic discriminatory treatment, or otherwise in
need of special solicitude from the courts.
Id. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
310. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2114 (1995)
(holding that racial classifications imposed by federal law, even to remedy general past
discrimination, must be subjected to strict scrutiny); Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d
932, 940 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996) (reaching similar conclusion).
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the test is out of keeping with the Carolene Products-based theory of pro-
tecting disempowered groups.
The empathy-failure theory of immutability resolves this tension. In
-sharp contrast to the status theory, it treats the two groups differentiated
by an immutable characteristic in an asymmetrical way that is consistent
with the other two prongs. This is because, as Ely points out, immutabil-
ity per se is not the real issue, but rather serves as a proxy for empathy
failure.311 The inquiry, then, looks at how the group is situated in society
rather than merely at how the trait is situated in the individual. If empa-
thy failure is the driving concern, the treatment of the two groups need
not (and indeed, will not) be symmetrical. Thus, in the same example of
sex distinctions, men can be treated differently from women because
men are not likely to bear the brunt of such empathy failure. The empa-
thy-failure theory thus harmonizes the three prongs of the test.
The Court could look to this more coherent empathy-failure theory
of immutability to resuscitate its analysis. Yet this would be problematic.
Like the status theory, the empathy-failure theory of immutability is vul-
nerable, because immutability is a poor proxy for empathy failure. In
certain cases, mutability engenders more empathy failure than immuta-
bility, and homosexuality constitutes one of these cases. For this reason,
the immutability prong should be jettisoned from the Equal Protection
inquiry, unless another theory for its usefulness proves viable.
Ely concedes that immutable characteristics are not perfect proxies
for those traits that cause empathy failure: "It is not quite the same thing
as immutability, of course: alienage generally is an escapable condition,
so in theory are poverty and perhaps even gender."312 Moreover, Ely's
proffered evidence313 as to why mutability may occasion more empathy-
the instance of age-may not do as much work for him as it initially
seems. Ely is not alone in perceiving that age is a characteristic that does
not necessarily have to divide political groups.3 14 Yet even assuming that
this is true,3 15 it is not clear that it is the mutable aspect of age that is
311. See Ely, supra note 37, at 160.
312. Id.
313. See id. at 160 & n.82.
314. See Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination
Act of 1975, 89 Yale LJ. 27, 33 (1979) (noting that age is an attribute "that each of us
presumably has experienced or will experience; members of other age groups are surely
less likely to use age rules to oppress persons whose status they have shared or expect to
share") (citation omitted).
315. I think this is presumptively, but not necessarily, true. First, distinctions should
be made between ages that legislators have been and ages legislators will be. One could
argue that legislators will be more likely to impose burdens on those younger than they are
because those burdens are unlikely to affect them. More generally, legislators may not
experience sympathy for either group if the group appears unlike the group they were or
will be at that age. Viewing the moral decay in the younger generation, a legislator might
feel more alienated from that group than otherwise precisely because he will contrast
members of that generation with (his recollection of) the morally upstanding youth he was
at the same age. The fact that "he was there" may allow him a kind of moral authority that
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maintaining political empathy. After all, while age is a mutable factor,
aging is immutable, so there is a critical problem of initial definition. In
addition, it may be the universality of aging, rather than the mutability of
age, that makes it unlikely to generate empathy failure. Even immutable
characteristics will not create empathy failure if they are universal-think
about the need to breathe.
Indeed, there are certain situations in which mutability would seem
to occasion more empathy failure than immutability. The empathy-failure
theory rests on the correct and commonsensical premise that if a charac-
teristic is mutable, it is more likely to implicate the decisionmaker who
does not share that trait. It mistakenly assumes, however, that complicity
inevitably will lead to greater empathy. In some cases, it may indeed be
true that complicity leads to empathy-"He that is without sin among
you, let him first cast a stone,"3 16 Jesus says, and the adulteress is saved
because the townspeople are convicted by their own consciences of their
complicity in her sin. Yet in other cases, it is precisely because the deci-
sionmaker is implicated that he experiences a visceral antipathy toward a
group.
Class can exemplify a mutable characteristic that creates such antipa-
thy. As Barbara Ehrenreich notes, it is not in spite of, but because of, the
fact that the middle class of the 1960s saw their potential to change into
the poor that they needed to distance themselves from the lower class.317
Ehrenreich posits that the poor were "invented" in that period, by which
she means that they were demonized as "half-child, half-psychopath" in
order to represent what the middle class feared most in itself, a "softening
of character [and] lack of firm internal values."318 This invention served
the middle class because, with "the discovery of poverty, the threat could
be externalized: Someone else had succumbed to the softening effects of
the consumer culture."319 Difference defined was identity affirmed; by
projecting the repressed and feared potentialities of the self onto a per-
son describable as the other, the middle class self assuaged its own fears.
Yet those fears could be quieted only so long as the other remained the
other, so long as the commonalities due to mutability remained carefully
obscured by protestations of difference. One form that "protesting too
much" took was demonization and antipathy.
To show that homosexuality works in precisely this way, I look at how
immutability is deployed both by pro-gay and anti-gay activists. Whether
he would not choose to claim had the characteristic been one that he had not shared.
Similarly, if a legislator knows that current senior citizens are enjoying benefits-such as
Social Security-that he likely will not enjoy at the same age, he may feel more alienated
from them, especially if it is their enjoyment of the benefits that deprives him of his.
316. John 8:7.
317. See Barbara Ehrenreich, Fear of Falling- The Inner Life of the Middle Class
17-56 (1989).
318. Id. at 51.
319. Id. at 52-53.
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consciously or not, this debate about sexual orientation has been played
out on the body.320 By examining how pro-gay and anti-gay activists deal
with the body as a metaphor for what is fixed about us, we can show that
mutability increases empathy failure for gays while immutability decreases
it.
B. The Body
The body is a common symbol. We see it in many formulations:
body of water, body of knowledge, body politic, Congressional body, body
of evidence, eucharistic body. Indeed, the process of making metaphors
- is itself described as a process of making bodies, a process of embodiment
orfiguration. The unique metaphorical value of the body, as indicated in
these examples, lies in its distinctiveness and fixity. First, the body ap-
pears to be distinctive-there are clear boundaries between what is the
body and what is not the body. Second, it appears to be fixed-not per-
fectly, but reasonably, stable over time.
Unlike the pink triangle and the closet, the body has not been self-
consciously deployed as a gay symbol. Nevertheless, the body has been
relentlessly (albeit mostly unthinkingly) used as an emblem of the distinc-
tiveness and fixity of homosexuality for both pro-gay and anti-gay per-
sons. It is important to remember that this need not be so. As Carol
Warren has noted: "Logically, homosexuality refers to a type of behavior
rather than to a condition. However, homosexuals are viewed generally
not just as people who do a certain type of thing, but, rather, as people
who are a certain type of being.'8 21 While every time we speak of a per-
son as a "homosexual" the body undergirds that statement, there are
more specific demarcations as well. Gay bashers deploy the gay body as
an embodiment of homosexuality, like an allegorical figure in a medieval
morality play, for the purposes of wreaking violence upon it. Pro-gay ac-
tivists also deploy the gay body, but to the opposite effect. By emphasiz-
ing the body as an emblem of what is fixed about an individual, they
emphasize the immutability and, therefore, the moral neutrality of sexual
orientation.
1. HomophobicDeployments of the Body. - Kendall Thomas notes that a
distinctive aspect of homophobia is the frequency and severity of the vio-
lence it exacts on homosexual bodies. Shortly after Bowers was decided, a
study commissioned by the National Institute of Justice noted that gay
men and women "'are probably the most frequent victims [of hate vio-
lence today].'"322 A NewYork City hospital reported that "'attacks against
320. See Halley, supra note 8, at 516-17 (describing pro-gay and anti-gay deployments
of immutability).
321. Carol Warren, Homosexuality and Stigma, in Homosexual Behavior: A Modem
Reappraisal 123, 124 (Judd Marmor ed., 1980).
322. Thomas, supra note 2, at 1464 (quoting Peter Finn & Taylor McNeil, The
Response of the Criminal Justice System to Bias Crime: An Exploratory Review 2 (1987))
(alteration in original). Thomas also notes that:
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gay men were the most heinous and brutal ... encountered,'" and "fre-
quently involved torture, cutting, mutilation, and beating, and showed
the absolute intent to rub out the human being because of his [sexual]
orientation."3 23 Thomas further notes that this violence often does not
stop at killing the victim:
One study of homophobic murders found that in most in-
stances, the victims were not just killed, but were "more apt to
be stabbed a dozen or more times, mutilated, and strangled,....
[and] [i] n a number of instances .... stabbed or mutilated even
after being fatally shot." The characteristic "overkill and exces-
sive mutilation" of attacks on gay men and lesbians suggest that
this is a species of violence whose form conveys its expressive
content: the medium is the message.
324
One might expect that the advent of AIDS would force such expressions
of violence to take less bodily invasive forms because of the risk of infec-
tion, but statistical evidence has shown a positive correlation between
AIDS and a rise in physical violence against gays.sas This homophobic
obsession with violating the body through direct bodily contact makes it
seem as if the body is one of the most useful means through which to
attack homosexuality. The lesson of the body that needs to be stabbed
even after such stabbings have rendered it a corpse is that homosexuality,
like a disease, may leave its traces in the body even after life has passed
out of it; the lesson of bashings which risk the basher's lives for the privi-
lege of bodily violence is that this risk is trumped by the literal need for
homosexual blood.
This evidence of the relationship between homophobia and the ho-
mosexual body might seem to support the contention that empathy fail-
[I]t is estimated that a full 80% of bias violence against gay men and women is
never reported to the police. This under-reporting is not surprising, since victims
of anti-gay violence have reason to be fearful that the response of state and local
officials may be unsympathetic or openly hostile, or that the disclosure of their
sexual orientation may lead to further discrimination.
Id. at 1464 (citation omitted).
323. Id. at 1463 (quoting National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Violence,
Victimization and Defamation in 1988, at 8 (1988)) (alteration in original).
324. Id. at 1466-67 (citing Gary D. Comstock, Violence Against Lesbians and Gay
Men 46-47 (1991) (quoting Brian Miller & Laud Humphreys, Lifestyles and Violence:
Homosexual Victims of Assault and Murder, 3 Qualitative Soc. 169, 179 (1980)))
(alteration in original).
325. As Sedgwick notes:
A similar phenomenon, also too terrible to be noted as a mere irony, is how
evenly our culture's phobia about HIV-positive blood is kept pace with by its rage
for keeping that dangerous blood in broad, continuous circulation.... [M]ost
immediately and pervasively [this] is evidenced in the literal bloodbaths that
seem to make the point of the AIDS-related resurgence in violent bashings of
gays-which, unlike the gun violence otherwise ubiquitous in this culture, are
characteristically done with two-by-fours, baseball bats, and fists, in the most
literal-minded conceivable form of body-fluid contact.
Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 129.
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ure is related to immutability, for the insistence of gay-bashers on the
body implies that homosexuality has a fixed seat in the body. But these
are also the persons who are least likely to adhere to the immutability
theory of homosexuality, given that this theory exonerates gays from
moral culpability.326 The fixity that the body ensures for homophobes,
therefore, is less immutability than what Foucault has called a "perverse
implantation."327 Under Foucault's theory, homosexuality is implanted
in a body in a stable enough way to provide an embodiment that may be
attacked, but does not permeate the individual so deeply as to provide
the absolution of immutability.
Perverse implantation is a complicated act of social legerdemain, in-
sofar as it must simultaneously assert that something is neither completely
mutable nor immutable: a status at once defined by a choice to engage
in certain conduct, but that also stands apart from that conduct. This
legerdemain is at work in the odd ability of a community to distinguish
between its designated homosexuals and those engaged in homosexual
acts. In the Nazi death camps, homosexuals were marked by pink trian-
gles; many guards, however, engaged in homosexual acts without being
branded in this way.3 28 Similarly, in the military, the single statement "I
am a homosexual" stands as the equivalent of the pink triangle insofar as
it marks a person as homosexual even in the absence of known homosex-
ual conduct,32 9 while, at the same time, a person can perform homosex-
ual acts that do not result in the nomenclature of homosexual being at-
326. See Halley, supra note 8, at 518 n.62 (citing surveys that note correlation
between belief that homosexuality is immutable and disapproval of discrimination against
gays).
327. Michel Foucault, 1 The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Robert Hurley
trans., 1990). The homosexual body as a metaphor has been explored through Foucault's
concept of the perverse implantation. As Foucault frames it in a celebrated quotation,
"homosexual" as an adjective was used to modify acts, not persons, until the late
nineteenth century, when a paradigm shift occurred:
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of
them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a
morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology.
Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It
was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their
insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and
body because it was a secret that always gave itself away ... Homosexuality
appeared as one of the forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the
practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the
soul. The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a
species.
Id. at 43.
328. See Plant, supra note 121, at 169-71.
329. See Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rev'd en banc sub nom. Stefan v.
Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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tached to that person.330 We clearly need to have people we can call
homosexuals, even when the conduct that ostensibly defines them as such
proves under- and over-inclusive as a means of distinguishing them.
It is imperative to recognize, however, that while perverse implanta-
tion may seem to have elements of both mutability and immutability, the
driving force behind it lies in the mutability of homosexuality. Iris Marion
Young notes: "Homophobia is one of the deepest fears of difference pre-
cisely because the border between gay and straight is constructed as the
most permeable; anyone at all can become gay, especially me, so the only
way to defend my identity is to turn away with irrational disgust. '3 31 To
recognize that one might be gay is an incitement to engage in the form of
protesting too much that is the implantation of homosexuality in an-
other. As argued earlier, the closeted homosexual is likely to be the one
who most vehemently needs to distance himself from homosexuality.
How better for him to break the continuum between homosexuality and
heterosexuality than by dichotomizing it into homosexual and heterosex-
ual bodies?3
32
Mutability explains the strange disjunction between status and con-
duct noted above. For if the need to implant homosexuality arises out of
the need to create an other out of the ostensibly exorcised possibilities
within the homophobic self, then it stands to reason that those possibili-
ties (insofar as they cannot truly be exorcised) can find fuller expression
once that other is created. The existence of a branded homosexual or an
"avowed" homosexual makes it easier for "straights" to engage in homo-
sexual conduct, because it transforms a distinction of degree (of homo-
sexual conduct) into a distinction in kind (between gay and straight bod-
ies demarcated by the boundaries of skin).333 The constitution of
830. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gay Legal Narratives, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 607,
627-29 (providing examples of homoerotic conduct in the military that does not result in
soldiers being labeled homosexual).
331. Iris M.YoungJustice and the Politics of Difference 146 (1990). The fact that the
act of sex traditionally has been conceived as one in which bodies are merged heightens
the perceived threat of the homosexual body. The angels in Paradise Lost are contrasted to
mere mortals because for them sexual congress is one of perfect blending. John Milton,
Paradise Lost, Book VIII, II. 626-29 ("if Spirits embrace, / Total they mix, union of pure
and pure / Desiring, nor restrained conveyance need / As flesh to mix with flesh, or soul
with soul"). Yet even in crude mortal acts of sex, the boundaries of the body are
temporarily extended in a way that may be unique in human experience. Sexual
orientation, because it has no visible markers, may be called into question precisely
through this act of merging. The putative heterosexual who has sex with a homosexual (of
the same sex) may, through that act of merging, be "infected" or "revealed" as a
homosexual himself.
332. Indeed, the practice of confining the homosexual in the closet merely mimics
and completes the antecedent practice of confining homosexuality in the body of the
other.
333. See Eskridge, supra note 330, at 626-29 (discussing how the military's labeling of
homosexuals as incompatible with military service allows soldiers to engage in homosexual
conduct while denying its homoerotic dimensions). This transformation will always be an
unstable one because it attempts to convert a continuum into a binary. This is perhaps why
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homosexuals is also the constitution of heterosexuals,334 heterosexuals
now liberated to engage in homosocial or homoerotic acts that fall short
the word "queer" is the best word for the "homosexual" half of the binary. Sedgwick notes
that:
The word "queer" itself means across-it comes from the Indo-European root
twerkw, which also yields the German quer (transverse), Latin torquere (to twist),
English athwart .... The queer of these essays is transitive-multiply transitive.
The immemorial current that queer represents is antiseparatist as it is
antiassimilationist. Keenly, it is relational, and strange.
Sedgwick, Foreword: T Times, in Tendencies, supra note 153, at xi, xii. The word "queer"
thus denotes a category on one side of a line, but it is the kind of category that will always
be reaching across that line to call into question the dividing practice that drew it.
334. The dividing practice is usually unconscious; the statement: "She is a
homosexual" usually is not perceived by the speaker as a manner of saying: "I, on the
other hand, am heterosexual." There is, of course, a reason for this blindness, in that the
need for "the homosexual" rests in a desire to defend the separation of homosexual and
heterosexual from close scrutiny.
This tacit dividing practice is committed by communities in addition to individuals.
For example, in Rowland v. Mad River Local School District, Montgomery County guidance
counselor Marjorie Rowland was fired for a declaration of her bisexuality precipitated in
part by her counseling two homosexual students. See 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984).
The sexuality of those who would dismiss her, of course, was never explicitly in question.
Yet the act of silencing her bisexuality needs to be read, asJanet Halley has read it, as an
act of self-fashioning on the part of the community:
Both Rowland and the town of Mad River were engaged in a diacritical struggle-
one in which the self-definition of both players was at stake. This should make
visible what otherwise should remain hidden-Rowland's discursive exertions
were made in interaction with a class of heterosexuals also in the process of self-
constitution.
Janet E. Halley, The Construction of Heterosexuality, in Fear of a Queer Planet 82, 85
(Michael Warner ed., 1993). The appellate court, in upholding the school district's
termination of Rowland, rejected her Equal Protection claim by stating that she "sought to
prevail on her equal protection claim without any showing that heterosexual school
employees in situations similar to hers have been, or would be, treated differently for
making their personal sexual preferences the topic of comment and discussion in the high
school community." Rowland, 730 F.2d at 451-52. In so stating, the court showed its
complicity in occluding the relationship between the self-constitution of the community as
straight and the constitution of Marjorie Rowland as deviant. The court implies that there
would have been no difference between the furor surrounding Rowland's declaration of
bisexuality and the reaction to a hypothetical disclosure of heterosexuality. Yet it is
precisely the point of the case, as Justices Brennan and Marshall pointed out in their
dissent from the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, that Rowland's disclosure could not
have been the topic of "comment and discussion" but for the fact of her bisexuality. 470
U.S. at 1009 (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Rowland revealed her
bisexuality in response to the question of why she was in a good mood on a particular day
by responding that she was having a romantic relationship with another woman. See id. at
1009 n.11. She could not have caused the same stir by revealing her heterosexuality on
that occasion because she was incapable of revealing her heterosexuality, as her audience
was a community committed to the presumption that all of its members were heterosexual.
The intrusion of the inconvenient fact of her bisexuality called that expectation into
question. The expulsion of Rowland from the school community counteracted that
intrusion. The sanction placed on Rowland was not a judgment rendered by an inert,
objective community but a response made by a community in need of reasserting its own
normative heterosexuality.
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of their being branded as homosexual themselves. 33 5 The homophobic
fear that drove the implantation was that the heterosexual would not be
able to resist becoming a homosexual; ironically, that fear finds fuller
expression once it has been overtly dispelled.
Further evidence that homosexuality engenders anxiety because of
its mutability can be adduced by comparing homosexuals to other sexual
outliers. We rely on the body to organize our social life by ensuring the
fixity of certain traits. One of these traits is obviously sex, whose binary
division the body appears to accommodate readily. A corollary of the
axiom of "one body, one person" appears to be "one body, one sex." The
social interest in this corollary reveals itself in the vehemence with which
sexual deviance is defined and regulated by it. What even a cursory re-
view of three sex-based outliers-transsexuals, transvestites, and homo-
sexuals-shows is the strong interest in retaining that premise. Transsex-
uals violate the corollary by surgically changing from one sex to another,
obtaining special knowledge of how it is to operate both as a man and a
woman in society.33 6 Transvestites do so by using sartorial means to ob-
tain the same knowledge. 33 7 And homosexuals do so by having the bio-
logical traits of one sex and the sexual preferences traditionally associ-
ated with the opposite one.
33 8
While all of these sex-based outliers violate the "one body, one sex"
corollary, they are not perceived to violate them equally because the body
itself constrains some transgressions more than others. Comparing
transsexuals and transvestites, Judge Posner notes that:
[W] e should expect the converted transsexual to engender less
shock than the transvestite. (I believe this is true.) Transsexual
conversion, requiring as it does surgical and hormonal treat-
ments, is not facile impersonation. It is painful, time-consum-
ing, expensive-and irreversible. Transsexualism does not im-
ply that we can change our sexual identity by changing our
clothes.3
39
Transsexualism threatens settled sexual expectations less because it asks
more of the body of the person who engages in it. The painful and irre-
versible dues that must be paid for such a subversion deter all but those
335. See Eskridge, supra note 330, at 626-29.
336. The transgressively plural knowledge of transsexuals has been dubbed the
"Tiresias syndrome." See Alison Baker, Better Be Ready 'Bout Half Past Eight, The Atlantic
Monthly, Jan. 1993, at 93, 95-96, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. It is
named after the classical figure who changed from a man to a woman and back again. See
Ovid, Metamorphoses 73-74 (Horace Gregory trans., 1958).
337. See generally Marjorie Garber, Vested Interests: Cross-Dressing & Cultural
Anxiety 128-61 (1992) (exploring the relationship between transvestism and gender
construction as distinct from homosexuality).
338. Hence the conception of the homosexual (which actually preceded our
contemporary notions of homosexuality) as an invert. See Sedgwick, supra note 131, at 87
(discussing conception of invert as a man's soul trapped in a woman's body, or vice versa).
339. Posner, supra note 17, at 27.
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who have good reasons to engage in it. Transsexualism achieves a kind of
moral seriousness because it cannot be a matter of mere play.
In sharp contrast, transvestites are more threatening because the
body provides no constraint that prevents a transvestite from confusing
sex boundaries. Because the body does not exact such dues from the
transvestite, it falls on society to impose them artificially. Stephen
Greenblatt gives a wonderful example of how a seventeenth-century court
resolved the "transvestite problem":
This was the case of Thomasine Hall, born in the 1570s near
Newcastle upon Tyne. At age twelve, Thomasine was sent by her
mother to live with an aunt in London, where she remained for
ten years. At the time of the Cddiz action, we are told, she cut
her hair, renamed herself Thomas, and enlisted as a soldier;
then returned to London and resumed her life as a woman;
then abandoned her needlework again and sailed as a man to
Virginia; then became Thomasine once more and served as a
chambermaid. Hauled before the Council and General Court
of Virginia in 1629 and asked "why hee went in weomans
aparell," Thomasine gave the unforgettable, if enigmatic, reply,
"I goe in weomans aparell to gett a bitt for my Cat." The judges
evidently felt that unresolved sexual ambiguity was more tolera-
ble than dizzying sexual metamorphosis; they preferred a figure
frozen in acknowledged androgyny to one who passed fluidly
and unpredictably from one state to another. Accordingly, they
ordered that it be published that Hall "is a man and a woman,"
and they insisted upon this doubleness in the clothes they re-
quired him to wear: "Hee shall goe Clothed in mans apparell,
only his head to bee attired in a Cyse and Croscloth [?] with an
Apron before him."340
What is interesting about the story is that the court did not seem to find
Thomas(ine)'s androgyny as disturbing as her protean ability to shuttle
back and forth between the male and the female identity. While the story
may have only limited relevance insofar as it is an example (and an anom-
alous one)' 41 of a colonial treatment of transvestism, it does dovetail with
Posner's hypothesis that what may be disturbing about transvestites is the
fact that their "dizzying sexual metamorphosis" is simply too "fluid" and
"unpredictabl [e] ."342
In this regard, the homosexual is more like the transvestite than the
transsexual. Posner notes that the shock occasioned by transvestism and
.male homosexuality both arise in part out of their protean nature:
[T]he shock value of transvestism and of effeminate or
hypermasculine male homosexuality is related to our deep-
340. Stephen Greenblatt, Shakespearean Negotiations 178 n.13 (1988) (citing
Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-32, 1670-76, at 195
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seated anxiety about disguises. To maneuver effectively in the
world, we need to assume that people and things have stable
identities. The idea that someone might change his identity by
changing his clothes violates this assumption. The method is
too facile. It is inconsistent with stable expectations. It is as if an
old man could pass himself off as young just by dressing like a
child.
3 43
Because the body does not provide any visible markers of homosexuality,
it does not police that identity.344 The homosexual body therefore must
be constructed through the process of implantation; just as the colonial
court sought to "freeze" Hall, the attempt to police homosexuals may
arise from the same desire to freeze the homosexual in a given, identifi-
able body.
2. Pro-Gay Deployment of the Body. - The pro-gay position that homo-
sexuality is immutable is a pre-emptive strike against this argument-it
contends that society need not artificially winnow gay from straight be-
cause biology has already done so naturally. The pro-gay deployment of
the homosexual body is most obvious in medical studies purporting to
find different neurobiological factors relating to sexual differentiation
that may explain homosexuality. Such studies include those investigating
the pattern of cognitive skills,-45 hemispheric patterns of electrophysio-
logical activation in male homosexuals, 34 and functional cerebral asym-
343. Posner, supra note 17, at 26.
344. In comparing transvestites to effeminate and hypermasculine male homosexuals,
Posner implies that the body may be refashioned as if it were a kind of clothing. It is
important to note that this aspect of the body calls into question its use as a signifier for
immutability. Posner is correct: many gays and lesbians do appear to use the body in
addition to their clothing as a means of "gender bending"-that is, exaggerating gender
characteristics traditionally ascribed to their sex (butch man or femme lesbian) or
appropriating the gender characteristics traditionally ascribed to the opposite sex
(effeminate man or butch lesbian). See, e.g., Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender
Insubordination, in Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories 13, 18-26 (Diane Fuss
ed., 1991); Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation:
The Effeminate Man in the Law and FeministJurisprudence, 105 Yale LJ. 1, 20-21 (1995);
Sue-Ellen Case, Toward a Butch-Femme Aesthetic, in Making a Spectacle: Feminist Essays
on Contemporary Women's Theatre, 282, 294-300 (Lynda Hart ed., 1992). A
hypermasculine gay man may deploy his muscularity as well as his chaps as part of his self-
fashioning in the same way that a butch lesbian may use her body hair and combat boots in
hers. But if a body may be doffed and donned like clothing, how accurate is it to use it as a
proxy for what is fixed about us? Indeed, as Posner indicates, part of the aversion to gays
and lesbians may arise from the fact that their deployment of the body calls into question
stable social orderings that are implicitly predicated on the assumption that the body is (or
should be) immune to such reformulations.
345. See Cheryl M. McCormick & Sandra F. Witelson, A Cognitive Profile of
Homosexual Men Compared to Heterosexual Men and Women, 16
Psychoneuroendocrinology 459, 466 (1991) (discussing correlation between sexual
orientation and cognitive abilities).
346. See Joel E. Alexander & Kenneth J. Sufka, Cerebral Lateralization in
Homosexual Males: A Preliminary EEG Investigation, 15 Int'lJ. of Psychophysiology 269,
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metry.347 Other studies adduce more ocular proof in the fingerable
structures of physiology, stating that differences between gays and
straights can be found in the anterior commissure of the human brain,
48
in the hypothalamic structure of the brain,3 49 in DNA markers on the X
chromosome,350 and in the dermal ridges on fingerprints. 3,5 While the
anti-gay deployment of the body offers up its blood, the pro-gay deploy-
ment offers up its chromosomes. If homosexuality is immutably part of
my body but not yours, then the border between homosexuality and het-
erosexuality becomes the stable one of my skin, which divides what is me
from what is not me.
It is thus no accident that when Nussbaum testified as a pro-gay ex-
pert witness before the district court in Evans v. Romer,3 52 she focused on
Aristophanes's story from the Symposium during the "very short time" she
had the ear of the Colorado district court.353 Aristophanes gives an ac-
count of how men and women were originally joined at the back. What
Aristophanes calls the "male sex" is thus two conjoined men; what he calls
the "female sex" is two conjoined women, and what he calls the "third" or
"Androgynous" sex is a conjoined woman and man. Broken apart for
their hubris, both men and women go about searching for their lost
other halves. Those who belonged to the "male sex" and "female sex" are
thus attempting to consummate homosexual relationships, while those
who belonged to the "Androgynous sex" are thus attempting to consum-
mate heterosexual ones.3
54
While the story works on many levels as a defense of homosexual
love,355 its primary contribution may be its ability to quiet the homo-
273 (1993) (discussing variable EEG activity between homosexual and heterosexual
populations).
347. See Cheryl M. McCormick & Sandra F. Witelson, Functional Cerebral Asymmetry
and Sexual Orientation in Men and Women, 108 Behavioral Neuroscience 525, 527-29
(1994) (discussing study of cerebral asymmetry in gay subjects).
348. See Simon LeVay, The Sexual Brain 123 (1993).
349. See Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between
Heterosexual and Homosexual Men, 253 Science 1034, 1034 (1991).
350. See Dean H. Hamer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 Science 321, 321 (1993).
351. SeeJA.Y. Hall & D. Kimura, Dermatoglyphic Asymmetry and Sexual Orientation
in Men, 108 Behavioral Neuroscience 1203, 1203 (1994).
352. 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
353. See Nussbaum, supra note 127, at 1517.
354. See Plato, Symposium 30-34 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1985).
355. For example, the heterosexual is seen to have its genesis in the "Androgynous
sex which partook of male and female in name and appearance, though surviving now only
as a name and a name of abuse." Aristophanes's story thus traces the group most
privileged by extant norms of sexual orientation-the heterosexual-back to an identity
that would be "abused" under the same norms-the Androgyne or hermaphrodite. The
story also traces the gay man and the lesbian back to sexes that extant sex norms have
deemed more normal-the "male sex" and the "female sex" respectively. Moreover, by
positing a symmetry between bodies attached to the same sex and bodies attached to the
opposite sex, Aristophanes suggests a symmetry in the legitimate ends of those bodies.
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phobic imagination by positing the immutability of homosexuality. One
of the reasons why the reader might be more likely to see how gays might
be similarly situated to straights through this story is precisely that those
identities are held fundamentally distinct. By positing a scenario in
which each of us looks for his or her lost other half (which must be either
man or woman) the story makes sexual orientation into the same kind of
stable binary as sex.
Moving from the prestige discourse of mythology to that of science,
pro-gay advocates have retold the Symposium story in the medical context.
Although they take place in a different genre, these studies-like
Nussbaum's use of Aristophanes-show that gays are more like transsexu-
als than transvestites, and that the life project of the homosexual is not
one of play but of moral seriousness.
3 56
This discussion shows that both pro-gay immutability theory and anti-
gay implantation theory support the idea that mutability rather than im-
mutability causes empathy failure in the context of gays. The case of gays
thus inverts the logic of Ely's rule. Just as Ackerman showed that "dis-
creteness" and "insularity" could be poor proxies for a group's political
powerlessness, 3 57 this analysis shows that "immutability" can be a poor
proxy for a group's potential to suffer empathy failure. Just as he made
the argument that "anonym[ity]" and "diffuse [ness]" could occasion
more political powerlessness than "discreteness" and "insularity,"358 this
analysis shows that "mutability" can occasion more empathy failure that
"immutability."
This illuminates an important difference between this prong and the
other two prongs. Courts should deepen their inquiries into the history
of discrimination prong and the political powerlessness prong, but need
not question the legitimacy of these prongs. In contrast, courts should
reject the immutability prong as illegitimate because it is based on the
incorrect assumption that immutability is necessarily linked to empathy
failure.
V. CONCLUSION
I began this Article with an anecdote about a judge who asked me
what the pink triangle was. There are many reasons why the encounter
remains vivid. First, I was struck that those who are empowered to regu-
late an identity are not necessarily those who know even its fundamental
characteristics. Second, I was shocked by my own deference, my own in-
sistence on interpreting all ambiguity in favor of the judge. These reac-
tions, I think, are the occasion for much of the anger and sadness I feel
356. See supra notes 345-351 and accompanying text. To claim that pro-gay
deployment of immutability results in empathy gains is not to express agreement with the
claim that homosexuality is immutable. I remain agnostic on that issue.
357. See Ackerman, supra note 40, at 723-24.
358. Id.
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when I revisit that interchange. Yet I think that there must be another
reason why that interchange remains unforgettable. Ultimately, what
stays with me about my conversation with the judge is his ability to admit
his ignorance. When I mentioned the pink triangle to him, he asked
what it was. When I told him, he said he had not known what I told him.
Granted, this interchange could have been a willful assertion of his privi-
lege of unknowing, or an unconscious assertion of his insensitivity to the
fact that he should have known the meaning of the symbol. But it did not
feel like that. The blankness of his face when he said "I didn't know that"
seemed like a blankness on which someone might write something.
The double meaning of my title should by now be apparent. First, I
have argued that symbols give a thicker response to the doctrinal inquiry
relating to suspect scrutiny than more traditional modes of analysis. Sec-
ond, I have recognized that the use of these symbols in legal discussion is
itself suspect. I have thus joined a marginalized group (gays) and a
marginalized discourse (literature) to challenge an existing normative
framework that has traditionally misunderstood both.
I hope the alliance proves fruitful. Courts, including the Supreme
Court, will consider the question of whether gays deserve heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause in the near future. When
they do, I hope they ask the question, "What might it be like to be gay?" I
am convinced that this is the question that underlies the spirit of the
Equal Protection Clause, a spirit of attempting to inhabit the worlds of
distant others. It was the question I heard the judge asking, and I hope
the courts ask it with the same openness and desire to know-'Vhat is
the pink triangle?" They will ask again and we will answer.
1834 [Vol. 96:1753
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